The Process of Marriage Equality by Blackman, Josh & Wasserman, Howard M.
Florida International University College of Law 
eCollections 
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
2015 
The Process of Marriage Equality 
Josh Blackman 
South Texas College of Law 
Howard M. Wasserman 
Florida International University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Josh Blackman and Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality , 43 Hastings Const. L.Q. 
243 (2015). 
Available at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications/202 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at eCollections. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information, 
please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu. 
 [243] 
The Process of Marriage Equality 
by JOSH BLACKMAN* & HOWARD M. WASSERMAN* 
Introduction 
The two-year race from United States v. Windsor1 to Obergefell v. 
Hodges2 produced3 an inconceivable sea change in substantive 
constitutional law.  But just as important as the right to marry was the 
process through which that right was vindicated.  Marriage equality 
was established via parallel litigation in thirty-seven states covering 
eight federal circuits.  And that litigation triggered a complex two-
year interaction of the doctrine governing injunctions, precedent, 
stays, concurrent state-federal litigation, and abstention. 
Many books and articles have and will be written about the 
marriage equality movement’s rapid success.4  This is not one of 
those.  Instead, as the title suggests, this article tells the story of the 
process of marriage equality and how four aspects of federal 
procedure and jurisdiction doctrine both enabled and frustrated 
marriage equality’s advance to the Supreme Court. 
 
*   Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law, Houston.  
*   Professor of Law, FIU College of Law.  The authors thank William Baude, 
Joshua Block, Brooke Coleman, Amanda Frost, Douglas Laycock, David Marcus, James 
Pfander, Richard Re, Martin Redish, and Kevin Walsh for comments and suggestions.  
 1.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 2.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 3.  Coincidentally or otherwise, Obergefell was decided on June 26, 2015, two years 
to the day after the Court issued Windsor and twelve years to the day of Lawrence v. 
Texas—all decisions authored by Justice Kennedy.  During arguments in Obergefell, 
Kennedy pointed out that the twelve-year period since Lawrence in 2003 was roughly 
comparable to the thirteen years that elapsed between Brown and Loving v. Virginia.  See 
argument in Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, at 6–7 (question from Justice Kennedy), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-556q1_6k47.pdf. 
 4.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, 
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2014); KENJI YOSHINO: 
SPEAK NOW: MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL (2015); Michael J. Perry, Obergefell v. 
Hodges: An Imagined Opinion, Concurring in the Judgment, http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2624022; Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph of Gay Marriage and the Failure of 
Constitutional Law, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
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The first procedural issue relates to the scope of the injunctions 
barring enforcement of the state marriage bans.  Courts, parties, and 
the public struggled to understand and define who was obligated to 
abide by any injunction and who was guaranteed a marriage license 
or recognition of a marriage under it.  The answer involves a complex 
interaction among the concepts of judgments, injunctions, precedent, 
and departmentalism in constitutional interpretation.  A court’s 
judgment and injunction compel conduct by the named defendants as 
to the named plaintiffs—in other words, only the named defendant 
officials had to issue marriage licenses to the named plaintiff couples.5  
As to everyone else, the judgment functions merely as precedent—
persuasive when from the district court, binding regionally when from 
the court of appeals, and binding nationally when from the Supreme 
Court.6  And precedent, whether binding or persuasive, does not 
directly control real-world conduct.  It instead must be put into effect 
by a court issuing a new judgment and injunction compelling new 
named defendants to issue licenses to new named couples. 
What we actually saw during the marriage equality litigation was 
widespread voluntary compliance by nonparty officials as to nonparty 
couples—once an injunction compelled marriage licenses as to some 
same-sex couples, officials began issuing licenses to other similarly 
situated couples—even though they were not required to do so by a 
court order.  As a result, most courts never had to grapple with the 
proper scope of the injunction, the meaningful differences between 
judgment and precedent, the different effects of persuasive or binding 
precedent, or the limits on attempts to enforce injunctions.  One 
exception, which one of us previously explored, was Alabama, where 
many officials refused to voluntarily comply with persuasive district 
court precedent.7  That refusal, which was procedurally proper, 
prompted unfortunate and inaccurate comparisons to George 
Wallace and massive resistance to Brown and desegregation.  
Problems over the scope of injunctions continued following 
Obergefell, as parties and courts struggled to understand the effect of 
 
 5.  DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 217 (Concise 4th ed. 
2012); see also David W. Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 27–28), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id= 2565988. 
 6.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party 
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1339–40 (2000); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and 
Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 924 n.31 (2011). 
 7.  Howard M. Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: Judicial Process and the Last Stand 
Against Marriage Equality in the Land of George Wallace, 110 NW. L. REV. ONLINE 1 
(2015), http://www.northwesternlawreview.org/online/crazy-in-alabama. 
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the Court’s decision, how to implement it, how it affected pending 
litigation, and how it applied to new state officials.  These struggles 
culminated in the infamous events in Rowan County, Kentucky, 
where a county clerk was held in contempt and jailed for failing to 
obey a district court injunction compelling issuance of marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.8 
The second procedural issue involves the pivotal but 
underappreciated role of stays pending appeal.  Following Windsor, 
federal district courts in more than two dozen states enjoined 
enforcement of bans on same-sex marriage.  Judges then had to 
decide whether to stay those injunctions pending review.  An 
injunction alters the status quo.  A stay of an injunction suspends that 
alteration,9 while refusing to grant a stay allows that altered status 
quo to take immediate, and perhaps irreparable, effect.  Here, the 
altered status quo meant issuance of hundreds or thousands of 
marriage licenses.  In several cases, denial of stays triggered 
simultaneous races to the courts of appeals and to the altars, with 
couples trying to obtain marriage licenses before a higher court 
intervened.  Many local licensing officials promptly (and eagerly) 
issued licenses, without waiting for an Article III-final judgment.  
State attorneys general frantically—and sometimes prematurely—
sought emergency stays from the courts of appeals and the Supreme 
Court. 
Exacerbating these scrambles were shifting signals from the 
Supreme Court through unexplained stays, denials of stays, and 
denials of certiorari.  William Baude identifies these orders as part of 
the Court’s “shadow docket.”10  Litigants and lower courts in the 
marriage equality cases struggled to understand and respond to those 
signals.  The Court seemingly changed its stance in ways affecting the 
propriety of stays four times.  First, in early 2014 the Justices 
intervened to stay two judgments from the District of Utah, signaling 
that injunctions should be stayed pending review.  Some lower courts 
followed this signal, others distinguished it, and others simply ignored 
it.  Second, in October 2014, the Court denied petitions for certiorari 
from five states in three circuits, establishing Article III-final 
judgments invalidating their marriage bans.  From that point forward, 
most district courts ceased staying injunctions, as did the Supreme 
 
 8.  See infra notes 128–34 and accompanying text. 
 9.  Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2009). 
 10.  William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. OF 
LAW & LIBERTY. 1, 3, 5 (2015). 
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Court, often over the dissent of Justices Scalia and Thomas.  The final 
period began in January 2015, when the Court granted certiorari on 
the petition from the Sixth Circuit case that became Obergefell.  
District courts differed over the significance of the grant and how to 
resolve their pending cases with a final Supreme Court decision 
looming. 
The third procedural issue concerned attempts by state attorneys 
general to move marriage cases out of federal court.  In three states, 
officials initiated mandamus proceedings in the state Supreme Court 
for the express purpose of prohibiting local officials from issuing 
marriage licenses based solely on voluntary compliance with federal 
precedent.11  State officials then argued to the federal courts that the 
pending mandamus actions stripped their jurisdiction or required 
abstention in deference to the pending state actions they had 
initiated.  Acting correctly, federal courts forcefully rejected these 
arguments.12 
Scholars will spend many years and pages exploring the rapid 
establishment of the constitutional right to marriage equality.  This 
paper contributes to that conversation by focusing, for the first time, 
on the critical, but underdeveloped, procedural nuances of high-
stakes constitutional and civil rights litigation.  We offer both a 
detailed historical record of the litigation that produced this 
constitutional watershed, as well as a better understanding of how 
procedure, jurisdiction, and the judicial process affect future 
constitutional litigation.  The results in the marriage litigation were 
decidedly mixed.  Courts and litigants often got procedure very wrong 
in a way that confused, extended, and raised the cost of litigation and 
that contributed to widespread public misunderstanding of these 
issues. 
We proceed in three parts.  Part I clarifies the proper scope of 
injunctions, highlights the confusion between judgments and 
precedent, and explores how that confusion affected the marriage 
equality litigation.  Part II assesses how lower courts handled stays 
pending review, particularly in light of the signals from the Supreme 
Court’s grants and denials of stays and grants and denials of 
certiorari.  Part III analyzes state efforts to preempt federal litigation 
 
 11. Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *43 (Ala. 
Mar. 3, 2015), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015); State ex rel. 
Schmidt v. Moriarty, No. 112, 590 (Kan. Oct. 10, 2014); State ex rel. Wilson v. Condon, 764 
S.E. 2d 247 (S.C. 2014).   
 12.  Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1185 (D. Kan. 2014); Condon v. Haley, 21 F. 
Supp. 3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014).   
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through parallel state litigation, and how they offered unsuccessful 
arguments about jurisdiction and abstention. 
I. Framing the Litigation and Framing the Injunction 
On June 27, 2013, (the day after Windsor), marriage equality had 
been established by legislation, popular enactment, or state court 
judgment in thirteen states.  What followed in the next two years was 
a massive campaign of parallel constitutional litigation challenging 
virtually identical same-sex marriage bans in thirty-seven states and 
two territories, covering nine federal circuits. 
Challenges to marriage bans typically were brought by one or a 
small number of same-sex couples who could not obtain marriage 
licenses or have out-of-state marriages recognized because of the 
challenged state laws.13  The defendants were state, county, and local 
officials responsible for issuing licenses or otherwise enforcing that 
state’s same-sex marriage ban. 
The challenges were largely identical because the bans in every 
state were substantially identical in substance, if not in language.  
Every state defined marriage as being between one man and one 
woman and prohibited any other combination to be married, 
recognized as married, or entitled to receive the benefits, protections, 
and incidents of marriage.  The challenged state action also was the 
 
 13.  For example, Obergefell involved fourteen same-sex couples and two men 
seeking marital status for their deceased same-sex partners, spread over four states.  
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  More specifically, the Michigan case was 
brought by one lesbian couple; the Kentucky case was two couples seeking Kentucky 
marriage licenses and four couples seeking recognition of their out-of-state marriages; the 
Ohio case involved four couples seeking recognition of out-of-state marriages for purposes 
of their children’s birth certificates and two men seeking recognition of their marital status 
on their same-sex partners’ death certificates; and the Tennessee case involved three 
couples seeking recognition of out-of-state marriages.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 
396–99 (6th Cir. 2014). 
Although never raised, there is at least a nice question whether plaintiffs properly could 
sue together in this way.  Parties may join as plaintiffs if their claims arise out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if the claims raise 
common questions of law or fact.  FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A), (B). The second prong is 
easily satisfied, as the legal question of the validity of the marriage bans is common to all 
claims.  But the first prong is far less clear, because there is no logical relationship among 
the different plaintiffs’ claims—there is no connection among the couples or their desire to 
marry, other than their wanting to engage in parallel conduct of getting married.  The 
counter is that the defendant officials applied the same law—the state ban on same-sex 
marriage—in denying each plaintiff a marriage license.  In any event, no one raised the 
issue because even had the plaintiffs filed separately, the common questions of law or fact 
allowed the cases to be consolidated and for certain issues, such as preliminary injunctions, 
to be resolved together.  FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). 
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same in every state—the refusal by a state official to issue a marriage 
license or to recognize an out-of-state marriage for two people who, 
but for being of the same sex, were entitled to receive marriage 
licenses or have their marriages recognized in that state.  Unique 
among constitutional litigation challenging state laws, there was no 
possibility of legal, factual, remedial, or administrative differences 
among different cases or plaintiffs.14  With so many states having 
identical prohibitions on same-sex marriage, it functionally 
established a nationwide prohibition on same-sex marriage, but one 
that had to be challenged state by state. 
In many cases, having declared the state marriage ban 
unconstitutional, district courts entered exceedingly broad 
injunctions.  Several injunctions purported to both prohibit defendant 
officials from ever enforcing same-sex marriage bans anywhere in the 
state as to any couple or any person, and to require them to grant 
marriage licenses to any couple requesting one statewide, even where 
only one couple brought the action.15 
Consider Judge Vaughn Walker’s order from the Proposition 8 
case in California that started it all: 
 
[T]he court orders entry of judgment permanently 
enjoining [Proposition 8’s] enforcement; prohibiting 
the official defendants from applying or enforcing 
Proposition 8 and directing the official defendants that 
all persons under their control or supervision shall not 
apply or enforce Proposition 8.16 
 
Or the order from Chief Magistrate Judge Candy Wagahoof Dale in 
the District of Idaho: 
 
The Court PERMANENTLY ENJOINS the State of 
Idaho and its officers, employees, agents, and political 
subdivisions from enforcing Article III, § 28 of the 
Idaho Constitution; Idaho Code Sections 32–201 and 
32–209; and any other laws or regulations to the extent 
they do not recognize same-sex marriages validly 
 
 14.  Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2542303; Marcus, supra note 5, at 61. 
 15.  Marcus, supra note 5, at 27 n.138. 
 16.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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contracted outside Idaho or prohibit otherwise 
qualified same-sex couples from marrying in Idaho.17 
 
Or the order from Judge Daniel D. Crabtree of the District of 
Kansas: 
 
Defendants are hereby enjoined from enforcing or 
applying Article 15, § 16 of the Kansas Constitution 
and K.S.A. § 23–2501 and any other Kansas statute, 
law, policy or practice that prohibits issuance of 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in Kansas. 
Defendants may not refuse to issue marriage licenses 
on the basis that applicants are members of the same 
sex.18 
 
State officials generally declined to challenge the scope of these 
overbroad injunctions, either in the district court at the time of entry 
or on appeal.  And in affirming the invalidity of same-sex marriage 
bans, courts of appeals generally did not explore or remark on the 
purported scope or effect of these injunctions. 
In fact, however, much of the procedural confusion and 
controversy in the marriage equality litigation resulted from the 
failure of attorneys, courts, and the public to understand procedural 
and remedial issues—about the limited scope of injunctions, about 
the differences between injunctions and precedent, and about how 
judgments control real-world behavior and establish constitutional 
change. 
A. Injunctions, Precedents, and Constitutional Compliance 
1. Injunctions and Precedents 
The “usual rule” is that litigation is conducted “on behalf of the 
individual named parties only.”19  That principle extends to actions to 
enjoin enforcement of unconstitutional state laws.  A court can 
“enjoin a defendant only with respect to defendant’s treatment of 
plaintiffs actually before the court, either individually or as part of a 
certified class.”20  As Richard Fallon argues, the prospective legal 
 
 17.  Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1086 (D. Idaho 2014) (emphasis in original). 
 18.  Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1206 (D. Kan. 2014). 
 19.  Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979). 
 20.  LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 217; see also Marcus, supra note 5, at 27–28. 
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effect of a decision pronouncing a law unconstitutional derives from a 
complex interaction among three distinct doctrines: injunction, 
preclusion, and precedent.21  To understand Fallon’s framework, we 
must understand precisely how precedent functions—that is, how 
prior judicial decisions regulate the conduct of state officials charged 
with enforcing a particular state law. 
An injunction prohibiting enforcement of a constitutionally 
invalid law only benefits the named plaintiffs and only binds named 
defendants.22 It also may extend to the party’s officers, agents, 
servants, and employees, as well as “other persons who are in active 
concert or participation” with the party.23  The injunction (and the 
opinion explaining and justifying the injunction) is directly, 
immediately, and coercively enforceable against the named 
defendants and for the benefit of the named plaintiffs.  It compels the 
former to perform (or refrain from performing) some acts for the 
latter’s benefit.  Failure to do so would be a direct violation of the 
injunction, punishable by contempt of court.24  A final judgment also 
has a preclusive effect in future litigation, but, again, only with respect 
to those parties.25 
As to nonparties, the force of the judgment and opinion 
justifying the judgment derives entirely from the doctrine of 
precedent.26  Its precedential force depends entirely on the court that 
rendered the judgment and where it stands in the judicial hierarchy.27  
A decision from the U.S. Supreme Court provides binding precedent 
on every court within the United States, federal and state.  A decision 
from a regional court of appeals provides binding precedent on all 
federal courts within the circuit, although not necessarily on state 
courts28 and not on other circuits.  A decision of a federal district 
court, however, is not binding on any other federal or state court, 
 
 21.  Fallon, supra note 6, at 1339–40; Fallon, supra note 6, at 923–24 n.31. 
 22.  Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Fallon, supra note 6, at 1340. 
This changes if the litigation is brought as a class action.  LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 217; 
see infra Part I.D. 
 23.  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(2), (3). 
 24.  In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 594 (1895); S.E.C. v. Homa, 514 F.3d 661, 674 (7th Cir. 
2008); LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 4. 
 25.  Fallon, supra note 6 at 1340; Fallon, supra note 6, at 923–24 n.31. 
 26.  Fallon, supra note 6, at 924 n.31; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The 
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1328 (1996). 
 27.  Randy Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 185–86 (2014). 
 28.  See generally Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow 
Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 55 
(2015); Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts 
Disagree on Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 236–37 (2014). 
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including courts in the same state, district, and even as to the same 
judge deciding a different case.29 
Regardless of type, however, precedent never directly regulates 
executive officials’ real-world conduct or obligates them to act (or 
refrain from acting) in any way.  An official’s failure to abide by even 
binding precedent—as opposed to a judgment—is not subject to 
contempt of court or other direct enforcement.  An individual seeking 
the benefit of precedent must initiate new litigation and obtain a new 
injunction compelling those officials to act or not act as to them.  
Precedent will almost certainly drive the judicial resolution (through 
binding or persuasive force, depending on the court) of that new 
litigation.  In other words, precedent is neither self-enforcing nor 
directly controlling of real-world conduct of responsible executive 
officers.  Rather, it persuades or influences judges in future litigation 
seeking new judgments and injunctions against those executive 
officials.  Precedent can be enforced as to those new parties only 
through that additional step of new litigation; the next court applies 
precedent to decide the next action involving the next set of parties 
and enters a judgment and binding injunction as to them.30  It is that 
new judgment and injunction that then directly controls new 
defendants’ real-world conduct as to new plaintiffs and that is directly 
enforceable through civil contempt. 
Subsequent litigation applying precedent can take two forms.  
First, when the challenged laws are criminal prohibitions enforced 
through government initiated prosecution or litigation, precedent 
affects resolution of that new case, requiring or suggesting the 
dismissal of the prosecution.31  Second, similarly situated persons 
might file a new federal § 1983 action against different defendants to 
enjoin enforcement of the challenged law as to them.  Precedent from 
the first case invalidating the law will compel or persuade (depending 
on the issuing court) the same outcome in the new suit.  Because bans 
on same-sex marriage are “enforced” by the relevant official 
 
 29.  Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 
490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989); Fallon, supra note 6 at 1340; Fallon, supra note 6, at 924 n.31. 
 30.  Cf. Marcus, supra note 5, at manuscript 27–28 (acknowledging that this “remedial 
parsimony” may seem “hard-hearted and inefficient”); but see Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-
44-DLB (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2015) (unpublished memorandum order explaining extension 
of injunction and stating that limiting injunction only to parties “would not only create 
piecemeal litigation, it would be inconsistent with basic principles of justice and fairness”), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2015/09/Judge-denies-Davis.pdf.   
 31.  Fallon, supra note 6, at 924 n.31; see, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 
931 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 456 n.3 (1974). 
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declining to issue a marriage license (or some other benefit) to a 
requesting couple, challenges to those bans involved only the second 
type of litigation. 
The precedent-injunction distinction further maps onto the 
concept of departmentalism—that federal executive and legislative 
officials,32 as well as state officials,33 wield independent power to 
interpret the Constitution and to act on their own constitutional 
understandings.  And that remains true even when those 
interpretations depart from, or directly conflict with, judicial 
interpretations, including interpretations from the Supreme Court.  
Of course, departmentalism is not universally accepted.34  Critics 
argue that by denying an authoritative judicial voice about 
constitutional meaning, departmentalism violates the rule of law, 
creating chaos and uncertainty as to what the law is and how to 
organize real-world conduct.35  But judicial supremacy is neither 
required by constitutional text nor structure.36  And any chaos or 
conflict might be more feature rather than bug in a system of 
separation of powers.37 
Gary Lawson proposes what he calls a middle-ground approach 
to departmentalism, grounded in the precedent-judgment distinction, 
that provides a clear stopping point on interbranch conflict.  Political-
branch officials generally must enforce and obey a court’s judgment,38 
the “raw determinations of liability or nonliability (as opposed to the 
explanations for those determinations embodied in judicial opinions) 
 
 32.  Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1269–70; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 81 GEO. L.J. 217, 220 (1994). 
 33.  Gary Lawson, Interpretive Equality as a Structural Imperative (or “Pucker Up and 
Settle This!”), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 384 (2003). 
 34.  Burt Neurborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. 
REV. 991, 992 (1987). 
 35.  Id. at 994; see also Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1268; Paulsen, supra note 
32, at 333. 
 36.  Paulsen, supra note 32, at 221. 
 37.  Lawson, supra note 33, at 384; Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1329–30.  In 
response to a question about judicial supremacy, Justice Samuel Alito explained that all 
branches of government “have a duty to adhere to the Constitution like” the Courts do.  
He stressed in closing, however, that “We are a nation of laws.  It is important for people 
to respect the actions by the branches of government when they are acting within the 
proper scope of their authority.”  See Josh Blackman, Justice Alito Reflects on his Tenth 
Anniversary on #SCOTUS, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), http://joshblack 
man.com/blog/2015/09/21/justice-alito-reflects-on-his-tenth-anniversary-on-scotus/. 
 38.  Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1325–27.  Lawson allows for the possibility 
that an official can disregard a judgment against him or that the President can decline to 
enforce a judgment, but only in extreme circumstances.  Id. 
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rendered in specific cases.”39  But that obligation extends only to the 
“raw judgment itself: the finding of liability or nonliability and the 
specification of the remedy” compelling parties to act or refrain from 
acting.40  It does not apply to the reasoning or the legal principles and 
conclusions that the court used to justify its judgment.41  The court’s 
opinion is merely an explanation for its order, having no independent 
legal force.42  The legal conclusions stated in the opinion affect future 
actors only through precedent or stare decisis, which provides an idea 
of how future cases may be resolved, while imposing no legal 
obligation to abide by the reasoning.43  Up to the point of a judgment 
and injunction against them, therefore, state and federal actors can 
proceed on, and argue for, their own best understanding of what the 
Constitution requires, even if it conflicts with the Court’s.  Once that 
judgment comes, however, political actors must comply. 
Lawson’s departmentalism rests on the idea that what makes 
courts unique is that they decide cases and issue judgments and those 
judgments control everyone who is subject to them or their 
obligations.  But the power to interpret the Constitution simpliciter is 
not unique to the courts, but instead resides in all public officials (of 
all branches and all levels) who swear an oath to uphold the 
Constitution.44  Only when the judicial interpretation is reduced to a 
judgment does it become supreme—and then only within the limited 
scope of that judgment.  To suggest otherwise would allow a court to 
expand the scope of its otherwise limited judgment and injunction 
simply by issuing a statement of reasons and constitutional analysis.45 
Merging Lawson’s departmentalism with Fallon’s precedent-
injunction distinction offers a new insight, which Kevin Walsh labels 
“judicial departmentalism.”46  Because only specific public officials 
are enjoined only as to specific plaintiffs, the scope of the judgment is 
necessarily limited.  Public officials can continue to act on their 
competing constitutional understandings as to similarly situated 
 
 39.  Id. at 1271. 
 40.  Id. at 1327. 
 41.  Id. at 1327, 1328. 
 42.  Wasserman, supra note 7, at 7. 
 43.  Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1328–29. 
 44.  Lawson, supra note 33, at 384; Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1269–70. 
 45.  Id. at 1328. 
 46.  Kevin C. Walsh, Combating judicial supremacy through containment and 
conversion, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Oct. 9, 2015), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorof 
justice/2015/10/combating-judicial-supremacy-through-containment-and-conversion.html. 
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nonparties, even if those understandings conflict with the opinion 
supporting the earlier judgment.  That interpretive freedom ends as 
soon as the courts speak as to the new parties and subject the 
defendants to a new or expanded judgment and injunction.  But that 
judgment comes only after new or expanded litigation and a new 
judicial order. 
To be sure, the result is the same—public officials will abide by 
binding precedent.  But that does not mean we do or should live 
under a regime of judicial supremacy, in which the executive is bound 
by judicial interpretation.  As Michael Paulsen argues, “we have 
wrongly described as judicial supremacy what really is coordinacy 
combined with inevitable (and proper) interpretive restraint by non-
judicial interpreters,”47 who adhere to the court’s particularized 
judgment of liability and remedy.48 
2. What Did the Courts Decide in the Marriage Equality Cases? 
We now get a clearer picture of the real effect of the various 
marriage equality decisions from the Supreme Court and the lower 
courts.  Obergefell reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit reviewing district court decisions as to marriage bans 
in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.  The ultimate result 
was the entry of injunctions prohibiting officials in those states from 
enforcing those bans and obligating them to issue marriage licenses or 
recognize the marriages of particular couples bringing each action.49  
Prior to Obergefell, decisions invalidating and enjoining enforcement 
of marriage bans and compelling the issuance of marriage licenses in 
those states, had a similar effect on named defendants as to named 
plaintiffs.  This was true whether those decisions came from federal 
district courts50 or were affirmed by a regional court of appeals.51 
But none of the injunctions entered in those cases on remand 
directly compelled officials to issue licenses to similarly situated 
 
 47.  Paulsen, supra note 32, at 343. 
 48.  Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1329. 
 49.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  The Supreme Court’s mandate did not 
issue until twenty-five days after its decision, on July 28, 2015, allowing parties to request 
reconsideration.  The case was remanded to the Sixth Circuit, which in turn remanded the 
cases to the respective district courts for entry of a permanent injunction and final order.  
 50.  See, e.g., Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1207–09, 1210 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 
12, 2015) (issuance of licenses to four couples); Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 
(N.D. Fla. 2014) (one couple); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010) (two couples). 
 51.  See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (two couples in 
Virginia); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (three couples in Utah). 
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nonparty same-sex couples or to anyone other than the named 
plaintiffs.  Nor did they compel nonparty state officials, such as clerks 
or judges in other parts of a state or in a different state, to issue 
licenses to anyone.52  The prior judgments affected these people only 
as precedent to be applied in subsequent litigation.  Officials 
remained free to believe that the prior court—including the Supreme 
Court—had been wrong in its interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and they could continue to act on that understanding by 
continuing to deny licenses.  These officials also could continue to 
argue that position in subsequent litigation, even knowing they would 
lose absent a change in precedent.  They became bound to act in a 
particular way as to new couples only after another court in a 
separate action involving those different parties applied precedent 
and reduced it to a judgment against them.  Once enjoined, however, 
these officials become legally obligated as to those parties and subject 
to civil contempt for noncompliance. 
Obergefell, as Supreme Court precedent, bound every federal 
and state court on the legal proposition that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits states from denying marriage licenses to same-
sex couples.53  Prior to Obergefell, a district court in Wisconsin or 
Indiana would have responded similarly to Judge Posner’s decision 
for the Seventh Circuit.54 
On the other hand, no court would be bound by prior precedent 
from any district court invalidating a ban or enjoining its 
enforcement.55  Thus, for example, when Judge Callie V.S. Granade 
of the Southern District of Alabama declared the state ban 
unconstitutional and enjoined a state official from enforcing it against 
 
 52.  This point is qualified slightly, depending on the structure of state law and who 
has the power to issue marriage licenses.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) allows a 
court to enjoin the party’s agents and “other persons who are in active concern or 
participation” with a named defendant.  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(C).  For example, an 
injunction against the attorney general would also bind county officials subject to her 
control or supervision. 
 53.  The latter is highly unlikely given the straightforwardness of the legal issue, the 
identity of the challenged state laws, and the identity of the challenged conduct (denying 
licenses or recognition.  See Marcus, supra note 5, at manuscript 26–28.  Cf. Costanza v. 
Caldwell, No. 2014-CA-2090, 2015 WL 4094655, at *4 (La. July 7, 2015) (Hughes, J., 
dissenting) (“Does the 5–4 decision of the United States Supreme Court automatically 
legalize this type of adoption?  While the majority opinion of Justice Kennedy leaves it to 
the various courts and agencies to hash out these issues, I do not concede the 
reinterpretation of every statute premised upon traditional marriage.”). 
 54.  Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 55.  See supra note 50. 
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four plaintiff couples,56 a different district court hearing a challenge to 
Alabama’s ban by a different couple would not have been bound by 
the injunction or by Judge Granade’s analysis.  That second court 
could have performed its own constitutional analysis to reach its own 
conclusion, without regard or deference towards the earlier decision.57  
In fact, Judge Granade herself could have reached a different 
conclusion in a subsequent challenge to the Alabama marriage ban 
(however unlikely that was to happen). 
The extension of Obergefell still required subsequent litigation, 
which tended to take two forms in the marriage equality campaign.  
Courts in pending cases either imposed injunctions or lifted stays on 
existing injunctions, directly binding defendant officials as to plaintiff 
couples.  Prior lower court decisions invalidating state bans and 
enjoining their enforcement were now unquestionably correct in light 
of Obergefell.58  Alternatively, other couples, having been denied 
licenses by officials not complying with precedent, had to initiate their 
own litigation against the appropriate officers, seek a new injunction 
prohibiting enforcement of the same-sex marriage ban, and compel 
the defendants to issue licenses to them.59  The district court then 
would apply Obergefell as precedent and compel the official to issue 
marriage licenses to those plaintiffs, an easy decision that the court 
likely would make relatively quickly.60 
The point remains that precedent has no effect until a new court 
relies on that precedent to speaks to particular state executive 
officials, as to particular plaintiffs, with respect to a particular law.  
Until then, state officials remained untethered to the constitutional 
understanding offered in Obergefell or in any other decision and free 
 
 56.  Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1207–10, (S.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2015).   
 57.  Wasserman, supra note 7, at 6–8. 
 58.  See, e.g., Waters v. Ricketts, 798 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2015); Rosenbrahn v. 
Daugaard, 61 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 2015); Jernigan v. Crane, 796 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2015); 
Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant, 791 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2015); DeLeon v. 
Abbott, 791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015); Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 791 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2015); 
Robicheaux v. Caldwell, Nos. 13-5090 C/W, 14-97, 14-327, 2015 WL 4090353 (E.D. La. 
July 2, 2015) (unpublished order imposing injunction). 
 59.  See, e.g., Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-00044-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1 (E.D. 
Ky. Aug. 12, 2015); Laurel Brubaker Caulkins, Texas Couple Gets Marriage License After 
Suing for Foot-Dragging, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (July 6, 2015), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2015-07-06/texas-couple-sues-clerk-claiming-foot-dragging-on-gay-marr 
iage; Robert Wilonsky, Update: ‘A Historic Day for Hood County’ after lawsuit leads to 
marriage license, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (July 6, 2015), http://thescoopblog.dallas 
news.com/2015/07/same-sex-couple-of-27-years-sues-hood-county-clerk-for-refusing-to-iss 
ue-marriage-license.html/. 
 60.  Miller, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1.   
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to abide by their own constitutional understandings in deciding 
whether to issue licenses or otherwise recognize same-sex marriages.  
State officials also remained free in subsequent litigation to argue, at 
a minimum, that prior precedent should be modified or overturned.61  
Only when the officials lose in that subsequent litigation, and are 
themselves enjoined from enforcing the challenged laws as to the 
named plaintiffs, are they judicially obligated to follow the court’s 
constitutional understanding. 
B. Voluntary Compliance 
1. Precedent and Voluntary Compliance 
The marriage equality litigation was atypical.  We do not 
regularly see new plaintiffs having to commence new litigation and 
secure new judgments and injunctions in the wake of constitutional 
decisions from the Supreme Court.  The reason is that state officials 
can, and usually will, conform their conduct to precedent as to 
similarly situated persons.  They decline to enforce a challenged law 
or otherwise engage in conduct as to those people where that conduct 
has previously been declared unconstitutional as to others.  In fact, 
courts likely issue those inappropriately overbroad injunctions in 
constitutional cases on the assumption that officials will voluntarily 
comply, so the scope-of-injunction question never arises.62 
Importantly, however, it remains a voluntary act of the officials 
rather than a product of legal or judicial compulsion.  Under the 
departmentalist understanding, executive officials choose to proceed 
under the new judicial interpretation of the Constitution in carrying 
out their official conduct, but are not compelled to do so prior to 
entry of a judgment against them; they retain authority to reach their 
own constitutional conclusions.63  This is so even in the face of binding 
authority, such as Obergefell or an Article III-final regional court-of-
appeals decision.64 
Perhaps this voluntary compliance derives from agreement with 
precedent, reached following independent constitutional 
 
 61.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
 62.  LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 217. 
 63.  See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
 64.  See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 
F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014); see also infra 
notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
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deliberation.65  Perhaps it is out of convenience.  Or perhaps it is out 
of executive certainty that binding precedent preordains their liability 
in the next lawsuit, such that the easiest course is to conform to 
precedent even while believing it wrong.66  This last possibility recalls 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s insistence that law is merely prediction by 
real-world actors of what courts will do.67 
It also means that departmental interpretation eventually yields 
to the judicial interpretation—that is, executive departmentalism 
yields to judicial departmentalism. While voluntary compliance with 
precedent (without a further court order) is not compelled, judicial 
and political processes incentivize it in a number of ways. 
First, binding precedent creates a legal certainty that state 
officials will lose the subsequent litigation and will be ordered to issue 
licenses to the new couples.  Even with a nonbinding district court 
decision, procedural rules make a new or expanded injunction as to 
new parties practically likely, even if not compelled by precedent.  
For example, most federal districts have a related-case rule, whereby 
cases raising similar legal and factual issues will be assigned to the 
same judge.68  Thus, following Judge Granade’s decision requiring one 
probate judge to issue licenses to four couples, any new constitutional 
challenge to Alabama’s ban in the Southern District of Alabama 
would have been assigned to Judge Granade, who was practically 
certain (if not legally required) to reach the same conclusion.69 
Relatedly, and perhaps more importantly, any official who forces 
that new lawsuit, loses, and is enjoined would be liable for the new 
plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees.  Every new couple obtaining a 
new injunction compelling the issuance of a marriage license would 
qualify as a “prevailing party” in a § 1983 action, having obtained 
injunctive or declaratory relief.70  While forcing the new lawsuit and 
 
 65.  Paulsen, supra note 32, at 338. 
 66.  See id. (describing “executive accommodation in light of the logical implications 
of the coordinacy of the branches”). 
 67.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) 
(“The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public 
force through the instrumentality of the courts.”). 
 68.  See, e.g., S.D. ALA. L.R. 3.3(a); see generally Katharine MacFarlane, Analyzing 
The Southern District Of New York’s Amended “Related Cases” Rule: The Process For 
Challenging Nonrandom Case Assignment Remains Inadequate, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY 
OF AM. L. 699 (2014). 
 69.  Wasserman, supra note 7, at 8. 
 70.  42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012); Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2012); 
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 603–04 (2001); see, e.g., Stipulation and Agreement as to Costs and Attorneys’ Fees at 
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new injunction may not cost the state, having to pay attorneys’ fees 
for dozens or hundreds of new couples will. 
A second, more remote incentive is that the similarly situated 
couple denied a license might sue not only for an injunction 
compelling the relevant officials to issue the license, but also for 
money damages for past injuries caused by denial of the license, 
which violates the Fourteenth Amendment under Obergefell.  
Recovering damages depends not on the Constitution, which plainly 
has been violated by the denial of the license, but on the sub-
constitutional defense of qualified immunity.71  That doctrine provides 
that a defendant officer is liable for damages only if the right violated 
was clearly established, such that a reasonable officer would be on 
notice that his conduct (here, denying marriage licenses to these new 
same-sex couples) violated the Constitution.72  Recent decisions have 
elaborated on this requirement, insisting that qualified immunity is 
designed to protect all but the “plainly incompetent,” meaning the 
defense is not lost unless prior precedent places the constitutional 
question “beyond doubt.”73  Further, the right cannot be defined at 
too high a level of generality.  Instead, precedent must establish the 
right within at least a factually analogous context. 
In addition, a couple also might seek damages not only from the 
officer who denied the license, but also from the local governmental 
entity for constitutional harm caused by its formal policies or by the 
training and supervision of employees by the municipal policymaker.74  
This turns on a subsidiary question of whether a county clerk, in 
making office policies with respect to marriage licenses, acts on behalf 
of the county rather than the state.75  One district court concluded that 
county clerks make policy for the state in Kentucky, precluding this 
strategy there.76 
 
¶¶ 10–11, Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-CV-64, (W.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2015), http://pdfserver.am 
law.com/nlj/Wisconsin%20ssm%20fee%20stipulation.pdf. 
 71.  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993); Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 
U.S. 232, 245 (1974). 
 72.  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). 
 73.  San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 
S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011). 
 74.  Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359–60 (2011); Cty. of Los Angeles v. 
Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2011); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 75.  McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997). 
 76.  Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-00044-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *14 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 
12, 2015).  
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Following Obergefell, it might appear that a damages action by a 
same-sex couple is very likely to succeed against truly recalcitrant 
state officers and offices.  A single decision from the Supreme Court 
declaring that bans on same-sex marriage violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment should be sufficient to clearly establish that right, given 
the factual similarity of all flat bans on issuing marriage licenses to 
couples who want them and who satisfy all other requirements.  The 
whole point of Obergefell is to place “beyond doubt” the question of 
the constitutional protection for same-sex couples to marry on 
identical terms as opposite-sex couples. 
It is less clear whether damages would have been available in the 
months prior to Obergefell.  The doctrine is in flux as to whether on-
point circuit precedent can clearly establish a right within a circuit.  
The Supreme Court has assumed it can, without actually deciding the 
point,77 an approach that has cast doubt on the matter.  Thus, for 
example, we do not know if the Seventh Circuit decision in Wolf 
clearly established the right to marriage equality within that circuit, 
such that only a plainly incompetent official would have believed he 
was justified in refusing to recognize or license a same-sex marriage.  
On the other hand, a single or small number of nonbinding district 
court decisions almost certainly do not clearly establish a right.  In 
any event, because there was a split among the courts of appeals as of 
November 2014, the right likely was not clearly established prior to 
the Court’s decision in Obergefell.  If “judges thus disagree on a 
constitutional question,” it is unfair to impose money damages on 
executive officers.78 
Moreover, qualified immunity must take into account some of 
the underlying facts and circumstances in defining the right at issue.79  
Thus, a clerk might be able to argue, at least in early cases, that while 
Obergefell clearly establishes a broad right of same-sex couples to 
marry, it does not clearly establish the right to have a specific public 
official issue that same-sex license even if it offends the official’s 
religious beliefs.80  These additional factual wrinkles mean it may take 
 
 77.  Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015); Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776; 
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2094 (2012). 
 78.  Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999). 
 79.  Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014).   
 80.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see 
Miller, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1; see also Robyn Tysver & Cody Winchester, Out of 
Nebraska’s 93 counties only one—Sioux County—refuses to issue same-sex marriage 
licenses, OMAHA.COM (July 2, 2015), http://www.omaha.com/news/nebraska/citing-religi 
ous-belief-clerk-in-sioux-county-nebraska-refuses-to/article_e35b4224-2021-11e5-ac56-0fe 
660bec1e7.html. 
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some time for the rights in Obergefell to become clearly established in 
practice. 
A final incentive for voluntary compliance is politics.  The public 
and media do not recognize or understand the distinctions among 
injunctions, judgments, persuasive precedent, and binding precedent.  
Thus, officials who adhere to formal procedure by awaiting a 
subsequent suit and injunction, rather than complying with precedent, 
risk accusations of defying or rebelling against the Constitution and 
the federal judiciary.  This is more or less what happened in Alabama 
in the months prior to Obergefell.81 
Ironically, of course, political considerations might disincentivize 
voluntary compliance.  Elected officials may recognize the political 
benefits of resisting, or at least seeming to resist, unpopular federal 
precedent, which they can criticize as judicial overreaching.82  That 
seems especially likely with controversial social issues such as same-
sex marriage.  Ultimately, politics may be inextricable from cost.  
Attorney’s fees83 and money damages84 come from the public fisc.  
And as much as the public in some states might disagree with 
Obergefell, there may (and even should) come a point at which the 
public tires of officials spending public funds to continue losing in 
federal court. 
Given the nature of the same-sex marriage bans being challenged 
in the states, the multistate litigation campaign made compliance with 
precedent especially likely.  The bans in every state were substantially 
identical in substance, if not in language—marriage was between one 
man and one woman and no other combination was entitled to be 
married, recognized as married, or entitled to receive the benefits, 
protections, and incidents of marriage.  The constitutionally violative 
state action was the same in every state—the denial by a state official 
of a marriage license to two people who, but for being of the same 
sex, were otherwise qualified for marriage in the state.  The Ohio 
marriage ban that Obergefell declared unconstitutional was identical 
to the ban in Nebraska; the Virginia marriage ban that the Fourth 
Circuit declared unconstitutional was identical to the South Carolina 
 
 81.  See Wasserman, supra note 7, at 2–3, 8. 
 82.  See Wasserman, supra note 7, at 16; see also, e.g., Roy Moore on gay marriage 
ruling: ‘Christians are going to be persecuted’, AL.COM, (June 28, 2015, 2:15 PM), 
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/06/roy_moore_speaking_at_kimberly.html; Tysver 
& Winchester, supra note 80. 
 83.  Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 558 (2010). 
 84.  Cf. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890–91 
(2014). 
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ban.  Thus, there was virtually no way that an official could hope to 
distinguish precedent in the event of future litigation.85  The outcome 
of future litigation was even more certain than on other controversial 
constitutional issues, such as whether government officials had taken 
sufficient steps to integrate the schools.  This similarity made it 
sensible for officials to avoid future litigation that would produce an 
inevitable defeat. 
2. Voluntary Compliance Before Obergefell 
This network of incentives worked in many places prior to 
Obergefell.  Officials went beyond the limited enforceable scope of 
the injunction, taking steps to issue licenses to similarly situated 
couples throughout the state in light of binding or merely persuasive 
precedent. 
For example, thousands of marriage licenses issued in Utah in 
the eleven days between the District of Utah enjoining enforcement 
of that state’s marriage ban86 and the Supreme Court’s stay of the 
injunction.87  Although the injunction itself guaranteed licenses only 
to the three plaintiff couples, clerks issued licenses to all other 
couples as an act of voluntary compliance with new precedent in 
anticipation that, if they did not comply, they would be sued and 
ordered to do so.  In an even more extreme example, clerks in 
Wisconsin voluntarily complied with a district court declaration that 
the marriage law was void, without even waiting for any injunction to 
issue.88 
A more expansive process played out in California.  Two same-
sex couples had sued six executive officer defendants: the Governor, 
the state attorney general, the director and deputy director of the 
state Department of Public Health (DPH), and the county clerk-
recorders (the officials who actually issue licenses) for two counties.  
In August 2010, Judge Walker declared that Proposition 8 violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment and permanently enjoined the six 
defendant officials from applying or enforcing that law.89  The court 
further directed them to ensure that all persons under their control or 
supervision similarly did not enforce the ban.90  When the defendant 
state officials declined to appeal the decision and the Supreme Court 
 
 85.  See Marcus, supra note 5, at 27. 
 86.  Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013). 
 87.  Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014); see infra Part II.A. 
 88.  See infra Section II.C.3.c. and accompanying text.  
 89.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 90.  Id. 
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ruled three years later that the sponsors of the voter-enacted same-
sex marriage ban lacked standing to appeal,91 the injunction became 
final and ready to take effect. 
As discussed above, regardless of what the opinion said, the 
court’s injunctive power was limited—the injunction itself could only 
bind the two named county clerk-recorders to issue licenses to the 
named couples.  Other couples seeking licenses would need to initiate 
their own litigation against the appropriate clerk-recorder and to 
obtain their own injunctions.  Further, because no one had standing 
to appeal Perry and establish binding precedent, there would be no 
binding authority on the matter.  Judge Walker’s decision would 
serve only as persuasive authority, leaving the next district court in 
California free to reach a different conclusion. 
Seeking to avoid this problem, nearly three weeks before 
Hollingsworth was decided, California Attorney General Kamala 
Harris advised that Judge Walker’s injunction would apply to all 58 
counties and that “DPH can and should instruct county officials that 
when the district court’s injunction goes into effect, they must resume 
issuing marriage licenses to and recording the marriages of same-sex 
couples.”92  Because DPH controlled county clerk-recorders in 
administering the state’s marriage license and certification laws,93 the 
injunction against the DPH officers effectively enjoined every county 
clerk-recorder.  Of course, even if the injunction reached everyone 
under DPH control, it still obligated them only as to the named 
plaintiffs, not the thousands of other couples who might seek licenses.  
Granting licenses beyond the plaintiff couples reflected further 
voluntary compliance. 
Harris’s order preempted discussions percolating among some 
county officials about challenging, in state or federal court, the scope 
of the Perry injunction or the attorney general’s supervisory authority 
to compel licenses for all similarly situated couples.94  Hours after the 
 
 91.  The Supreme Court’s determination that initiative proponents lacked standing to 
appeal rendered the district court judgment and the injunction final.  See Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013). 
 92.  Letter from Attorney General Kamala Harris to Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. 
(June 3, 2013), http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ht/ag_prop_8_letter.pdf. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Marty Lederman, The fate of same-sex marriage in California after Perry, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 11:32 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/the-fate-of-
same-sex-marriage-in-california-after-perry/; Howard Wasserman, What’s next in 
California, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 26, 2013, 11:48 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/praw 
fsblawg/2013/06/whats-next-in-california.html.  
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Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth, the Ninth Circuit sua 
sponte dissolved its stay of the district court’s injunction.95  Circuit 
Justice Kennedy then denied an application for a stay from the Prop 8 
intervenors.96  And all county clerk-recorders in California quickly fell 
in line.97 
But this is how voluntary compliance operates—the party 
defendants chose to comply and to order those subject to their 
supervision to comply.  They proceeded as if the injunction protected 
all couples and entitled them to licenses, without having to pursue 
further litigation or secure a new injunction.  And they ensured that 
county-level officials did the same through their supervisory 
authority.  In fact, Harris performed the first same-sex marriage for 
the plaintiffs in Perry hours after the Supreme Court issued its 
ruling.98 
Officials in some states even sought to voluntarily comply with 
court of appeals precedent dealing with a marriage ban from another 
state within the circuit, even before their own state’s ban had been 
invalidated. 
For example, following Tenth Circuit decisions declaring invalid 
marriage bans in Utah and Oklahoma,99 and the Supreme Court 
denial of certiorari rendering those decisions Article III final,100 the 
chief judge of the Tenth Judicial District in Kansas issued an 
administrative order directing the clerk of that court (the local official 
charged with issuing marriage licenses) to issue licenses to same-sex 
couples.  The chief judge was not compelled by any court order to do 
 
 95.  The Ninth Circuit did not even wait for the Supreme Court’s mandate to issue 
twenty-five days later.  Josh Blackman, Prop 8 Supports File Emergency Motion With 
Circuit Justice Kennedy To Stop SSM In California, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (June 29, 
2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/06/29/prop-8-supports-file-emergency-motion-
with-circuit-justice-kennedy-to-stop-ssm-in-california/ 
 96.  Id.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, Supreme Court Docket No. 12-144, http://www.sup 
remecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/12-144.htm.  On July 29, 2013, the 
judgment finally issued, but, by that point, same-sex marriages were being performed 
throughout California.  
 97.  Officials in Alabama responded in a very different manner.  See Wasserman, 
supra note 7, at 6–7; see also infra notes 171–78 and accompanying text. 
 98.  Josh Blackman, Constitutional Weddings: Kristin M. Perry and Sandra B. Stier, 
JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (June 28, 2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/06/28/cons 
titutional-weddings-kristin-m-perry-and-sandra-b-stier/.  
 99.  Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) (invalidating marriage ban in 
Oklahoma); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (invalidating marriage ban 
in Utah).   
 100.  Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014) (mem.) (case from Oklahoma); Herbert v. 
Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014) (mem.) (case from Utah).   
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this;101 neither the judge, the clerk, nor any Kansas couple was party to 
or otherwise affected by the injunctions in the Tenth Circuit cases, 
which did not even involve Kansas law.  But the Kansas judge 
recognized that the court of appeals decisions constituted binding 
precedent for the legal proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment 
required states to recognize same-sex marriages on the same terms as 
opposite-sex unions.  And it was legally certain what would happen 
next—a Kansas couple seeking a license would sue the clerk in the 
District of Kansas, the district court would be bound by Bishop and 
Kitchen to similarly declare the Kansas ban invalid, and it would 
enjoin the clerk not to enforce the state ban and to issue licenses to 
the plaintiff couples.  The prospect of federal litigation yielding an 
adverse result was so certain that it made sense to voluntarily comply 
with binding constitutional precedent, rather than forcing the 
plaintiffs to file litigation and placing the government on the hook for 
a new injunction and attorneys’ fees.102 
A similar sequence of events followed in South Carolina after the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the invalidation of Virginia’s marriage ban.103  
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case, a probate 
judge in Charleston County began accepting marriage license 
applications from same-sex couples and indicated his intention to 
issue licenses in compliance with Fourth Circuit precedent.104  Again, 
the Fourth Circuit did not address South Carolina law, this probate 
judge, or South Carolina couples.  But it was binding circuit 
precedent that made it legally certain that, if he declined to issue the 
licenses and was sued in federal court, he would be enjoined to issue 
the license, as well as made to pay attorney’s fees.  Given that 
prospect, voluntary compliance again made sense.105 
3. Voluntary Compliance After Obergefell 
Voluntary compliance was the predominant response to 
Obergefell.  On the day of the decision, fourteen states were not yet 
 
 101.  Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1185 (D. Kan. 2014). 
 102.  The attempt to voluntarily comply with precedent was thwarted by the Kansas 
Attorney General, who initiated state court litigation to prevent enforcement of the 
administrative order.  State ex rel. Schmidt v. Moriarty, No. 112, 590 (Kan. Oct. 10, 2014); 
see infra Section III.A. 
 103.  Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 104.  Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 580 (D.S.C. 2014). 
 105.  As in Kansas, however, attempt to voluntarily comply was thwarted by the state 
attorney general through state court litigation.  State ex rel Wilson v. Condon, 764 S.E. 2d 
247 (S.C. 2014); see infra Part Section III.A. 
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issuing same-sex marriage licenses under explicit state law, an Article 
III-final injunction, or statewide voluntary compliance.  State 
executives in numerous states—including the four states whose laws 
were at issue before the Court—immediately ordered statewide 
compliance with the decision and announced plans to issue licenses.106  
Although these states could have waited for the Court’s mandate 
(due twenty-five days later), most chose not to wait. 
The willingness of officials to voluntarily comply with Obergefell 
as to similarly situated people meant these scope-of-injunction and 
scope-of-precedent questions never were litigated, at least early on in 
the process.  This is likely because the legal distinction between 
injunction and precedent carries no practical difference when the 
precedent is a binding decision from the Supreme Court.107  An 
injunction directly binds the defendant officers as to the party 
plaintiffs, compelling issuance of licenses to them.  Precedent binds 
the second court, compelling the same conclusion in the subsequent 
litigation involving the similarly situated nonparty plaintiff couples 
against these or other defendant officers.  The second case necessarily 
and certainly produces a new injunction compelling those officers to 
issue licenses to these new couples.  The outcome in the subsequent 
litigation is certain and marriage licenses will issue to all same-sex 
couples in the state requesting them. 
Nevertheless, consider how Mississippi Attorney General Jim 
Hood described Obergefell immediately after the decision.  He 
recognized that the decision was not immediately effective in 
Mississippi and would not become so until the Fifth Circuit lifted the 
stay on the district court injunction.  Prior to that, the Supreme 
Court’s mandate—issued in a case involving laws and parties in four 
other states—did not affect laws, officials, or citizens of Mississippi.  
Thus, no Mississippi officials were immediately obligated to issue 
licenses to same-sex couples.108  At least implicitly, Hood was 
justifying the move in terms of the injunction/precedent distinction, 
effectively demanding an order applicable to him and other state 
officials as to specific Mississippi couples under Mississippi law. 
One of two additional steps was necessary.  The Fifth Circuit had 
to lift the stay and affirm the district court injunction prohibiting 
 
 106.  See, e.g., Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-00044-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1 (E.D. 
Ky. Aug. 12, 2015).  
 107.  Fallon, supra note 6, at 1340; Fallon, supra note 6, at 924 n.31. 
 108.  Sarah Fowler & Kate Royals, Miss A.G.: Same-sex couples cannot yet marry, 
CLARION-LEDGER (June 28, 2015, 12:11 PM), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2 
015/06/26/hinds-not-issuing-same-sex-marriage-licenses/29333011/. 
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enforcement of the Mississippi ban, which it did five days after 
Obergefell.109  Alternatively, the district court had to apply Obergefell 
as precedent in a new action to enjoin enforcement of the Mississippi 
ban as to new plaintiffs.  Again, because Supreme Court precedent is 
binding on all courts, these second steps were guaranteed to happen 
in fairly short order and the result was preordained.  But state 
officials could, consistent with their constitutional oath and public 
obligations, choose to await completion of the formal process, if they 
were willing to bear the litigation costs and the political fallout. 
Controversies over implementation of judicial decisions and 
orders, both before and after Obergefell, predictably sparked 
comparisons to Massive Resistance to Brown v. Board of Education 
and school desegregation.110  Following Brown, officials in many states 
refused to stop enforcing laws requiring segregated schools or to take 
steps to move their systems towards integration.111  It took years of 
new lawsuits and new (often narrow) injunctions in different states,112 
a Supreme Court decision broadly asserting supreme judicial 
authority to declare constitutional meaning,113 and political pressure114 
before something resembling integration began to take hold. 
Beyond the pejorative term “Massive Resistance,” what really 
happened after Brown was simply refusal by state officials to 
voluntary comply with precedent—even precedent from the Supreme 
Court—in the absence of a judgment and injunction binding on them 
as to particular plaintiffs.  Again, however, this was both substantively 
and procedurally permissible, in light of departmentalism and the 
necessarily limited reach of judgments and judicial orders.115  At 
worst, state officials failed to accommodate the realities of coordinate 
interpretation in not deferring to the Supreme Court when the result 
 
 109.  See cases cited supra note 59. 
 110.  Wasserman, supra note 7, at 2, 9–10; see Mark Joseph Stern, Resistance to 
Desegregation or Same-Sex Marriage, SLATE (July 6, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/out 
ward/2015/07/06/segregation_or_same_sex_marriage_take_our_quiz.html (offering quiz on 
whether statements were made in response to Obergefell or desegregation). 
 111.  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 328–29, 330–31, 385 (2004); Carroll, 
supra note 14, at 14–15; David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its 
Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 692–93 (2011). 
 112.  Carroll, supra note 14, at 15; Marcus, supra note 111, at 680–81. 
 113.  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  But see Lawson, supra note 33, at 379; 
Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1293 n.124. 
 114.  KLARMAN, supra note 111, at 418–19. 
 115.  See supra Part I.A.1. 
268 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 43:2 
of any litigation was inevitable.116  Rhetoric aside, the real 
constitutional problem in Cooper v. Aaron was not that the Little 
Rock School Board refused to follow Brown, but that the Board 
attempted to avoid complying with the district court’s approved 
desegregation plan (issued based on Brown’s precedential effect) 
binding the Board as to its constituents.117  And the real effect of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling was to deny the Board’s request to suspend 
that injunction, which the district court had granted and the court of 
appeals had reversed.118  Having been enjoined and having been 
unable to get out of the injunction, the Board’s independent 
constitutional authority ran out as to those parties. 
The levels of resistance did not increase much in the early 
months following Obergefell.  There was some early posturing by 
high-level officials in several southern states.  Chief Justice Roy 
Moore of the Supreme Court of Alabama argued that Obergefell was 
worse than Plessy v. Ferguson119 and Supreme Court decisions about 
slavery.120  Moore also warned that the decision would lead to 
persecution of Christians.121  The Attorney General of Texas opined 
that individual employees could seek a religious accommodation from 
issuing licenses to same-sex couples,122 while acknowledging that the 
elected county clerk almost certainly would be sued if no one in the 
office was able to provide the licenses.123 
Instead, the prevalent response was voluntary compliance.  The 
overwhelming majority of local officials in every state began issuing 
licenses to same-sex couples shortly after the decision.  Unlike with 
 
 116.  Paulsen, supra note 32, at 338. 
 117.  Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4–5. 
 118.  Id.; see Justin Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
1053,1058–59 (2014). 
 119.  Jeremy Diamond, Alabama chief justice: Marriage ruling worse than segregation 
decision, CNN (June 26, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/26/politics/roy-moore-conserv 
atives-gay-marriage-alabama-react/.   
 120.  Assoc. Press, supra note 82.   
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Letter from Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, to Dan Patrick, Lt. 
Governor (June 28, 2015), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/ 
51paxton/op/2015/kp0025.pdf; see also Josh Blackman, Thoughts on the Texas Attorney 
General’s Decision Concerning Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG 
(June 28, 2015), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/06/29/thoughts-on-the-texas-attorney-
generals-decision-concerning-same-sex-marriage-licenses/.  
 123.  Letter from Ken Paxton, supra note 122.  The letter cited Texas’s Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act as the basis for the accommodation, although it is unclear 
whether the statute is either necessary or sufficient to protect a public official in the face of 
a constitutional claim by a same-sex couple denied a license. 
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desegregation, public officials who were not inclined to comply 
resigned and left the scene124 or made noise from the wings, but 
without actively interfering with the enforcement of rights.  One 
report showed that approximately two months after Obergefell, fewer 
than twenty counties in Southern states were not issuing licenses to 
same-sex couples.125  And thirteen of those were in Alabama,126 where 
some probate judges were waiting for the Supreme Court of Alabama 
to vacate a mandamus order in light of Obergefell.127 
The most dramatic resistance came from Kim Davis, Clerk of 
Rowan County, Kentucky.  Under Davis’s instructions, the office 
stopped issuing marriage licenses to any couples, same—or 
opposite—sex.  And she not only refused to issue licenses herself, but 
prohibited her deputies from doing so.  Citing her religious beliefs 
and the state’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Davis insisted 
that, because those licenses were issued in her name as Clerk of the 
County, she was being compelled to recognize marriages in violation 
of her deeply held beliefs.  Judge David Bunning of the Eastern 
District of Kentucky applied Obergefell, rejected her religious-liberty 
arguments, and preliminarily enjoined her to begin issuing licenses.128  
Both Judge Bunning and the Sixth Circuit declined to stay that 
injunction. 
When Davis continued to refuse to issue licenses, 
notwithstanding the injunction, Bunning held Davis in civil contempt 
and jailed her over Labor Day weekend 2015.129  This sanction—which 
the ACLU, representing the plaintiffs, had opposed—made Davis a 
political celebrity.130  Once deputies in the office began issuing 
 
 124.  Entire Tenn. county clerk’s office resigns over same-sex marriage licenses, WKRN 
(July 2, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://wkrn.com/2015/07/02/entire-tenn-county-clerks-office-
resigns-over-same-sex-marriage-licenses/; Mark Joseph Stern, Two Clerks Resigned to 
Avoid Issuing Gay Marriage Licenses.  Good for Them!, SLATE (July 1, 2015, 9:48 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/07/01/clerks_resign_to_avoid_issuing_gay_marri
age_licenses_good.html. 
 125.  Greg Sargent, A Kentucky clerk is turning away gay couples.  But she’s a real 
rarity, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2 
015/09/01/a-kentucky-clerk-is-turning-away-gay-couples-but-shes-a-real-rarity/. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See infra notes 157–59 and accompanying text. 
 128.  Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-00044-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 
12, 2015). 
 129.  Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-44-DLB, (ED. Ky. Sept. 3, 2015) (minute order), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/davis.contempt.order_.pdf. 
 130.  Maxwell Tani, Kim Davis, the jailed clerk who refused to give out gay marriage 
licenses, was just honored like a rock star at a surreal rally, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 8, 
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licenses, Bunning lifted the contempt order and released Davis after 
five days, contingent on her not interfering with her deputies.131 
Bunning also clarified that the injunction required that licenses 
be issued to all legally eligible couples, not only the named 
plaintiffs.132  Unfortunately, his explanation for that extension showed 
the typical misunderstanding of the limited scope of his equitable 
power: 
 
Had the Court declined to clarify that its ruling 
applied to all eligible couples seeking a marriage 
license in Rowan County, it would have effectively 
granted Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and left 
other eligible couples at the mercy of Davis’ “no 
marriage licenses” policy, which the Court found to be 
in violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  Such an 
approach would not only create piecemeal litigation, it 
would be inconsistent with basic principles of justice 
and fairness.  Thus, when the need arose, the Court 
clarified that its ruling applied with equal force to all 
marriage license applicants in Rowan County, 
regardless of their involvement in this litigation.133 
 
While Judge Bunning’s heart was no doubt in the right place, the 
reasoning is inconsistent with the limited scope of a court’s injunctive 
 
2015, 4:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/kim-davis-eye-of-the-tiger-jail-2015-9.  
For a discussion of whether incarceration was even necessary, see Samuel Bagenstos, 
Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis Never Should Have Gone to Jail, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 8, 
2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122758/kentucky-clerk-kim-davis-never-should-
have-gone-jail; Marty Lederman, Does anyone have any idea what’s happening with 
marriages in Rowan County, Kentucky?, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 5, 2015), http://balkin 
.blogspot.com/2015/09/does-anyone-have-any-idea-whats.html. 
 131.  Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-44-DLB, (E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2015) (order for the release 
of Kim Davis), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/bunning .lift_.pdf.  
The last piece of that order somewhat hearkens back to the 1960s, where a district court 
similarly enjoined Alabama Governor George Wallace from interfering with other state 
officials in complying with injunctions to integrate schools.  See United States v. Wallace, 
218 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. Ala. 1963); Wasserman supra note 7, at 3, 9. 
 132.  Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-44-DLB, (E.D. Ky. Sept. 3, 2015) (order granting 
preliminary injunction), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/davis.inj 
unction.amended.pdf. 
 133.  Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-44-DLB, at *3–4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2015) (mem.), http:// 
www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2015/09/Judge-denies-Davis.pdf (emphasis added); 
see also Howard Wasserman, Justice and Fairness v. Procedure, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 24, 
2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/09/justice-and-fairness-v-procedure.ht 
ml. 
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power.  In moving to extend the injunction, the plaintiffs had offered 
a more plausible justification—that a pending motion for certification 
of a Rule 23(b)(2) class made the broader preliminary injunction 
appropriate to protect the interests of putative class members.134  But 
the court declined to follow that path, leaving the class issue 
untouched and leaving one issue on which he might be vulnerable for 
reversal on appeal. 
Other noncompliance was more symbolic than real.  For 
example, several weeks after Obergefell, the clerk in Hood County, 
Texas, refused to issue a license to a same-sex couple, purportedly 
because the office lacked the proper forms; when the couple filed a 
civil action in the Northern District of Texas, the clerk issued the 
license within a matter of hours.135 
It might be tempting to argue that the different response reflects 
present-day society being more receptive to social change, including 
judicially created social change.  But two other possibilities carry 
greater explanatory power.  One explanation is administrative.  States 
could drag their feet post-Brown in part because of the massive 
restructuring of state law and the operation of public schools 
necessary to achieve integration.  When the Supreme Court ordered 
states to comply with Brown with “all deliberate speed,”136 it 
recognized that the demand for forward progress had to be balanced 
against these executive and financial burdens.  But no such 
administrative burdens attach to approving or recognizing same-sex 
marriages, except perhaps some de minimis costs in creating new 
marriage license forms (that, for example, have two spaces for 
“Applicant” rather than one for “Husband” and one for “Wife”).  
This has two effects.  First, it becomes more difficult for officials to 
rely on anything other than “I disagree with the Supreme Court” to 
justify noncompliance, which may not be a politically feasible 
position.  Second, federal courts hearing the lawsuits necessitated by 
noncompliance are likely to be unsympathetic to defendant officials 
and quick to enjoin them to recognize same-sex marriages in the 
absence of countervailing state interests. 
 
 134.  Miller v. Davis, No. 15-cv-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4747531 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2015) 
(mem.); see also infra Part I.D. 
 135.  Caulkins, supra note 59; Wilonsky, supra note 59; see Howard Wasserman, What 
can plaintiffs sue for after Obergefell, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 6, 2015), http://prawfsblawg. 
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/07/what-plaintiffs-can-sue-for-after-obergefell.html. 
 136.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
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A second explanation is procedural—the incentives for voluntary 
compliance are more powerful today than in the period of Massive 
Resistance following Brown.  Actions for damages under § 1983 were 
not a significant part of the civil rights landscape in the years just after 
Brown.  It was not until several years later that the Supreme Court 
recognized that public officials are subject to liability even when they 
act contrary to state law137 and that local governments are liable for 
damages for constitutional harm resulting from their official 
policies.138  Further, prevailing civil rights plaintiffs were not entitled 
to attorney’s fees until Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Award Act of 1976,139 legislation explicitly designed to offer 
plaintiffs a greater chance at obtaining constitutional relief by 
providing competent counsel.140  These developments made Massive 
Resistance to same-sex marriage significantly more expensive than it 
was fifty years earlier, as fees easily could run into the hundreds-of-
thousands of dollars, as Rowan County has discovered.  It made fiscal 
sense for state and county officials to defer to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation in Obergefell and avoid further interbranch conflict—
to practice what Michael Paulsen calls “coordinacy.” 
C. The Limits of Persuasive Authority 
The concepts of precedent and injunction overlap, at least as a 
practical matter, when precedent is binding.141  Even if not bound by a 
judgment and even if free to reach different constitutional 
conclusions, state officials are likely to comply with circuit or 
Supreme Court precedent as to similarly situated parties.  They know 
that binding precedent guarantees that they will lose in any 
subsequent litigation, become subject to an injunction, and be made 
to pay attorneys’ fees and perhaps damages.  Thus, the cheapest, 
simplest, and likely least controversial move is for officials to act as if 
they are bound by a precedent.142  This explains Nebraska’s post-
Obergefell concession in the Eighth Circuit that it would abide by the 
Court’s precedent and no longer attempt to enforce its marriage ban 
 
 137.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 138.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 139.  Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
 140.  Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 (1986); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 751–52 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 141.  Fallon, supra note 6 at 1340; Fallon, supra note 6, at 924 n.31. 
 142.  Supra Part I.B. 
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against the plaintiffs,143 although not bound by the judgment in the 
case. 
On the other hand, the concepts diverge when comparing district 
court precedent, which is merely persuasive, to injunctions.  Attorney 
General Harris’ quick voluntary compliance in California preempted 
discussions percolating among some county officials about 
challenging, in state or federal court, the scope of the district court 
injunction in Perry or the attorney general’s supervisory authority to 
compel them to issue licenses to all similarly situated couples.144 
The effect of the gap between persuasive precedent and 
injunction was illustrated by a series of genuinely wild and 
misunderstood litigation moves in Florida and Alabama during the 
six months prior to Obergefell.  Judges in the Northern District of 
Florida and the Southern District of Alabama declared their 
respective state marriage bans unconstitutional and issued broad 
injunctions prohibiting the defendant officers from enforcing the 
laws.145  Both courts stayed their orders only for short periods, to give 
state officials time to seek stays from reviewing courts.146  After those 
appeals proved unsuccessful, both injunctions took effect.147  The 
plaintiff couples obviously were entitled to marriage licenses from the 
named defendants, on pain of contempt.  But no one—not the courts, 
the litigants, the media, or the public—quite grasped what this meant 
for the state as a whole, for similarly situated couples not protected 
by the injunction, or for other state officials not bound by the 
injunction. 
In both states, the statewide organization for the local officials 
(county clerks in Florida, probate judges in Alabama) charged with 
issuing marriage licenses took the position that the injunction only 
bound the named defendants to issue licenses to the named plaintiffs, 
 
 143.  Appellants Suggestion of Mootness and Motion to Vacate Preliminary 
Injunction, Waters v. Ricketts, 798 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-452), http://files.eqcf. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/12706015-Mootness-and-Motion-to-Vacate-PI-.pdf.  
 144.  Lederman, supra note 94; Wasserman, supra note 7; supra notes 89–98 and 
accompanying text.  
 145.  See, e.g., Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1207 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2015); 
Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1291 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015); Brenner v. Scott, 999 
F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014). 
 146.  Strawser, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1207; Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL 
328825, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Ala., filed Jan. 25, 2015); Brenner, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1293. 
 147.  Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015); Armstrong v. Brenner, 135 S. Ct. 890 
(2015); see supra Part I.D. 
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but had no effect beyond those parties.148  They advised their 
members that they were not obligated to issue licenses to any other 
couples and, indeed, were still prohibited from doing so by state law.  
In Alabama, Chief Justice Roy Moore asserted his authority as the 
chief administrative officer of the state courts to advise against149 and 
then prohibit150 probate judges from issuing licenses.  Moore 
emphasized the limited scope of the district court’s injunction, its 
nonapplication to nonparty probate judges, and the limited 
precedential authority of district court decisions. 
In response, federal courts in both states issued orders 
“clarifying” their injunctions.  Both judges acknowledged that their 
injunctions did not compel any nondefendant officers to issue licenses 
and did not compel issuance of licenses to any nonplaintiff couples.151  
But, both judges insisted, “the Constitution”152 did require issuance of 
licenses to other couples by nondefendant officials.  And both courts 
punctuated this point by recalling historical resistance to 
desegregation decrees and constitutional change.153  It is not clear 
what the judges hoped to convey or what they meant by saying “the 
Constitution” requires anything.  At best, it is a point about 
precedent—the Constitution as interpreted by that district judge in an 
earlier case requires issuance of the licenses.  Indeed, both judges 
expressly, and properly, recognized that new couples could bring new 
lawsuits and successfully obtain injunctions and attorney’s fees in 
light of that precedent.154 
What both courts as well as most observers missed is that this 
interpretation, as precedent, was persuasive only.  “The Constitution” 
 
 148.  Memorandum from Attorneys to FACC (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/250336675/Greenberg-Traurig-Revised-Memo-December-15-2014; Michael Finch II, 
Alabama Probate Judges Association Says Not to Issue Marriage Licenses to Same-Sex 
Couples on Monday, AL.COM (Jan. 25, 2015, 5:58 PM), http://www.al.com/news/mobile/ 
index.ssf/2015/01/alabama_probate_court_judges_gay_marriage.html. 
 149.  Memorandum from Chief Justice Roy S. Moore to Ala. Probate Judges (Feb. 3, 
2015), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272411089/Chief-Justice-Moore-s-Memorandum. 
 150.  Admin. Order of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Feb. 8, 2015), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272411125/CJ-Moore-Order-to-Ala-Probate-Judges.  
 151.  Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2015) (order clarifying 
judgment), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272411158/Searcy-v-Strange-1-28-15; Brenner v. 
Scott, No. 4:14-cv-107-RH/CAS, 2015 WL 44260, at *1 (N.D. Fla. 2015) (order on the 
scope of the preliminary injunction).   
 152.  Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N (S.D. Ala. Jan. 28, 2015) (order clarifying 
judgment) (emphasis added), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272411158/Searcy-v-Strange-1-
28-15; Brenner, 2015 WL 44260, at *1 (emphasis in original). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
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required issuance of licenses only because one district judge in a 
single judicial opinion had so interpreted it.  But this interpretation 
was not binding on any other court or judge in any other case, unless 
that second court chose to follow it.  And because precedent does not 
bind anyone outside of a court order, state officials could continue 
deciding for themselves what the Constitution meant and what it 
required. 
Officials knew that the next court—including even that same 
judge—might reach a different conclusion on the constitutional 
question when these couples initiated new litigation.  Unlike with 
Supreme Court or court of appeals precedent declaring what “the 
Constitution” required, district court precedent did not preordain the 
outcome of subsequent litigation.  However unlikely a different result 
might have been—especially if the action were brought before the 
same judge—the legal possibility remained. 
This, in turn, means that persuasive authority offers less 
incentive for officials to voluntarily comply rather than continuing to 
follow their own constitutional interpretation and fight the issue.  
Indeed, the compliance incentives worked very differently in the two 
states.  In Florida, the practical reality prevailed.  Both the state 
association of county clerks155 and the state attorney general156 
responded to the clarified order by acceding to clerks issuing licenses 
without awaiting further lawsuits, orders, or appeals. 
The clarifying order was far less effective in Alabama.  While 
some county officials began issuing licenses in response to the 
clarified order, far from all complied.157  What followed instead in 
Alabama was an escalating game of litigation chicken amid a circus of 
public confusion, which one of us discussed in detail elsewhere.158  The 
Supreme Court of Alabama exercised its original jurisdiction to issue 
a writ of mandamus prohibiting all state probate judges, other than 
those bound by the federal injunction, from issuing marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples.159  Through it all rang comparisons of ongoing 
 
 155.  Howard Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, Redux, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(Jan. 3, 2015, 9:31 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/01/the-process-of-
marriage-equality-redux.html. 
 156.  News Release, Attorney General Pam Biondi, Attorney General Pam Bondi’s 
Statement Regarding Judge Hinkle’s Order (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ 
newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/891D80F35B6D0B6985257DC0007E5358. 
 157.  Wasserman, supra note 7, at 6, 9. 
 158.  Id. at 10–11. 
 159.  Ex parte Alabama ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752 (Ala. 
Mar. 3, 2015); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 211–12.  In response, the plaintiffs converted 
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events to former Alabama Governor George Wallace and resistance 
to integration, with critics decrying Alabama’s “defiance” and 
“rebellion” against the federal judiciary and the Constitution.160 
But this criticism misunderstood the nature of judicial relief and 
the judicial process, the distinction between injunction and precedent 
and the limited imperative for state officials to voluntarily comply 
with precedent.161  In the end, it created a few weeks of intense public 
focus on that state, while illustrating the all-too-common gap between 
legal reality and popular rhetoric. 
D. Civil-Rights Injunction Class Actions 
The way to close the practical gap between an injunction and 
persuasive district court precedent is through a class action.  Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) permits class actions where “the 
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that 
apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as 
a whole.”162  The Supreme Court promulgated the rule in 1966 to 
facilitate civil rights actions seeking injunctive relief applicable to 
broad groups of plaintiffs and defendants.  This new procedural 
device was an explicit response to Massive Resistance and the 
experience with post-Brown desegregation litigation.  In cases 
involving other schools and other plaintiffs, courts often accorded 
relief only to the named individuals, such as by ordering them to be 
admitted into previously all-white schools.  But they did not provide 
the broad structural relief of integrating the schools in a way that 
would benefit a broad class of people.163 
Class status in civil rights litigation resolves that inefficiency by 
allowing for relief beyond the named individual plaintiffs and 
defendants.164  Certification enables the court to legitimately impose a 
broader injunction affording relief to all similarly situated people 
against all similarly situated officers.165  These broader injunctions can 
directly protect everyone in the class and directly obligate all officials 
 
the pending federal suit into a class action, applicable to all same-sex couples seeking 
licenses against every probate judge in the state.  Wasserman, supra note 7, at 13; see infra 
Part I.D. 
 160.  Id. at 11–12. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 163.  Carroll, supra note 14, at 15–16; Marcus, supra note 111, at 702–08; Marcus, supra 
note 5, at 6–7. 
 164.  LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 217; Marcus, supra note 5, at 28. 
 165.  LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 217. 
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to perform (or refrain from performing) some act with respect to 
every class member.  Because every similarly situated person is 
protected by and subject to the class judgment, no one is left to rely 
on subsequent litigation and the indirect precedential force of the 
prior decision.  And the obligations imposed on the defendants 
extend to all class members. 
Class certification seems particularly appropriate in marriage 
equality litigation, since the underlying facts were identical in every 
case and there was no possibility of legal, factual, remedial, or 
administrative differences among plaintiffs.166  Same-sex couples 
wanted to get married, took the necessary steps to do so, and were 
denied licenses by state officials following express state law 
prohibiting couples from marrying because they were of the same sex.  
The remedy would be the same for all couples—prohibiting state 
administrators from enforcing the marriage ban and obligating them 
to issue marriage licenses to all class members.  David Marcus 
categorizes this type of public-interest class action as involving 
necessarily interdependent claims with plausibly indivisible 
remedies—state law and state officials treated every couple the same, 
although an injunction ordering licenses to one couple but not others 
remained plausible.167  He calls these the “paradigmatic” candidates 
for 23(b)(2) certification.168 
At the same time, Marcus recognizes that class treatment may be 
less necessary in these cases, given the plausibility of each couple 
pursuing individual litigation.169  Moreover, the likelihood of 
voluntary compliance with precedent declaring a statute 
unconstitutional, may provide a basis for government officials to 
argue and courts to conclude, that class treatment is unnecessary.170 
 
 166.  Carroll, supra note 14, at 37; Marcus, supra note 14, at 61. 
 167.  Marcus, supra note 5, at 27. 
 168.  Id. at 50–51. 
 169.  Id. at 27–28. 
 170.  Mills v. Dist. of Columbia, 266 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Alliance to 
End Repression, 565 F.2d at 980); see also Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 
1973) (Friendly, J.) (affirming the district court’s denial of class certification on the ground 
that “the judgment run[s] to the benefit not only of the named plaintiffs but of all other 
similarly situated” claimants and the “State has made clear that it understands the 
judgment to bind it with respect to all claimants”).  Virginia made this argument in 
opposition to class certification.  See State Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Class Certification at *5–6, Harris v. McDonnell, 988 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. 
Va. Dec. 23, 2013) (No. 5:13-cv-77), https://www.scribd.com/doc/274519731/30-State-Defen 
dants-Brief-in-Opp-to-Plff-Mot-for-Class-Cert-8-30-13.   
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In response to the Supreme Court of Alabama’s mandamus 
order, and some state officials continuing to refuse to voluntarily 
comply with district court precedent,171 the Alabama plaintiffs turned 
to the injunctive class action.172  Judge Granade certified a plaintiff 
class defined as: 
 
All persons in Alabama who wish to obtain a marriage 
license in order to marry a person of the same sex and 
to have the marriage recognized under Alabama law, 
and who are unable to do so because of the 
enforcement of Alabama’s laws prohibiting the 
issuance of marriage licenses to same sex couples and 
barring recognition of their marriages.173 
 
The defendant class was defined as: 
 
All Alabama county probate judges who are enforcing 
or in the future may enforce Alabama’s laws barring 
the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
and refusing to recognize their marriages.174 
 
In a separate order, Judge Granade extended the preliminary 
injunction, previously entered against one probate judge in favor of 
four couples, to prohibit the defendant class from enforcing the 
state’s same-sex marriage ban.  The order further required them to 
issue marriage licenses to any member of the plaintiff class who 
followed the proper steps towards obtaining a license.  This extended 
injunction required every Alabama probate judge to issue licenses to 
any same-sex couples in Alabama who requested one, with every 
judge subject to contempt for noncompliance.175 
Recognizing the “imminent” resolution of Obergefell, however, 
Judge Granade stayed the class injunction “until the Supreme Court 
issues its ruling.”176  Following Obergefell, the plaintiffs argued, and 
Judge Granade agreed, that the stay lifted as soon as the Court issued 
its decision on June 26.  The class-wide preliminary injunction 
 
 171.  Supra notes 145–60 and accompanying text. 
 172.  Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1), (2) (establishing standards for class certification). 
 173.  Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449251, at *1 (S.D. Ala. May 
21, 2015). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Strawser, 2015 WL 2449468, at *1.  
 176.  Id. at *6. 
BLACKMAN&WASSERMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2015  4:34 PM 
Winter 2016] THE PROCESS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 279 
became immediately effective and binding on every probate judge in 
the state.177  In other words, precedent was converted into an 
injunction, and because of class certification, the injunction bound all 
possible similarly situated defendants and ran in favor of all possible 
similarly situated plaintiffs. 
While the days immediately following Obergefell were marked 
by scattered attempts by some probate judges to avoid issuing licenses 
to same-sex couples or to avoid issuing licenses at all,178 the now 
effective class injunction quickly ended those efforts by ensuring 
compliance without need for that additional step.  A couple denied a 
license by a probate judge would not have to initiate a new lawsuit or 
obtain a new injunction.  They instead could go directly to Judge 
Granade for an order enforcing the existing injunction, with no 
further constitutional analysis required.  The court would promptly 
order the probate judge to issue licenses under the terms of the 
injunction, with failure to comply sanctioned by civil contempt. 
The post-Obergefell confrontation in Rowan County, Kentucky, 
further illustrates the benefits of the class action strategy.  The day 
after Judge Bunning enjoined Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis (and 
her deputies) from refusing to issue licenses, two couples were denied 
licenses—one was a party to the case, and the other wasn’t.179 
Procedurally this was permissible as to the latter, because the 
injunction only compelled the clerk to issue licenses to four named 
couples.  It was impermissible, however, as to the former, and could 
have placed Davis in contempt.180  Of course, the plaintiffs recognized 
these possibilities and had sought class certification; but the court, 
without explanation, declined to rule on the request.  That failure, in 
turn, called into question the court’s later expansion of the injunction 
beyond the parties to all eligible persons seeking marriage licenses.181 
E. What if Obergefell had come out the other way? 
A final lens on the precedent/injunction distinction in marriage 
equality litigation is through a counter-factual: What would have 
 
 177.  Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C (S.D. Ala. July 1, 2015) (order clarifying 
preliminary injunction), http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Alabama-
Judge-Clarification-Order.pdf. 
 178.  See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 7, at 15; see supra notes 106–27 and 
accompanying text. 
 179.  Wasserman, supra note 7. 
 180.  As discussed previously, see supra notes 22–25, 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 181.  Supra notes 26–31, 52–61 and accompanying text. 
280 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 43:2 
happened, procedurally, had the Supreme Court gone the other way 
in Obergefell and ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
protect the right of same-sex couples to marry? 
In states under Article III-final injunctions prohibiting 
enforcement of the same-sex marriage ban,182 state attorneys general 
likely would have moved in the district courts under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate the injunctions in light of the binding 
change in constitutional law.183  In fact, however, the precedent-
injunction divide makes this move unnecessary.  Because the 
injunctions only prohibited enforcement of the marriage bans as to 
the named plaintiffs, the states had already satisfied those judgments 
when those same-sex couples received marriage licenses or otherwise 
had their marriages recognized. 
All other licenses were issued to same-sex couples in those states 
on the strength of officials’ voluntary compliance with that regionally 
binding precedent.  Of course, that voluntary compliance properly 
would cease in light of superseding nationally binding precedent.  As 
soon as the counter-factual Obergefell came out, a state official could 
decline to issue any further licenses, knowing that, if sued by new 
couples, the district court would not find him liable or enjoin him to 
issue licenses.  In other words, the state could alter its voluntary, 
precedent-guided behavior.  There would be no need to return to 
court for permission to do so. Further, the states would have no 
ongoing procedural duty to recognize those marriage licenses that 
were validly issued during the pendency of the litigation.184 
In states in which the injunction had not become Article III-final, 
the state could ask the court of appeals to reverse the district court in 
light of the new precedent and the change to Fourteenth Amendment 
law.  Courts of appeals generally apply the law in effect at the time it 
decides a case, even if the law has changed subsequent to the trial 
court decision.185  Again, however, the revised judgment is only 
 
 182.  This included California, Oregon, Utah, Oklahoma, Virginia, North Carolina, 
Wisconsin, and Indiana. 
 183.  Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239 (1997); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 
502 U.S. 367, 388 (1992). 
 184.  Two district courts found that the states were obligated to recognize validly 
issued marriage licenses as a matter of due process.  Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1192 
(D. Utah 2014); Caspar v. Snyder, No. 4:14-cv-11499, 2015 WL 224741 (E.D. Mi. Jan. 15, 
2015), https://www.scribd.com/doc/252720181/4-14-cv-11499-46. 
 185.  United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (Marshall, 
C.J.) (“It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to enquire 
whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not.  But if subsequent to the 
judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively 
changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied.”). 
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necessary as to the named plaintiff couples.  As to nonparties, state 
officials remain in the same situation described above—they could 
end their voluntary compliance, knowing that, if sued by new couples, 
the district court would not find them liable or issue an injunction in 
light of Obergefell.  And to the extent the injunction was not stayed 
pending appeal and the plaintiff couples already had received their 
licenses, no further steps would have been necessary. 
The one case in which state officials would have had to seek 
formal reversal or vacatur of a district court injunction would have 
been Strawser in Alabama.  Because that injunction had been 
extended to a class of every probate judge obligated to issue licenses 
to a class of every same-sex couple seeking a license, the obligation to 
issue licenses across the state came directly from the injunction, not 
merely from precedent and voluntary compliance with precedent.  
The class injunction would remain in force, albeit temporarily.  The 
counter-factual Obergefell would require the court to vacate its 
judgment, although the defendants still would have had to take the 
extra step of moving for that relief.  This again demonstrates how the 
class action device affects the injunction/precedent line. 
II. Stays, Cert Denials, and the Supreme Court 
After district courts began enjoining enforcement of same-sex 
marriage bans and compelling the issuance of licenses and recognition 
of same-sex marriages, the judges confronted when and how those 
injunctions should take effect.  The question of whether to stay a 
judgment pending appeal, and the controversy and confusion it 
created throughout the Article III judiciary, made marriage equality 
largely unprecedented as a constitutional-litigation campaign. 
We discuss the stay issue in a chronology, divided into four 
phases, each defined by a different signal from the Court and a broad 
range of responses to those signals from the lower courts.  The initial 
period involved the sui generis case from the District of Utah, the first 
post-Windsor decision invalidating a state ban.  The eleven-day 
period from Christmas Eve 2014, when the court invalidated the 
Beehive state’s ban, until January 7, 2014, when the Supreme Court 
intervened with a stay, was a litigation steeplechase.  The second 
period began after the Utah controversy, with the Supreme Court 
apparently signaling that lower courts should put on hold any 
injunctions until the appeals process was completed.  This message 
lasted until October 2014, when the Supreme Court unexpectedly 
denied certiorari in cases from three circuits, sending a third signal 
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that the same-sex marriage bans likely would not withstand 
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, so lower courts should not stay 
injunctions during the appeals process.  The fourth period began in 
January 2015, when the Court granted certiorari in the case from the 
Sixth Circuit that became Obergefell, lasting until the Court’s decision 
on the merits in June.  During this period, the lower courts split on 
whether to stay judgments until the Supreme Court finally resolved 
the issue once and for all. 
Events within each period illustrate how different courts read or 
ignored the prevailing signals from the shadow docket.  They also 
show that the “correct” answer to the stay question, at least for courts 
relying on Supreme Court signals, arguably shifted in each new 
period. 
A. Injunctions and Stays 
Three themes emerged on the question of stays in the same-sex 
marriage litigation.  First, these cases teed up the question of when 
lower courts should stay judgments pending review by a higher court. 
Generally, courts consider four factors in deciding whether to stay a 
judgment: (1) whether the stay applicant (the loser in the lower court) 
has made a “strong showing” that he is likely to succeed on the merits 
of the appeal; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured 
absent the stay; (3) whether the stay will substantially injure other 
interested parties; and (4) where the public interest lies.186  Although 
stays and preliminary injunctions are distinction mechanisms, they 
overlap in function and in the factors governing each.187  A 
preliminary injunction alters the status quo and the stay suspends that 
alteration,188 leaving reviewing courts time and space to “responsibly 
fulfill their role in the judicial process.”189  But a court must not 
“reflexively” hold every order in abeyance pending review.190  The 
decision to grant a stay involves the exercise of sound discretion and 
the propriety of a stay depends on the circumstances of each case.191 
The likelihood-of-success prong presents two potential 
difficulties, particularly for the district court that issued the 
injunction.  First, the inquiry requires the court to predict the losing 
 
 186.   Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 
U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). 
 187.  Id. at 1758, 1761. 
 188.  Id. at 1758.  
 189.  Id. at 1757. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. at 1760. 
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party’s likely success before a reviewing court—in other words, 
predict how a higher court will decide the issue.  This prediction 
departs from a lower court’s ordinary approach to legal analysis.192  
Second, the stay decision may be affected by what one scholar calls 
“lock in”—the court becomes tied to its position that the plaintiffs 
were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim, 
thereby justifying the injunction in the first instance.193  The judge 
struggles to conceive of the defendants prevailing on the merits on 
appeal.194  In other words, having declared a marriage law 
unconstitutional, it would be difficult for the same judge to imagine a 
higher court declaring the law to be constitutional. 
The remaining factors, when considered together, seek to 
balance the need for responsible, unpressured appellate review with 
the prevailing party’s entitlement to prompt execution of orders 
benefitting them.195  Courts are less likely to stay a prohibitory or 
negative injunction, such as an order barring the government from 
enforcing a challenged law.  For one thing, a negative injunction does 
not prohibit enforcement of the challenged law against anyone other 
than the named plaintiffs.196  If the injunction is reversed on appeal, 
the state will have an opportunity to enforce the law, including 
against the plaintiff.197  By contrast, courts might be more likely to stay 
a mandatory or positive injunction requiring the state to take 
affirmative steps, which cannot be undone (or can be undone only at 
great difficulty and cost) should the injunction eventually be 
reversed.198 
 
 192.  Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 690–93 
(1995); compare id. at 679 with Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The 
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 74 (1994). 
 193.  Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
779, 804 (2014). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Nken, 129 U.S. at 1757. 
 196.  Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452, 456 n.3 (1974). 
 197.  There is a nice question whether conduct engaged in under the protection of a 
preliminary injunction can be the subject of a later prosecution if the injunction is reversed 
and lifted.  Compare Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 649-50 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) with id. at 657-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see 
also Mike Dorf, Can a Federal Appeal Court Provide “Grandfather” Status to  Utah Same-
Sex Marriages if the District Court Ruling is Later Reversed on Appeal?, DORF ON LAW 
(Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/12/can-federal-court-provide-grandfather. 
html. That question is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 198.  Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1208 (D. Utah 2014) (citing University of 
Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 398 (1981)); see also Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940, 
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The marriage cases were unique because the injunctions were 
both prohibitory and mandatory.  State officials were prohibited from 
enforcing bans on same-sex marriage (a negative order) and also were 
mandated to license or recognize same-sex marriages of the named 
plaintiffs (a positive order).  Thus, without a stay, the plaintiff couples 
would be legally entitled to marriage licenses and state officials would 
immediately be obligated to issue them.  State officials also would 
likely voluntarily comply with the precedent created by the 
(unstayed) judgment and issue licenses to similarly situated couples. 
But once a couple has been married, it is difficult for the state to 
undo that marriage if the judgment were reversed on appeal based on 
the reviewing court’s determination that bans on same-sex marriage 
are constitutionally valid.  States would face two unappealing options.  
First, the state could continue to recognize a large number of same-
sex couples as legally married in the state, even though valid state 
policy would continue to prohibit any other same-sex couples from 
marrying.  Second, and even worse, the state would have to 
retroactively invalidate recognized marriages and suspend all 
attendant benefits, including spousal support and custody 
arrangements, that the couples had come to rely on.199  Whether as 
part of the irreparable harm, substantial injury, or public interest 
prongs, the possibility of post-litigation chaos loomed in various ways.  
The way to avoid chaos is to stay the injunction, ensuring that no 
marriage licenses issue prior to the end of litigation. 
Of course, it remains questionable whether chaos qualifies as 
irreparable harm to the state justifying a stay.  William Baude 
wondered: 
 
[W]hat was the irreparable harm suffered by the state 
in the absence of a stay, if marriages were 
provisionally recognized over the summer? .  . .  Or did 
the Court as a whole intend to finally endorse the 
categorical claim that “any time a State is enjoined by 
a court from effectuating statutes enacted by 
 
191 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application of stay) (citing 
San Diegans for Mt. Soledad Nat. War Memorial v. Paulson, 548 U. S. 1301 (2006))) 
(Kennedy, J., in chambers) (staying an injunction requiring a city to remove its religious 
memorial). 
 199.  Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Too much for Hitler: Why same-sex marriage is 
irreversible, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 8, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/10/too-much-
for-hitler-why-same-sex.html (arguing that it is “morally impossible” for a state to 
invalidate marriages at a later date). 
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representatives of its people, it suffers a form of 
irreparable injury.”200 
 
The answer may be that the inability to enforce its laws simpliciter is 
not irreparable harm, but the inability to enforce combined with the 
chaos of inconsistent marital statuses, and the provisioning of marital 
benefits, should be irreparable harm. 
The second theme is the force and effect of what William Baude 
calls the Court’s shadow docket.  These are the summary decisions, 
stays, cert denials, and other orders that the Court regularly issues,201 
typically with minimal, if any, briefing, reasoning, or explanation.202  
Through that shadow docket, the Court (or individual Justices) 
engage in what Richard Re calls “signaling”—taking official actions 
that do not establish conventional precedent or resolve ultimate 
merits issues, but nonetheless suggest, perhaps deliberately, how 
lower courts should decide cases.203  These unexplained stays and cert 
decisions played a significant role in the marriage equality litigation.  
At various points over the two years from Windsor to Obergefell, the 
Court stayed or declined to stay lower court decisions, unexpectedly 
denied cert in some cases, and unsurprisingly granted cert in other 
cases, all without explanation and often without apparent dissent.  At 
the same time, lower courts appeared conflicted about what to do 
with the penumbras emanating from the shadow docket—whether to 
decide cases by exercising their best judgment applying the traditional 
four factors in light of existing precedent or to be guided by the 
Court’s non-precedential and unexplained signals. 
The third and related theme revolves around the centrality of the 
Supreme Court in constitutional litigation.  The Justices have taken it 
upon themselves to resolve a significant constitutional issue, 
especially when it divides lower courts.  This was especially true for 
the same-sex marriage cases.  The existence of identical laws in so 
many states functionally created a nearly nationwide prohibition on 
same-sex marriage. Resolving the constitutional validity of this policy 
forms the core of the Court’s role of judicial review.  Given that 
inevitably, lower courts arguably were obligated to decide cases with 
 
 200.  Baude, supra note 10, at 12–13 (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) 
(Roberts, C.J., in chambers)). 
 201.  Id. at 3.  
 202.  Id. at 5. 
 203.  Richard M. Re, Supreme Court Signals, PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 12, 2014), http:// 
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/11/supreme-court-signals.html. 
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an eye to minimizing issues that might complicate or hamper the 
Court’s ultimate review.  For example, district judges should have 
recognized that thousands of marriages could be invalidated if the 
Supreme Court were to ultimately uphold the bans.  This should have 
influenced what courts did to define and maintain the status quo 
pending completion of litigation. 
The Court exercised a high degree of control over when and how 
it would decide the issue through a series of unexplained stay orders 
and certiorari denials.  It also attempted to control the status quo and 
ensure that lower courts did not negatively affect its eventual review 
or otherwise move too fast on the issue, through its stay and certiorari 
decisions.  The problem emerged that lower courts differed on the 
deference owed to that procedural control.  And the Court arguably 
can be blamed for relying on its non-precedential orders that did not 
explain what it was doing or how lower courts should respond.  The 
inferior courts were forced to read between the lines. 
B. Phase I: Utah: Christmastime, 2013 
The first phase of the marriage equality litigation began in—of 
all places—Utah, a state whose admission to the Union was 
contingent on restricting marriage to one man and one woman (stress 
on “one”).204  On December 20, 2013, Judge Robert J. Shelby of the 
District of Utah rendered the first post-Windsor decision invalidating 
the states same-sex marriage ban, and immediately enjoining its 
enforcement.  Most significantly for our purposes, the court did not 
impose a stay or delay the judgment to offer time to appeal.  The 
decision did not even address any of the stay factors.205  Worse, the 
judge issued the decision at 1:30 p.m. MST on the Friday before 
Christmas.  That afternoon, the Salt Lake County Clerk began issuing 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.206  In what CNN described as 
“joyful mayhem,” hundreds of people lined up at the Clerk’s office, as 
the office stayed open past 5 p.m.207 
 
 204.  On July 16, 1894, Congress enacted the Enabling Act that paved the way for 
Utah’s admission to the Union.  Section 3 provided, “[t]hat polygamous or plural 
marriages are forever prohibited.”  Enabling Act, UTAH STATE ARCHIVES, http://archives 
.utah.gov/research/exhibits/Statehood/1894text.htm. 
 205.  Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013).  
 206.  Emergency Motion for Stay at 3, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 
2014), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272208444/13-12-20-Emergency-Motion-for-Stay.   
 207.  Tom Watkins, In Utah, judge’s ruling ignites same-sex marriage frenzy, CNN 
(Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/20/justice/utah-same-sex-marriage-ruling/ind 
ex.html.  
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In a conference call with counsel several hours later, the district 
court declined to stay the order sua sponte or to entertain an oral 
motion to stay.208  Instead, Judge Shelby insisted that Utah file a 
written motion and ordered full briefing on the issue.209  
Unfortunately, a ruling following briefing would not be prompt 
enough to avoid the issuance of more licenses.  The Salt Lake County 
Clerk was scheduled to open and resume issuing licenses to same-sex 
couples at 8 a.m. on Monday,210 one hour before Judge Shelby’s 
scheduled hearing.211 
Utah launched a two-pronged attack to preserve the status quo.  
First, on Friday evening, Utah filed a written motion with Judge 
Shelby for stay pending appeal.  The Attorney General cited the 
Ninth Circuit’s grant of a stay in Perry v. Schwarzenegger—the 
challenge to California’s Prop 8 litigation—as demonstrating the need 
“to preserve the status quo pending appellate determination.”212  In 
Perry, however, Judge Walker stayed his judgment only for six days, 
leaving it to the court of appeals to put the mandate on hold.213  The 
court of appeals did so four days later.214  The situation in Utah would 
not play out so neatly.  Second, Utah filed an emergency motion with 
the Tenth Circuit to stay the injunction until Judge Shelby ruled on 
the pending motion to stay.215  The Attorney General explained that 
the district court would not rule before the Salt Lake County Clerk’s 
office would reopen on Monday and the stay was necessary to give 
Judge Shelby time to make his decision. 
On Sunday, December 22, Tenth Circuit Judges Holmes and 
Bacharach denied the state’s emergency motion.  The motions panel 
explained that the rules of appellate procedure only permit the court 
to stay a final judgment pending appeal.  The court could not stay a 
 
 208.  Emergency Motion for Stay, supra note 206, at 2–3. 
 209.  Id. at 3. 
 210.  Id.  
 211.  Kitchen v. Herbert, District Court Docket No. 95 (D. Utah. Dec. 21, 2013). 
 212.  Defendants’ Motion to Stay Pending Appeal, Kitchen v. Herbert, 916 F. Supp. 2d 
1181 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272209007/13-12-20-Defen 
dants-Motion-to-Stay-Pending-Appeal, citing Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1070 (9th 
Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded by Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).  
 213.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  
 214.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 
16, 2010). 
 215.  Emergency Motion for Stay, supra note 206, at 3.   
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judgment pending the district court’s decision on a motion to stay.216  
The denial was without prejudice, giving the state leave to file a 
proper motion for a stay pending appeal of a final judgment.  Early 
Monday morning, Utah filed with the Tenth Circuit a new emergency 
motion for temporary resolution of stay motions,217 which Judges 
Holmes and Bacharach promptly denied.218  The court explained, 
again, that the court of appeals cannot stay a judgment pending 
district court resolution of a stay motion.219  Further, the court 
rejected the government’s “anticipatory request” to stay the district 
court’s order in the event of an adverse ruling (on the motion for 
stay) later that day.220 
At 9 a.m. that day, Judge Shelby held a hearing on the 
government’s motion for stay pending appeal.  At the end of the 
hearing, he denied from the bench the written motion he had 
requested, then issued a seven-page order later in the day.221  Judge 
Shelby offered four reasons for denying the stay.  First, the state had 
not submitted evidence showing a likelihood of success on appeal.222  
Second, Utah would suffer no harm by allowing same-sex couples to 
marry while the appeal was pending.  The “court only consider[ed] 
the harm done to the State and not to the same-sex couples whose 
marriage arrangements may be subject to legal challenge.”223  Third, 
the court concluded that some of the couples “may be facing serious 
illness or other issues that do not allow them the luxury of waiting for 
such a delay.”224  Finally, the public interest “weigh[ed] in favor of 
protecting the constitutional rights of Utah’s citizens” to same-sex 
marriage.225  Judge Shelby even rejected a request for a stay to allow 
the Tenth Circuit to decide whether a stay is appropriate, insisting 
that doing so would not maintain the status quo. 
Part of the problem with Judge Shelby’s reasoning was a strange 
understanding of the status quo.  On Friday morning, the status quo 
 
 216.  Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2013) (order denying stay), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/273884289/13-12-22-Order-Denying-Motion-to-Stay.   
 217.  Emergency Motion for Stay, supra note 206.   
 218.  Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (order denying stay), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272300692/13-12-23-Order-Denying-Renewed-Motion.  
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013) (order denying stay), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272300792/13-12-23-District-Courts-Order-on-Motion-to-Stay.  
 222.  Id. at 3.  
 223.  Id. at 5. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. at 6. 
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was what it had been for a century—Utah would not issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.  Judge Shelby’s order, without a stay, 
immediately and perhaps irreparably altered the status quo.  It now 
became the new normal that same-sex couples were allowed to marry, 
as the Clerk of Salt Lake County recognized.226  Thus, Judge Shelby 
reasoned, a stay would amount to an injunction preventing county 
clerks from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  In other 
words, an alteration of the status quo.  But this misunderstands the 
nature of injunctions and stays and their respective effects on the 
status quo.  The stay would alter the status quo on Monday only 
because the court had already altered the status quo on Friday with 
its injunction.  The point of a stay would be to suspend that 
alteration.227  Had Judge Shelby issued the stay on Friday, the 
practical status quo would have remained unchanged.  Even if Judge 
Shelby was correct in anticipating how the Supreme Court would 
ultimately rule, at the time the decision wreaked of hubris.  Michael 
Dorf argued that Shelby’s decision not to stay the judgment reflected 
both the “correct moral outcome” and the “correct legal outcome,” 
but was “still wrong,” because “only a fool can confidently predict 
exactly what the Supreme Court will do in this case.”228 
Shortly after the district court denied the stay on Monday, Utah 
filed two emergency motions in the court of appeals for a stay 
pending appeal and stay pending resolution of the motion to stay; 
Judges Holmes and Bacharach promptly denied both the following 
day.  They insisted that Utah was not likely to succeed on appeal and 
there was not a strong threat of irreparable harm absent a stay.229 
Utah then waited a full week before petitioning the Supreme 
Court for a stay pending appeal on New Year’s Eve.230  Justice 
Sotomayor, as Tenth Circuit Justice, called for a response by January 
3, 2014, although she did not issue a stay on her own initiative.231  
 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2009).  
 228.  Michael Dorf, Was Tenth Circuit Correct Not to Stay The District Court SSM 
Ruling?, DORF ON LAW, (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/12/was-10th-
circuit-correct-not-to-stay.html.  
 229.  Herbert v. Kitchen, No. 2:13-CV-00217-RJS (10th Cir. Dec. 24, 2013) (order 
denying emergency motion for stay and temporary motion for stay), https://www.scribd. 
com/ doc/272301500/13-12-24-Order-Denying-Emer-Motion-for-Stay.   
 230.  Herbert v. Kitchen Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 13A687, http://www.sup 
remecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/13a687.htm.   
 231.  In contrast, also on New Year’s Eve, Justice Sotomayor both called for a 
response and issued a stay against the enforcement of the Affordable Care Act’s 
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Under the Supreme Court’s rules it takes five Justices to grant a 
stay.232  On January 6, 2014, the full Court granted the stay, without 
comment or dissent.  The meaning of that order would remain hotly 
contested in the lower courts for the next nine months. 
Seventeen days after Judge Shelby’s order, the judgment was 
finally stayed and same-sex marriages were put on hold.  In the 
interim, Utah issued over 1,300 marriage licenses to same-sex couples, 
nearly 1,000 of which were solemnized.  The recognition of these 
marriages would be subject to future litigation.233 
Much of the blame for this disorder falls to Utah, which failed to 
request a stay of the judgment in advance, a point Judge Shelby 
emphasized in his order.234  Even if a stay might have been warranted, 
judges are not obligated to do so sua sponte.  Utah, however, was not 
entirely at fault.  It was likely unthinkable when summary judgment 
motions were filed following Windsor that the court would invalidate 
the law on the Friday before Christmas and let the judgment take 
effect immediately, particularly without performing a stay analysis.  
This was a mandatory injunction, requiring the state to take some 
action, making a stay especially appropriate.  And being the first 
federal decision post-Windsor to invalidate a state ban should have 
counseled further caution.  That Judge Shelby ultimately denied from 
the bench the written motion for a stay that he had requested, 
followed a few hours later by a seven-page opinion, makes it fairly 
apparent that he did not think a stay was warranted, whether or not 
the state requested it.  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit promptly denied a 
stay pending appeal.  In short, while Utah should be faulted for failing 
to request a stay in advance, the state would not have received the 
relief they ultimately requested. 
 
contraceptive mandate against the Little Sisters of the Poor, see Little Sisters of the Poor 
v. Sebelius Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 13A691, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/13A691.htm.   
 232.  Stephen R. McAllister, Practice Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 
J. KAN. B. ASS’N, April 1995, at 25, 37 (“It takes five votes to grant a stay, although it 
takes only four votes to grant a cert petition.”).  
 233.  Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1197 (D. Utah 2014).  This was not the first 
time there was a race to the courthouse for same-sex marriage licenses.  In 2004, dozens of 
gay and lesbian couples got married in New Mexico’s Sandoval County in a single day, 
until the county clerk received orders from the attorney general to stop.  The courts never 
decided whether the marriages were valid, so the couples remained legally married.  At 
least one pair got divorced.  So What Happens to the Same-Sex Marriage Licenses Issued in 
Utah, WSJ LAW BLOG (Jan. 6, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/01/06/so-what-happens 
-to-the-same-sex-marriage-licenses-issued-in-utah/. 
 234.  Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 2013) (order denying 
motion to stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272208577/13-12-23-District-Courts-Order-on 
-Motion-to-Stay.   
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C. Phase II: Certiorari Pending: January-October 2014 
The lower courts divided over the significance of the Supreme 
Court’s unexplained order in Kitchen.  Some accepted it as a 
command to stay judgments until the full process played out through 
the courts of appeals and certiorari to the Supreme Court.  Other 
courts did not get the same message and either distinguished or 
disregarded those orders.  The overarching problem was the possible 
gap between the signal emanating from one (and eventually two 
more) unexplained Supreme Court orders and lower courts’ analysis 
of the stay factors.  Courts had to decide the weight to give that 
unexplained order in a case with identical consequences in the denial 
of the stay and to balance that against their independent equitable 
analysis. 
District courts fell into three groups.  One group stayed 
judgments until the appeals process was completed.  A second group 
did not stay their judgments pending appeal, but did issue stays to 
give the court of appeals an opportunity to decide whether a stay was 
warranted.  Finally, a third group, which also included the Fourth and 
Tenth Circuits, refused to stay their judgments at all, prompting the 
Supreme Court to intervene, as it had in Utah. 
1. Staying the Judgment 
Five district courts—the District of Oklahoma,235 Eastern District 
of Virginia,236 Western District of Texas,237 Southern District of 
Ohio,238 and Western District of Kentucky—got it right.  Each 
declared inavlid bans on same-sex marriage, but put their judgments 
on hold pending the review process.  They generally cited the 
Supreme Court’s order in Kitchen. 
Judge John G. Heyburn of the Western District of Kentucky’s 
analysis was particularly measured.  The Supreme Court “has sent a 
 
 235.  Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (“[I]n 
accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in a nearly identical case on 
appeal from the District Court of Utah to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, see Herbert 
v. Kitchen . . . the Court stays execution of this injunction pending the final disposition of 
any appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.”). 
 236.  Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
 237.  De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 666 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (“In accordance 
with the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay in Herbert v. Kitchen . . .  and consistent with 
the reasoning provided in Bishop and Bostic, this Court stays execution of this preliminary 
injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.”).  
 238.  Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1512541, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 
2014). 
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strong message by its unusual intervention and order in [Kitchen].  It 
cannot be easily ignored.”239  But he recognized the need to balance 
the interests of plaintiffs, who appeared to have won important 
constitutional rights, against the systemic interests in complete review 
without chaos: 
 
Perhaps it is difficult for Plaintiffs to understand how 
rights won can be delayed.  It is a truth that our 
judicial system can act with stunning quickness, as this 
Court has; and then with sometimes maddening 
slowness.  One judge may decide a case, but ultimately 
others have a final say.  It is the entire process, 
however, which gives our judicial system and our 
judges such high credibility and acceptance.  This is 
the way of our Constitution.  It is that belief which 
ultimately informs the Court’s decision to grant a stay.  
It is best that these momentous changes occur upon 
full review, rather than risk premature implementation 
or confusing changes.  That does not serve anyone 
well.240 
 
Those systemic interests, in terms of the broader public-interest, even 
overcame the apparent weakness of the state’s constitutional 
arguments on the merits.  Following Judge Heyburn’s lead, Judge 
Timothy Black of the Southern District of Ohio found that the 
government was unlikely to prevail on appeal and would not be 
irreparably harmed.  But on the chance that the government did 
succeed on appeal, the result could be “confusion, potential inequity, 
and high costs.”241  The public interest warranted a stay because 
“[p]remature celebration and confusion do not serve anyone’s best 
interests. The federal appeals courts need to rule, as does the United 
States Supreme Court.”242 
 
 239.  Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 558 (W.D. Ky.) rev’d sub nom. DeBoer 
v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) cert. granted sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 1039 (2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) and 
cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) and cert. granted sub nom. Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S. 
Ct. 1041 (2015) and rev’d sub nom.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 240.  Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 558 (emphasis added).  
 241.  Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1512541, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 
2014). 
 242.  Id. 
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2. Stays to Permit Appeals 
Other judges stayed their judgments to allow the state to seek a 
stay from the courts of appeals.  Notably, this was similar to the 
process that Judge Walker and the Ninth Circuit employed in Perry.243  
While this approach gave states time to review the injunctions and 
avoided the immediate chaos of a race to the altar, it still occasioned a 
mad scramble to obtain a stay before the judgment went into effect.  
Such time-limited stays also created the risk that the court of appeals 
would not intervene in time. 
a. District of Idaho 
After invalidating Idaho’s marriage ban, Chief Magistrate Judge 
Candy Wagahoof Dale of the District of Idaho denied the state’s 
motion to stay pending appeal, but set her injunction to take effect 
less than 72 hours later.244  The state noticed its appeal that day, and 
two days later the Ninth Circuit temporarily stayed the judgment 
pending resolution of the stay motion.245  Five days after that, the 
court granted a stay pending the entire appeals process.246  It took the 
Ninth Circuit eight days to consider the weighty matter, far more than 
the three the district judge had initially allotted. 
Notably, Ninth Circuit Judge Hurwitz concurred in the stay 
order, but stressed that he did so solely because the Supreme Court 
“has virtually instructed courts of appeals to grant stays in the 
circumstances before us today.”247  He insisted that he would have 
reached a different conclusion “[i]f we were writing on a cleaner 
state” and independently weighed the traditional four factors.  He 
also rejected the state’s irreparable harm argument, finding that 
“[a]ny harm resulting from the possible invalidity of marriage licenses 
issued pendente lite to same-sex couples would be primarily suffered 
by the plaintiffs, not the State.”248  Again, however, the analysis 
turned on the public-interest element and here, even while 
 
 243.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 244.  Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1087 (D. Idaho) aff’d, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 
2014) cert. denied, No. 14-765, 2015 WL 2473531 (U.S. June 30, 2015) and cert. denied sub 
nom.  Idaho v. Latta, 135 S. Ct. 2931 (mem.) (2015).   
 245.  Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. May 15, 2014) (order granting temporary 
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270977326/Latta-v-Otter-14-5-15-Temporary-Stay. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Id. 
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disagreeing with the conclusion, Judge Hurwitz captured the import 
of the Kitchen order: 
 
[A]lthough the Supreme Court’s order in Herbert is 
not in the strictest sense precedential, it provides a 
clear message—the Court (without noted dissent) 
decided that district court injunctions against the 
application of laws forbidding same-sex unions should 
be stayed at the request of state authorities pending 
court of appeals review.”249 
b. District of Utah (again) 
In Evans v. Herbert, Judge Dale Kimball held that Utah must 
recognize those 1,300 marriage licenses issued during the seventeen-
day interregnum following initial invalidation of Utah’s same-sex 
marriage ban in Kitchen v. Herbert.250  He then stayed the decision for 
twenty-one days (a much more reasonable time period) to allow the 
state to seek a stay from the Tenth Circuit.  The state appealed 
eighteen days later and the Clerk of the Tenth Circuit temporarily 
stayed the injunction.251  Three weeks later, a divided panel issued a 
stay only to give the state time to seek a stay from the Supreme 
Court.252 
Judge Kelly dissented from that order, insisting that the mandate 
should be permanently stayed pending completion of review, “to 
allow for an orderly resolution of this controversy and one based 
upon the rule of law.”253  He argued that denying the stay 
“complements the chaos begun by the district court in Kitchen,” 
where “the State was compelled to issue marriage licenses to 
hundreds of same-gender couples” before “the Supreme Court 
granted a stay.”254  The dissent highlighted the oddity of the situation: 
even though the Supreme Court stayed the decision in Kitchen, the 
court of appeals did not stay the resulting order in Evans.  “The rule 
contended for by the Plaintiffs—that a federal district court may 
change the law regardless of appellate review and the State is stuck 
 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1214 (D. Utah 2014).   
 251.  Evans v. Herbert, No. 14-4060 (10th Cir. June 5, 2014) (order granting temporary 
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270979850/Evans-v-Herbert-2014-06-05-Temporary-St 
ay. 
 252.  Evans v. Herbert, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1230 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Id.  
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with the result in perpetuity—simply cannot be the law. It would not 
only create chaos, but also undermine due process and fairness.”255  
Further, “[i]t is disingenuous to contend that the State will suffer no 
harm if the matter is not stayed; undoing what is about to be done will 
be labyrinthine and has the very real possibility to moot important 
issues that deserve serious consideration.”256  Granting the “stay 
would simply maintain the status quo until this case—and the broader 
issue to ultimately be resolved in Kitchen—comes to a resolution via 
the normal legal process, including that currently unfolding in the 
Utah courts.”257  Rather, the “State and its citizens, and respect for the 
law, are better served by obtaining complete, final judicial resolution 
of these issues.”258  The Supreme Court would agree with Judge Kelly, 
and once again promptly stayed the order,259 without recorded 
dissent.260 
Evans reflected a pattern in the District of Utah and the Tenth 
Circuit.  For the second time, the district court declined to stay its 
judgment, forcing Utah to seek an emergency stay from the Tenth 
Circuit.  For the second time, the court of appeals declined to stay the 
 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id.   
 257.  Id.  
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Evans v. Herbert, No. 14A65 (U.S. July 18, 2014) (order granting stay pending 
appeal), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/071814zr_d18e.pdf.  
 260.  In an interview, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the lack of a dissent from denial 
of a stay does not indicate that an order was unanimous.  See Justices Silent Over 
Execution Drug Secrecy, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/n 
ews/2014/aug/3/justices-silent-over-execution-drug-secrecy/?page=all.  Ginsburg further 
suggested that it might depend on institutional concerns; see also Baude, supra note 10, at 
3.  Consider what Ginsburg said about Justice Sotomayor’s position on the grant of a stay 
in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius:  
“NLJ: A day after the Hobby Lobby decision, the court, with three dissents, issued an 
injunction against the application of the contraceptive insurance requirement to Wheaton 
College, a religious institution.  Wheaton had objected to getting an exemption via a self-
certifying letter stating its objections to the coverage.  You assigned the Wheaton dissent 
to Justice Sotomayor as well and she wrote a blistering opinion. 
GINSBURG: That may have been the same thing.  She granted the stay in Little Sisters of 
the Poor [raising similar objections to the letter] because she was the Tenth Circuit justice.  
I think it was another case where she wanted to make clear what her view was.  Besides, 
there was enough in my dissent in Hobby Lobby. I had said everything I wanted to say on 
that subject so it was appropriate for somebody else.”  http://nationallawjournal.com/ 
module/alm/app/nlj.do#!/article/1701862687; see also Josh Blackman, Little Sisters of the 
Poor v. Sebelius, Ginsburg, J., dissent from granting of stay on behalf of Sotomayor, J., 
after the fact, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Aug. 22, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/201 
4/08/22/little-sisters-of-the-poor-v-sebelius-ginsburg-j-dissenting-from-granting-of-stay-on-
behalf-of-sotomayor-j-after-the-fact/.  
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judgment pending appeal, forcing Utah to seek an emergency stay 
from the Supreme Court.  And for the second time, the Supreme 
Court promptly granted the stay.  If the message was not clear after 
the Supreme Court’s Kitchen order, it should have become 
abundantly clear after Evans.  Lower courts should continue to stay 
all same-sex marriage rulings and must maintain the status quo ex 
ante pending appeal. 
c. District of Colorado 
Five days after the Supreme Court granted the stay in Evans, 
Judge Raymond Moore of the District of Colorado discussed the 
problem of conflicting authorities.  On one hand, the Supreme 
Court’s actions in Kitchen and Evans stood as “implied directives to 
issue stays in these matters.”261  On the other hand, doing so arguably 
is contrary to accepted standards for when to stay judgments under 
the traditional four factors.262  On the third hand, Moore noted that 
the Tenth Circuit had twice263 reached the constitutional merits, 
invalidating marriage bans in Utah and Oklahoma and enjoining 
enforcement of those laws.  These judgments made it “conceivable 
that any perceived ‘directive’ from the Supreme Court to let appellate 
courts consider this issue does not apply here.”264  On the fourth hand, 
the Court had stayed the judgment in Evans only five days earlier.  
This decision was a “wild card in the analysis,” and “it appear[ed] to 
the [district c]ourt that it may well be that a message is being sent by 
the Supreme Court.”265 
Yet Judge Moore insisted that he was unable to divine the 
meaning of the Supreme Court’s two stays.  “[T]his Court is not some 
modern day haruspex skilled in the art of divination. This Court 
cannot—and, more importantly, it will not—tell the people of 
Colorado that the access to this or any other fundamental right will be 
delayed because it ‘thinks’ or ‘perceives’ the subtle—or not so 
subtle—content of a message not directed to this case.”266 
Unlike other courts, Judge Moore was unwilling to be bound by 
the Supreme Court’s unexplained stay decisions.  He also manifested 
 
 261.  Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-CV-01817-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 3634834, at *4 (D. 
Colo. July 23, 2014). 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) (Oklahoma); Kitchen v. Herbert, 
755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (Utah). 
 264.  Burns, 2014 WL 3634834 at *4. 
 265.  Id. at *5. 
 266.  Id.  
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a very different conception of the rule of law than Judge Kelly had 
proffered, concluding that the “rule of law demands more . . . .  
Defendants are not entitled to a stay order under the applicable rules. 
This is where this Court’s analysis must end.”267 
Judge Moore recognized that the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme 
Court might issue a stay in this matter, so he stayed the injunction for 
one month.  And, in fact, the Tenth Circuit did just that several weeks 
later, citing earlier stays and finding no reason to deviate from that 
approach in this case.268  In doing so, the court of appeals noted that 
the Supreme Court had granted a stay of a Fourth Circuit decision the 
day prior.269 
d. Northern District of Florida 
In August, Judge Robert Hinkle of the Northern District of 
Florida declared that state’s ban unconstitutional.  Echoing the 
District of Colorado, Judge Hinkle explained that “it is a rare case in 
which a preliminary injunction is properly stayed pending appeal.”270  
But “[t]his is the rare case.”271  Once again, the potential for chaos 
presented an additional public-interest consideration.  “There is a 
substantial public interest in implementing this decision just once—in 
not having, as some states have had, a decision that is on-again, off-
again.”272  Beyond the tumult an immediate order causes the state, the 
court observed that there is a possible harm to the couples deciding 
whether to marry.  “[A]llowing those who would enter same-sex 
marriages the same opportunity for due deliberation that opposite-
sex couples routinely are afforded. Encouraging a rush to the 
marriage officiant, in an effort to get in before an appellate court 
enters a stay, serves the interests of nobody.”273  A stay was 
appropriate, although only “long enough to provide reasonable 
assurance that the opportunity for same-sex marriages in Florida, 
once opened, will not again close.”274 
 
 267.  Id.  
 268.  Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-1283 (10th Cir. Aug 21, 2014) (order granting stay 
pending appeal), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270986446/BUrns-v-Hickenlooper-14-08-21-
Order-Granting-Stay.  
 269.  Id.; see infra Part I.B.4. 
 270.  Brenner v. Scott, No. 4:14CV107-RH/CAS (N.D. Fla. Jan. 1, 2015) (order 
clarifying preliminary injunction).   
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id. 
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Judge Hinkle stayed the injunction until Supreme-Court-
imposed stays pending petitions for certiorari from the Fourth and 
Tenth Circuits were lifted, plus an additional ninety days.  On 
December 3, 2014, following the denial of certiorari in those cases,275 
an Eleventh Circuit panel ordered that the stay on Judge Hinkle’s 
preliminary injunction would expire at the end of the day on January 
5, 2015.276  By that point, petitions for certiorari had already been filed 
from decisions of the Sixth Circuit upholding same-sex marriage bans.  
Florida then sought an emergency stay from the Supreme Court on 
December 15, which the Court denied. Justices Scalia and Thomas 
dissented and would have granted the stay.277 On January 1, 2015 
(four days shy of 90), the stay was lifted and the preliminary 
injunction went into effect, even while a cert grant from the Sixth 
Circuit was both inevitable and imminent278 and would be granted 
only eleven days later. 
3. Stays Denied 
The third category, and where things got ugly, involved judges 
who did not issue stays at all, even in light of the signals from Kitchen 
and Evans.  District courts in four states ordered that same-sex 
marriage licenses must be issued or recognized before a higher court 
could intervene.  Although in each case a higher court did issue a stay 
after only a quick appeal, it was not soon enough to prevent a repeat 
of the events in Utah.  Hundreds of couples received marriage 
licenses pendent lite, creating a new potential group of injured 
plaintiffs should those injunctions be reversed. 
a. Western District of Tennessee 
Judge Aleta A. Trauger of the Middle District of Tennesse 
believed she had identified one distinction with the prior stay cases.  
Tanco v. Haslem was a recognition case, in which the court ordered 
the state to recognize three out-of-state same-sex marriages.279  But 
 
 275.  See infra Part I.C. 
 276.  Brenner v. Armstrong, No. 14-14061 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014) (order denying 
motion to extend stay of preliminary injunction), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270989229/ 
Brenner-v-Scott-14-12-03-Order-Motion-to-Stay.  
 277.  Armstrong v. Brenner Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 14A650 (Dec. 19, 
2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14a650.htm.  
 278.  The petition in Obergefell would be distributed only four days later on December 
23, 2014.  See Obergefell v. Hodges Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 14-556, http://ww 
w.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14-556.htm 
 279.  Jesty v. Haslam, No. 3:13-CV-01159, 2014 WL 1117069, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 
20, 2014).  
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the decision said nothing about whether the state had to issue 
marriage licenses to anyone.  Thus, comparing this case to Bostic, 
DeLeon, and Bishop was “comparing apples and oranges.”280  Her 
order would “not open the floodgates for same-sex couples to marry 
in Tennessee, nor does it require Tennessee to recognize all legal 
same-sex marriages performed outside of Tennessee.”281  
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit promptly stayed the decision pending 
full review by a merits panel, emphasizing that “[b]ecause the law in 
this area is so unsettled, in our judgment the public interest and the 
interests of the parties would be best served by this Court imposing a 
stay on the district court’s order until this case is reviewed on 
appeal.”282  Four months later the Supreme Court stay in Evans 
signaled that even recognition cases should be put on hold.283 
b. Eastern District of Michigan 
In March 2014, following a two-week trial and a month of 
consideration, Judge Bernard Friedman of the Eastern District of 
Michigan invalidated Michigan’s ban and enjoined the state from 
enforcing it.284  But he did not issue a stay.  He did not even analyze 
Kitchen or any other decision in which other courts had granted stays.  
And, as in Utah, the decision triggered a race to the altar.  
Approximately 300 couples obtained licenses in a twenty-four-hour 
period, all seemingly knowing that a stay of the order was imminent.285  
As in Utah, United States Attorney General Eric Holder announced 
that these couples could seek federal benefits without awaiting final 
judicial resolution.286 
The following day, a Saturday morning, the Sixth Circuit ordered 
the plaintiffs to respond to the state’s emergency motion for a stay 
 
 280.  Id. at *3. 
 281.  Id. at *4. 
 282.  Id. citing Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1512541 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 
16, 2014).   
 283.  Herbert v. Evans Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 14A54, http://www.sup 
remecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14a65.htm; see also supra notes 250-60 
and accompanying text.  
 284.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014).   
 285.  John Eligon & Erik Eckholm, Gay Couples in Michigan Seize Their Chance to Be 
Married After Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
03/23/us/gay-couples-in-michigan-seize-their-chance-to-be-married-after-ruling.html.  
 286.  Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Federal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Marriages in Michigan, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-federal-recognition-same-sex-marriages-
michigan.  
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pending review, thereby temporarily putting the injunction on hold.287  
Three days later, a divided panel granted the stay, finding that there 
was no basis to distinguish Kitchen (and three other cases which we 
address infra), which granted stays, and no reason to balance the 
equities any differently.288  Judge Helene White dissented from the 
stay order, insisting that, although the Court stayed the injunction in 
Kitchen, “it did so without a statement of reasons, and therefore the 
order provides little guidance.”289  In other words, the shadow docket 
was not precedential. 
In January 2015, Judge Mark Goldsmith of the Eastern District 
of Michigan ruled that the state was required to recognize the 300 
marriages performed in the twenty-four hours between the injunction 
and the Sixth Circuit stay.290  He stayed his judgment for twenty-one 
days to allow for review, but the state, already defending its ban 
before the Supreme Court, did not appeal.291 
c. Western District of Wisconsin 
After the tumult in Utah, the most chaotic marriage equality 
appeal arose in Wisconsin.  Through a combination of inexplicable 
foot-dragging by the court and premature exuberance by state 
officials, eight days elapsed before marriages were put on hold. 
On Friday, June 6, 2014, Judge Barbara Crabb of the Western 
District of Wisconsin declared that state’s ban unconstitutional, but 
did not issue an injunction.292  In all other cases, the injunction 
accompanied the declaratory judgment in a single order.  Instead, 
 
 287.  DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-01341 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2014) (order directing 
plaintiffs to file a response), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270993091/DeBoaer-v-Snyder-14-
03-22-Order-From-Sixth-Circuit.  
 288.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 14-01341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (order granting stay), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/270993306/DeBoer-v-Snyder-14-3-25-ORder-Granting-Stay.  
Typically, a stay request can be made to the court of appeals only if relief were sought 
from the district court but the district court failed to afford the requested relief.  FED. R. 
APP. P. 8(a)(2)(A)(ii).  The Sixth Circuit found those requirements had been 
“substantially met” when the district court failed to rule on the stay request. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Caspar v. Snyder, 2015 WL 224741, 4:14-cv-11499 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2015).   
 291.  Gov. Rick Snyder: State will not appeal court decision on 300 same-sex couples 
married in March, MICHIGAN.GOV (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668, 
7-277-57577_57657-346819—,00.html.  This decision not to appeal speaks to the near 
impossibility of voiding marriages that were lawfully performed, and that society had 
come to rely on.  See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 292.  Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1028 (W.D. Wis. June 6, 2014), judgment 
entered (June 13, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) and cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 
(2014). 
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Judge Crabb gave the parties ten days to file supplemental materials 
concerning the state’s motion to stay the injunction and requested 
proposed language for the injunction.  It is not clear what additional 
materials could have been filed, as the issue had been briefed a month 
earlier.293  No other court made a similar request. 
Declining to wait for an injunction, a number of clerks celebrated 
early.  Dane County Clerk Scott McDonnel announced on Friday that 
“[t]he law right now is that the marriage ban is unconstitutional. If 
someone comes in and says, ‘Can you marry me?’ I have to follow the 
federal court.”294  This was wrong, of course, as the court had not 
issued an injunction, but merely declared the law unconstitutional.  
McDonnel was under no legal obligation to follow the declaration, 
although under he could find it persuasive and follow it.295  As in Utah 
and Michigan, the decision triggered a race to the altar—over the 
next eight days, more than 500 same-sex couples were issued licenses 
in nearly seventy counties across the state.296 
On Friday evening, Wisconsin filed an emergency motion for a 
stay with the district court.297  The court took no action during the 
weekend, even as hundreds of marriage licenses were being issued.  
Rather, Judge Crabb scheduled a telephone hearing for 1 p.m. 
Monday, June 9, 2014.  Before the hearing was held, and while the 
emergency motion for a stay was pending, Wisconsin filed an 
emergency motion for a stay with the Seventh Circuit.298 
 
 293.  On May 23, 2014, Michigan filed a motion to stay to “preserve the status quo for 
when an appeal is filed.”  See Motion to Stay, Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. 
Wis. June 6, 2014) (No. 14-cv-64-bbc), (https://www.scribd.com/doc/271037666/Wolf-v-
Walker-14-05-23-Motion-to-Stay. 
 294.  Weddings Continue after Judge Declares Ban Unconstitutional, WIS. ST. J. (June 
7, 2014), http://host.madison.com/news/local/weddings-continue-after-judge-declares-ban-
unconstitutional/article_100865d0-c06e-5254-8cee-0d4733f17942.html#ixzz3fPSnQjLe. 
 295.  Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 469-70 (1974 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 
U.S. 82, 124-26 (opinion of Brennan, J.)); Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild 
Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1113 (2014).  
 296.  Scott Walker & J.B. Van Hollen Appeal Gay Marriage Ruling, MILWAUKEE WIS. 
J. SENTINEL (July 10, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/scott-walker-jb-
van-hollen-appeal-gay-marriage-ruling-b99308729z1-266644411.html.  Litigation to 
establish the validity of those marriages never materialized and became moot when the 
Supreme Court denied cert in the case in October.  See infra Part I.C. 
 297.  Emergency Motion to Stay, Wolf v. Walker, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 
14-2386, 14-2387, 14-2388, 14-2525), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272305270/14-06-06-
Emer-Motion-to-Stay. 
 298.  Emergency Motion for Temporary Stay from Relief, Wolf v. Walker, 766 F.3d 
648 (7th Cir. 2014) (Nos. 14-2386, 14-2387, 14-2388, 14-2525),  https://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/272305369/14-06-09-Appellants-ER-Motion-for-Temp-Stay-From-Relief.  
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Following the Monday conference, the district court denied 
Wisconsin’s motion for an emergency stay.299  First, in an interesting 
procedural wrinkle, Judge Crabb determined that she retained 
jurisdiction over the case, even though Wisconsin had already filed a 
notice of appeal that morning because “an appeal taken from an 
interlocutory decision does not prevent the district court from 
finishing its work and rendering a final decision.”300  Wisconsin thus 
made a similar mistake as Utah in seeking to stay an injunction that 
had not yet issued.  This is impossible procedurally, even though 
clerks in the state were acting as if the injunction had been issued.  
This dynamic presented a serious catch-22 for states—they cannot 
stay an injunction that has not been issued, but the un-issued 
injunction is the reason they need to seek a stay. 
Second, Judge Crabb concluded that the Supreme Court’s stay 
orders were inapplicable, because this case was different—she had 
not issued an injunction yet and defendants did not cite any authority 
for the proposition that a court may stay a stand-alone declaratory 
judgment.301  On both fronts, Judge Crabb’s decision to invalidate the 
law, but not issue an injunction, left Wisconsin in an interminable 
bind—they could not do anything until the coercive order issued. 
Third, the Court brushed off any responsibility for clerks issuing 
marriage licenses, explaining that this was not a result of an 
injunction, which had not issued.  She insisted that the propriety of 
clerks issuing these licenses in violation of state law was beyond the 
scope of the case.302  To the extent that “defendants believe that a 
particular county clerk is issuing a marriage license in violation of 
 
 299.  Wolf v. Walker, Nos. 14-2386, 14-2387, 14-2388, 14-2525 (7th Cir. June 9, 2014) 
(order denying emergency motion for stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271058059/Wolf-
v-Walker-14-06-09-Order-Denying-Emerngency-Motion-for-Stay. 
 300.  Id. (quoting Wis. Mutual Ins. Co. v. United States, 441 F.3d 502, 504–05 (7th Cir. 
2006)).  The Seventh Circuit confirmed that conclusion in a two-page unsigned order 
issued on June 10, 2014, stating that “that the order appealed from may not be a final 
appealable judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,” because “[t]he district court 
has not entered a Rule 58 judgment in this case,” as it “has yet to determine the specifics 
of the injunctive relief which it intends to enter.”  Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-2266 (7th Cir. 
June 10, 2014) (order denying emergency motion for stay), https://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/271058839/Wolf-v-Walker-14-06-10-Order-Stating-Case-Not-Appealable.  However, 
without explanation, hours after issuing this unsigned order, in another unsigned order, 
“The court, on its own motion, VACATES the June 10, 2014 order as erroneously issued.”  
Id.  
 301.  Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-2266 (7th Cir. June 10, 2014) (order denying emergency 
motion for stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271058839/Wolf-v-Walker-14-06-10-Order-
Stating-Case-Not-Appealable.   
 302.  Id. 
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state law, that is an issue outside the scope of this case.”303  The only 
viable option for Wisconsin would have been to initiate state court 
proceedings against the seventy clerks who were issuing licenses in 
violation of state law.304  This is formally correct, as the various clerks 
were not operating under the compulsion of a federal court 
injunction.305  Thus, they were not subject to the district court’s 
control. But the court was almost certainly aware of the potential 
persuasive effect of her declaration on state officials and the 
foreseeable effect of delays in issuing (and staying) the injunction. 
Eight days after the declaratory judgment, Judge Crabb entered, 
then immediately stayed, a preliminary injunction.306  While she would 
not have granted a stay as a matter of first impression, she could not 
ignore Kitchen or the other courts that had stayed injunctions in light 
of Kitchen.307  Finally reaching the conclusion she should have reached 
eight days earlier, Judge Crabb stated that although it was impossible 
to know why the Supreme Court had stayed Kitchen because it had 
not explained its action, every injunction since then had been stayed, 
at least where the state had requested one.308 
Given her ultimately correct resolution of the stay issue, it is 
difficult to fathom why Judge Crabb did not stay the judgment one 
week earlier, especially given the mischief that ensued in the gap 
between her declaration and the injunction.  Blaming the clerks for 
acting prematurely and lawlessly is legally correct, but ignores the fact 
that Judge Crabb could have prevented the chaos by delaying her 
declaratory judgment until the injunction was ready.  A cynical 
explanation may lie in Judge Crabb’s opinion granting the stay: 
 
After seeing the expressions of joy on the faces of so 
many newly wedded couples featured in media 
reports, I find it difficult to impose a stay on the event 
that is responsible for eliciting that emotion, even if 
 
 303.  Id. 
 304.  In fact, three states would take that very step to prevent clerks from issuing 
licenses prior to an appellate decision.  See infra Part III.A.  
 305.  In any event, even had an injunction issued, most of these clerks were not parties 
to Wolf and thus would not have been bound by that injunction.  In reality, most of the 
clerks would have been acting voluntarily, not under court compulsion, regardless of what 
orders Judge Crabb had issued.  See infra Part II. 
 306.  Wolf v. Walker, 26 F. Supp. 3d 866, 870 (W.D. Wis. 2014), appeal dismissed (June 
16, 2014). 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. 
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the stay is only temporary.  Same-sex couples have 
waited many years to receive equal treatment under 
the law, so it is understandable that they do not want 
to wait any longer.309 
 
As a procedural matter, this is problematic.  Judge Crabb knew 
from the outset that any injunction likely would be stayed in light of 
Kitchen.  And she knew from watching other states what would 
happen on the ground in the absence of an express stay of the 
judgment.  By delaying the injunction and stay for a week, she 
allowed the same race to the altar in Wisconsin.  This race continued 
until she cut it off, preempting the inevitable Seventh Circuit stay.  
The most plausible explanation for this bizarre turn of events is that it 
was a deliberate effort to allow marriages to proceed before the court 
of appeals put them on hold, as it would have done following Kitchen. 
d. Southern District of Indiana 
In two decisions in spring 2014, Judge Richard Young of the 
Southern District of Indiana ordered the state to recognize one out-
of-state same-sex marriage and then declared the state’s same-sex 
marriage ban unconstitutional in its entirety.310  He refused to stay 
either order.  In the May 9 recognition order, he largely ignored 
decisions from courts staying injunctions, other than to insist that the 
narrow recognition order should not be controlled by Kitchen’s 
concern for staying a broad injunction.311  (This was the same 
reasoning Judge Trauger had used in the Western District of 
Tennessee two months earlier; she was promptly reversed by the 
Sixth Circuit312).  But his second opinion, invalidating the ban on 
same-sex marriage licenses, did not cite any previous orders from any 
courts.313 
Unsurprisingly, given events in Utah, Michigan, and Wisconsin, 
clerks in Indiana immediately began issuing licenses to same-sex 
couples.  An official from the Marion County Clerk’s Office in 
 
 309.  Id. at 874.   
 310.  Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025 (S.D. Ind. 2014), appeal dismissed 
(July 14, 2014).   
 311.  Id. 
 312.  Supra Part II.C.3.a. 
 313.  Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1149 (S.D. Ind.) aff’d, 766 F.3d 648 (7th 
Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) and cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 135 
S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
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Indianapolis told the New York Times “[i]t’s crazy busy.”314  Although 
the Seventh Circuit immediately stayed the injunction hours after 
Indiana submitted its application, and before a response was even 
filed,315 nearly a thousand same-sex couples, including 550 in Marion 
County, received licenses.316  As in Utah, Indiana Governor Mike 
Pence declined to recognize these “gap” marriages, insisting that the 
marriage law “is in full force and effect and executive branch agencies 
are to execute their functions as though the U.S. District Court Order 
of June 25, 2014 had not been issued.”317  Without explanation, unlike 
in Utah and Michigan, the Department of Justice did not issue a 
statement that the federal government would recognize the Indiana 
gap marriages.318 
e. Fourth Circuit 
Demonstrating that the confusion over stays was not confined to 
the district courts, the Fourth Circuit offered the most inexplicable 
denial of a stay during the entire marriage equality litigation. 
 
 314.  Jack Healy, U.S. Appeals Court Rejects Utah’s Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/us/us-appeals-court-rejects-utahs-ban-
on-gay-marriage.html?_r=0.   
 315.  Bogan v. Basin, No. 14-627 (7th Cir. June 27, 2014) (order granting stay), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271034362/Bogan-v-Baskin-14-6-27-Order-Granting-Stay.  
Notably, Judges Posner, Williams, and Hamilton were on the motions panel for Bogan v. 
Baskin, and these judges also served as the merits panel for Baskin, which was 
consolidated with Wolf v. Walker.  In contrast, in the Sixth Circuit none of the judges on 
the motions panel for DeBoer v. Snyder (Rogers, White, and District Judge Caldwell) 
were on the merits panel (Sutton, Cook, and Daughtry).  Similarly, in the Eleventh 
Circuit, of the three judges on the motions panel (Kelly, Lucero, and Holmes), only 
Holmes was on the two-judge motion panel.  For a discussion of how two Judges on the 
Seventh Circuit—Posner and Easterbrook—often retain merits appeals of cases they 
heard as motions judges, see Margaret v. Sachs, Superstar Judges as Entrepreneurs: The 
Untold Story of Fraud-On-The-Market, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1237 (2015) (“If the 
motions panels had instead surrendered the appeals for reassignment to merits panels, the 
prevailing pattern in every other circuit, 180 some percentage of the merits panels would 
almost certainly not have included Judge Easterbrook or Judge Posner.”).  See generally, 
Alison Frankel, At 7th Circuit Unseen Judicial Mechanics Drive Decisions, REUTERS (Dec. 
3, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/12/03/at-7th-circuit-unseen-judicial-
mechanics-drive-decisions-new-paper/.   
 316.  State Recognizes June Marriages of Same-Sex Couples, USA TODAY (July 9, 
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/07/09/state-recognize-june-marria 
ges-sex-couples/12410207/.  
 317.  General Counsel to Gov. Mike Pence, Status of Same-Sex Marriages According to 
Indiana Law and Pursuant to Court Order (July 7, 2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.doc 
umentcloud.org/documents/1214271/status-of-same-sex-marriages-according-to.pdf.   
 318.  Ian Thompson, What’s the Holdup DOJ?, SLATE (Sept. 10, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/09/10/married_same_sex_couples_in_indiana_an
d_wisconsin_deserve_recognition.html.  
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In July 2014, a divided panel affirmed a district court order 
declaring Virginia’s same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional.  
Although the Supreme Court by that point had twice intervened and 
four sister circuits (Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth) had stayed 
district court injunctions, the majority did not even address the issue.  
Accepting the stayed district court judgment as a permanent 
injunction, the court of appeals announced that the injunction would 
go into full effect once its mandate issued three weeks later.319  Twelve 
days after a motion for a stay pending the filing of a petition for 
certiorari,320 Judges Floyd and Gregory issued a brief, three-sentence 
order denying the motion.  In what can be charitably described as 
deliberate indifference, the court order offered no citation or 
discussion of any of the orders from the Supreme Court or other 
circuits.321  Because Virginia was no longer defending the law, a 
county clerk sought a stay from Supreme Court, faulting the Fourth 
Circuit for ruling without mentioning Kitchen and without engaging 
in any substantive analysis.322  As it had done in Kitchen and Evans, 
the Court promptly granted the stay without recorded dissent.323 
And so ended the third epoch of same-sex marriage appeals, 
where the clear message was to stay judgment and mandates pending 
complete appellate review. 
 
D. Phase III: Certiorari Denied & Circuit Splits: October 2014- 
 January 2015 
 
The signal changed radically on the first day of the October 2014 
term.  The Court unexpectedly, and without published dissent, denied 
 
 319.  FED. R. APP. P. 41(b) (“The court’s mandate must issue 7 days after the time to 
file a petition for rehearing expires, or 7 days after entry of an order denying a timely 
petition for panel rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion for stay of mandate, 
whichever is later. The court may shorten or extend the time.”).  Opponents to Gay 
Marriage in Virginia Ask for Delay in Issuing Licenses to Couples, NBC WASH. (Aug. 14, 
2014), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Virginia-Gay-Marriage-Fight-One-Step-
Closer-to-the-Supreme-Court-271091751.html.  
 320.  Bostic v. Schaeffer, Motion for Stay of Mandate Pending Filing of Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari (4th Cir. Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271064286/Bostic-
14-08-01-Motion-by-Appellant-to-Stay-Mandate.  
 321.  Bostic v. Schaeffer, No. 14-1167 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2014) (order denying motion to 
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271064616/Bostic-14-08-13-4thDistCtOrderStayDenied 
20140813-1. 
 322.  McQuigg v. Bostic, Application to Stay Mandate Pending Appeal (Aug. 14, 
2014), at 3 https://www.scribd.com/doc/236849402/McQuigg-Stay-Application.  
 323.  McQuigg v. Bostic, No. 14A196 (Aug. 20, 2014) (order granting motion to stay 
pending appeal), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/082014zr_i4dk.pdf.  
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certiorari in the Bostic troika from the Fourth Circuit,324 Bogan and 
Wolf from the Seventh Circuit,325 and Bishop and Kitchen from the 
Tenth Circuit.326  This shocked327 Court watchers, who had been 
awaiting Court action on the marriage cases.328 
The cert denials produced Article III-final judgments requiring 
officials in five states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  
They also spoke to the respective roles of the Supreme Court and 
lower courts in constitutional decision-making and to the Court’s 
discretion as to when to exercise its jurisdiction.  Two weeks earlier in 
remarks at the University of Minnesota Law School, Justice Ginsburg 
 
 324.  McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 (2014); Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); 
Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014).  
 325.  Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
 326.  Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014). 
 327.  The cert denials were contained in an 89-page order list, which included the 
results of the September “Long Conference” in which the Court decides the thousands of 
cert petitions from the summer recess.  See Linda Greenhouse, How Not To Be Chief 
Justice: The Apprenticeship Of William H. Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1368 
(2006). 
The order list was posted to the Court’s recently redesigned, but still buggy, web site.  U.S. 
Supreme Court Technical Glitch, WBRZ, Oct. 6, 2014, http://www.wbrz.com/news/high-
court-glitch-delays-news-on-gay-marriage/. Marcia Coyle of the National Law Journal 
commented that: “A mad scramble ensued to search for the orders list on the Supreme 
Court’s newly redesigned website.  ‘Where the [expletive] is the orders list?’ came a 
frustrated shout from one end of the pressroom. ‘Wait, wait, it’s up now,’ shouted 
another.”  See Marcia Coyle, “Behind the Scenes: SCOTUS Media Room on Opening 





 328.  Adding to the drama, the paper list distributed to the press by the Public 
Information Office was missing thirty-three pages, including the pages containing the 
seven cert. denials.  As Coyle relayed the story: “Everyone looked at the bulky list first for 
any sign of the seven pending same-sex marriage petitions. Seeing none, reporters tweeted 
that the court had said nothing about same-sex marriage Monday. But as reporters, most 
on deadlines, continued to comb the list for other news, NBC’s Pete Williams suddenly 
called out, ‘The list goes from page 17 to 50.’ Where were the missing 33 pages, and more 
importantly, what was on those pages?”  Id.  Garret Epps remarked that “a number of 
reporters went upstairs for oral argument, not knowing that history was being made. (I 
was one.).” 
Supreme Court spokesperson Kathy Arberg blamed the problem on “technical glitches.”  
Coyle added that the “high court’s copy machine apparently had a bad morning, but 
perhaps not as bad as those editors and reporters who soon regretted those early 
advisories of no news on same-sex marriage.”  See Josh Blackman, SCOTUS Press Room 
Confusion – 33 Pages of Orders Missing Due to Technical Glitches, JOSH BLACKMAN 
BLOG (Oct. 6, 2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/10/06/scotus-press-room-confus 
ion-33-pages-of-orders-missing-due-to-technical-glitches/. 
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hinted that “when all the courts of appeals are in agreement there is 
no need for us to rush to step in,”329 although “[s]ooner or later, yes, 
the question will come to the Court.”330 
The cert denials seemed inconsistent with the Court’s signals in 
granting multiple stays over the previous eight months.  As Baude 
argued, “one would have guessed that the stays were premised on the 
probability that the Court would take up the issue. So something 
unusual was going on, but we don’t know what.”331 
The cert denials shifted the analysis in three respects.  First, it 
might have tempted lower courts to treat the denials as, if not a 
decision on the merits, a strong signal that the Court agreed with the 
decisions invalidating state laws.332  Second, it raised the possibility 
that the Court might leave the constitutional issue to the lower 
courts—at least, Justice Ginsburg suggested, so long as they all went 
the same way, as had been the case to that point.  Third, it signaled 
that the Court was no longer concerned with preserving its 
opportunity to speak before the lower court judgments took effect or 
with states issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples on the 
persuasion of lower court decisions.  There was no practical 
difference in licenses issued on the strength of an Article-III final 
judgment as opposed to on the strength of an unstayed district court 
order—the result is marriage licenses issuing before the Supreme 
Court has spoken. 
Although there was no dissent from the orders denying cert., 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, subsequently revealed his 
disagreement in a dissent from a denial of a stay in an unrelated case 
a month later.  Citing Hollingsworth v. Perry (the Prop 8 case), 
Justice Thomas argued that, “we often review decisions striking down 
state laws, even in the absence of a disagreement among lower 
courts.”333  Referring to the cert. denials in the same-sex marriage 
 
 329.  Lyle Denniston, Mixed Signals on Same-Sex Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 18, 
2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/09/mixed-signals-on-same-sex-marriage/. 
 330.  Id. 
 331.  Baude, supra note 10, at 7–8. 
 332.  But see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 456 (1953) (“We have frequently said that 
the denial of certiorari ‘imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case.”) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 333.  Maricopa Cty., Arizona, et al., v. Angel Lopez-Valenzuela, 135 S. Ct. 428 (Nov. 
13, 2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay) (citing Hollingsworth 
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)). 
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cases, however, “for reasons that escape me, we have not done so 
with any consistency, especially in recent months.”334 
Lower courts reacted to this shift in signals almost immediately. 
1. Ninth Circuit 
Just over thirty hours after the cert denials, writing for a Ninth 
Circuit panel, Judge Stephen Reinhardt declared unconstitutional 
marriage bans in Idaho and Nevada.335  The court remanded the cases 
to the district courts for entry of permanent injunctions.  Rather than 
waiting the typical seven days before issuing a mandate,336 the panel 
ordered its mandate to take effect that day.337 
The Nevada Governor and Attorney General announced that 
the state would take no further action in this matter.338  But Idaho 
launched a multi-pronged attack.  On October 8 at 5:30 a.m. EDT, it 
filed an emergency motion with the Ninth Circuit to recall the 
 
 334.  Id.  Seven months later, the two Justices also dissented from denial of certiorari 
in Maricopa (as opposed to denying a stay), stating that “discretion [to review cases] 
should be exercised with a strong dose of respect for state laws.  In exercising that 
discretion, we should show at least as much respect for state laws as we show for federal 
laws . . . .  Our indifference to cases such as this one will only embolden the lower courts to 
reject state laws on questionable constitutional grounds.”  Maricopa Cty., 135 S. Ct. at 
2046.   
 335.  The Idaho case was Latta v. Otter.  The case from Nevada was Sevcik v. Sandoval.  
Sevcik is a unique case with a lengthy posture.  In 2012, the district court found Nevada’s 
marriage law constitutional, and it was appealed to the Ninth Circuit of December 4, 2012, 
six months before United States v. Windsor was decided.  The case was stayed until July 18, 
2013—after the decision in Windsor—and was not argued, along with Latta, until 
September 8, 2014.  
 336.  FED. R. APP. PROC. 41.  
 337.  Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (order issuing mandate), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271297775/Latter-v-Otter-14-10-07-Mandate-Forthwith.  As in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, Judge Reinhardt (who was on both panels) did not wait twenty-
five days for the mandate to issue before dissolving the stay. 
 338.  Ninth Circuit Strikes Marriage Bans in Idaho and Nevada, WASH. BLADE (Oct. 7, 
2014), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/10/07/ninth-circuit-strikes-marriage-bans-
idaho-nevada/.  At some point on Wednesday morning (exactly what time is unclear), 
Nevada District Court Judge Robert C. Jones, who had previously upheld Nevada’s same-
sex marriage ban, recused rather than lift the stay and let gay marriages proceed in 
Nevada.  No explanation was given for the recusal.  Around 4:22 ET on Wednesday, the 
case was reassigned to Judge James Mahan.  Chris Geidner, Conservative Nevada Juge 
Recuses Himself from Ending Marriage Ban, BUZZFEED (Oct. 8, 2014), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/conservative-nevada-judge-recuses-himself-from-
ending-marria#.hdlb9XJgGq.  Sevcik v. Sandoval, No. 2:12-cv-00578-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev. 
Oct. 8, 2014) (recusal order), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271304203/Sevcik-v-Sandoval-
14-10-08-recuse.  
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mandates.339  A few hours later, it filed an emergency application to 
stay the mandates with Circuit Justice Kennedy.  The application 
explained that without a Supreme Court stay, marriage licenses would 
have to be issued to same-sex couples that day at 8 a.m. MDT, or 10 
a.m. EDT.340  At 9:47 a.m. EDT,341 with thirteen minutes to spare, 
Justice Kennedy stayed the mandate pending further orders and 
requested a response from the plaintiffs by October 9.342 
But there was a problem with Justice Kennedy’s order, perhaps 
caused by the haste with which the motion was filed.  He ordered the 
recall of the mandate not only in the Idaho case, but also in the 
Nevada case, inadvertently putting on hold same-sex weddings there 
even though the state was no longer litigating the issue.343  The Clark 
County, Nevada, clerk tweeted at 11:30 a.m. EDT that the “issuance 
of marriage licenses to same-sex couples is on hold due to an order 
from the U.S. Supreme Ct.”344  Reporter Lyle Denniston explained 
that the error was due to the fact that the caption on the Ninth Circuit 
order included both cases.345  Someone in Justice Kennedy’s chambers 
likely copied and pasted the caption from the Ninth Circuit’s order, 
even though only Idaho appealed. 
Finally, at 3:18 p.m, Justice Kennedy issued a revised order, 
vacating the stay in the Nevada case.346  Same-sex marriages in 
Nevada proceeded, albeit delayed by five hours.  The stay for the 
 
 339.  Appellants’ Emergency Motion for Recall of Mandate, Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 
456 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (Nos. 14-35420 & 14-35421), https://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/271299136/Latter-v-Otter-14-10-08-Emergency-Recall-Mandate.  
 340.  Emergency Application of Governor C L “Butch” Otter to Stay Mandate 
Pending Disposition of Applications for Stay Pending Rehearing And Certiorari, Latta v. 
Otter, 135 S. Ct. 344 (2014) (No. 14A374), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271299344/Latter-
v-Otter-Emergency-Stay-Motion-10-8-14.  
 341.  Lyle Denniston, Idaho Same-Sex Marriage Delayed, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 8, 
2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/idaho-asks-same-sex-marriage-delay/.  
 342.  Latta v. Otter, No. 14A374 (Oct. 8, 2024) (order granting stay), https://www. 
scribd.com/doc/271299469/Latter-v-otter-14-10-08-SCOTUS-Granting-Motion-to-Stay.  
 343.  Chris Geidner, Justice Anthony Kennedy Halts 9th Circuit Marriage Ruling, 
BUZZFEED (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/justice-anthony-
kennedy-halts-9th-circuit-marriage-ruling-fr#.gjokgAjXBZ  
 344.  Id.  
 345.  Lyle Denniston, Same-Sex Marriage OK in Nevada, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 8, 
2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/same-sex-marriages-in-nevada-maybe-yes-may 
be-no/.  Fittingly, the original title of the post was “Same-Sex Marriage in Nevada—
Maybe Yes, Maybe No.” 
 346.  Latta v. Otter, No. 14A374 (Oct. 8, 2014) (revised order), https://www.scribd. 
com/doc/271300597/Latta-v-Otter-14-10-8-Revised-Order; see also Lyle Denniston, Same-
Sex Marriage OK in Nevada, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.scotusblog 
.com/2014/10/same-sex-marriages-in-nevada-maybe-yes-maybe-no/.  
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Idaho case remained in effect pending further orders from Justice 
Kennedy or the Court. 
At 5:51 p.m. EDT, the Ninth Circuit issued an order 
“interpret[ing]” the Supreme Court’s revised order “as a directive to 
recall the mandates” in the Idaho case,347 which the court did.  It is not 
clear why the court did this.  Justice Kennedy’s order had expressly 
requested a response from the plaintiffs as to the stay.  It did not 
order or suggest that the court of appeals do anything, particularly 
withdrawing the mandate, which would moot the application before 
the Supreme Court.  Ostensibly disregarding the Ninth Circuit’s 
order, the Supreme Court late Friday afternoon denied the stay and 
vacated its previous order, without any noted dissent.348  This was the 
first denial of a stay by the Supreme Court, following on the heels of 
the cert denials four days earlier.  According to one commenter, 
“courts likely will take this move as a sign that stays are no longer 
required during marriage appeals.”349 
On October 15, 2014, the same Ninth Circuit panel dissolved its 
original stay in Latta,350 which had remained in effect even after the 
Supreme Court’s order.351  The per curiam opinion offered a helpful 
recitation of the turn of events and of the significance of the Court’s 
denial of certiorari and denial of stay in Latta.352  It explained that the 
Ninth Circuit’s stay was issued a number of months ago, before 
relevant factual and legal developments, including decisions 
invalidating marriage laws in Latta and in other circuits.  Those 
decisions, in tandem with the cert denials, altered the calculus so that 
Idaho could no longer meet the standard for granting or continuing a 
 
 347.  Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (order recalling mandates), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271301173/Latta-v-Otter-10-8-14-Order-Recall.  
 348.  Latta v. Otter, No. 14A374 (Oct. 10. 2014) (order denying motion to stay), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271301531/Latta-v-Otter-14-10-10-deny-stay.  
 349.  Chris Geidner, Supreme Court Allows Idaho Same-Sex Marriages to Proceed, 
BUZZFEED (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/supreme-court-allows-
idaho-same-sex-marriages-to-proceed-end#.boaybr9Mdj.  
 350.  Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. May 15, 2014) (order granting temporary 
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/270977326/Latta-v-Otter-14-5-15-Temporary-Stay. 
 351.  Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2014) (order and opinion dissolving 
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271302160/Latta-v-Otter-14-10-15-Ca9-Another-Stay. 
Rather than seeking another emergency appeal to the Supreme Court, Idaho filed a 
petition for rehearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit.  On January 9, 2015, the petition 
was denied over the dissents of Judges O’Scannlain, Rawlinson, and Bea.  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 30, 2015.  See Latta v. Otter, 135 S. Ct. 345 
(2014). 
 352.  Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 496, 498 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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stay.  Specifically, when the “Supreme Court denied certiorari in all 
the pending cases, it was aware that there were cases pending in other 
circuit courts that had not yet been decided but that might 
subsequently create a conflict.  The existence of those pending cases, 
and the possibility of a future conflict, did not affect the Court’s 
decision to permit the marriages to proceed.”353  The cert denials 
signaled that the Justices were now content with same-sex marriage 
becoming the law within the regional circuit even while other 
petitions for certiorari remained outstanding. 
Interestingly, in upholding the marriage laws in Kentucky, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee two months later, Judge Jeffrey 
Sutton of the Sixth Circuit drew the opposite lesson from the cert 
denials.354  He minimized the significance of the seven denials from 
among the 1,575 cases in the orders list that first Monday in October.  
He explained that “this kind of action (or inaction) ‘imports no 
expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been 
told many times.’”355  Sutton further argued that “[j]ust as the Court’s 
three decisions to stay those same court of appeals decisions over the 
past year, all without a registered dissent, did not end the debate on 
this issue, so too the Court’s decision to deny certiorari in all of these 
appeals, all without a registered dissent, does not end the debate 
either.”356  In either direction, a decision not to decide is a decision not 
to decide. 
A few loose ends remained in the Ninth Circuit.  On October 12, 
2014, Judge Timothy M. Burgess of the District of Alaska declared 
that state’s marriage ban unconstitutional and immediately enjoined 
the state from enforcing it.357  Alaska appealed and the panel only 
granted a stay to give the state an opportunity to seek a stay from the 
Supreme Court.358  Curiously, Judge O’Scannlain would have granted 
the stay pending the entire appeals process.359  His dissent relied on 
the Kitchen stay order, but disregarded that fact that the Court had 
denied certiorari in that case a few days earlier and had signaled in 
 
 353.  Id. at 499. 
 354.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).   
 355.  Id. at 402 (citing United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)).  “The ‘variety 
of considerations [that] underlie denials of the writ’ counsels against according denials of 
certiorari any precedential value.”  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 356.  Id. 
 357.  Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1073 (D. Alaska 2014). 
 358.  Hamby v. Parnell, No. 14-35856 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2014) (order granting stay), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272313595/14-10-15-Order-Granting-Stay.   
 359.  Id. 
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Latta that it would not grant further stays.  For O’Scannlain, the 
weight of the stay trumped the weight of the cert denial.  As would 
become the new normal, the Supreme Court denied Alaska’s 
emergency motion for a stay, without noted dissent.360 
On October 17, 2014, Judge John Sedwick immediately enjoined 
Arizona’s marriage ban in light of Ninth Circuit precedent, 
complaining that “it is clear . . .  that the High Court will turn a deaf 
ear on any request for relief from the Ninth Circuit’s decision.”361  In a 
testament to how quickly things had changed with respect to the 
same-sex marriage appeals, that same day Arizona Attorney General 
Tom Horne—a lame duck who had lost the Republican primary—did 
not seek a stay, claiming that such a frivolous appeal would warrant 
Rule 11 sanctions: 
 
The probability of persuading the 9th Circuit to 
reverse today’s decision is zero. The probability of the 
United States Supreme Court accepting review of the 
9th circuit decision is also zero. I have decided not to 
appeal today’s decision, which would be an exercise in 
futility, and which would serve only the purpose of 
wasting taxpayers’ money.362 
 
Horne was correct about the practical futility and the desirability 
of not wasting taxpayer money, although his Rule 11 argument is 
overstated. 
2. Fourth and Seventh Circuits 
While chaos reigned in the Ninth Circuit, matters were much 
more orderly in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.  By denying 
certiorari, the Supreme Court created Article III-final judgments in 
both circuits and both courts of appeals lifted stays of their 
mandates,363 causing the injunctions to take effect.364  Same-sex 
 
 360.  Hamby v. Parnell, No. 14A413 (Oct. 18, 2014) (order denying stay), https://www. 
scribd.com/doc/272313694/14-10-18-deny-stay.   
 361.  Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1315 (D. Ariz. 2014).   
 362.  Arizona Attorney General Press Release, Attorney General Tom Horne Will Not 
Appeal Same-Sex Marriage Ruling (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.azag.gov/press-
release/attorney-general-tom-horne-will-not-appeal-same-sex-marriage-ruling. 
 363.  While a mandate issues twenty-five days after the judgment, “if the petition is 
denied, the mandate issues forthwith.”  SUP. CT. R. 45.  
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marriages began almost immediately in the affected states of Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Indiana.365 
Federal district courts in North Carolina, where litigation was 
pending but not yet appealed, lifted their own stays.366  Officials in 
South Carolina began issuing licenses without awaiting an order 
declaring invalid that state’s law.367  The Fourth Circuit denied a 
request by the South Carolina Attorney General for a stay and any 
additional time to seek a stay from the Supreme Court.368  The high 
court denied that stay, over dissents of Justices Scalia and Thomas.369 
3. Tenth Circuit 
Following the cert denials, the Tenth Circuit similarly lifted stays 
in cases from Utah, Oklahoma, and Colorado, immediately putting 
into effect the preliminary injunctions that were previously stayed.370  
Nevertheless, district courts within the circuit—now bound by circuit 
precedent to declare state laws unconstitutional—still exercised some 
 
 364.  Bostic v. Schaeffer, No. 14-1167 (L) (4th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014) (mandate), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271071787/Bostic-14-10-6-mandate; Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-
2525 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (order affirming district court), https://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
271071351/Wolf-14-10-07-AFFIRMING-District-Court; Baskin v. Bogan, No. 14-2386 (7th 
Cir. Oct. 7, 2014) (mandate), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271071539/Baskin-14-10-7-order. 
 365.  President Obama said of the cert denials: “In some ways, the decision that was 
just handed down to not do anything about what states are doing on same-sex marriage 
may end up being as consequential—from my perspective, a positive sense—as anything 
that’s been done.”  Jeffrey Toobin, How Obama Transformed the Federal Judiciary, THE 
NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/obama-
brief.  
 366.  Fisher-Borne v. Smith, No. 1:12-cv-589 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 2014) (order lifting 
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271073702/NC-14-10-08-Order-Lifting-Stay; Bradacs v. 
Haley, No. 3:13-cv-02351-JMC (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
271074754/SC-14-10-07-Order-Lifting-Stay; McGee v. Cole, No. 3:13-24068 (S.D. W. Va. 
Oct. 7, 2014) (order lifting stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271073868/Wv-Stay-Lifted-
Oct-7. 
 367.  Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 580 (D.S.C. 2014). 
 368.  Emergency Application to Stay U.S. Dist. Court Order, Condon v. Haley, 135 S. 
Ct. 702 (2014) (No. 14A533), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014 
/11/14A533_Stay_Application.pdf.  
 369.  Wilson v. Condon, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014).   
 370.  Herbert v. Kitchen, No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014) (order lifting stay), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/271071169/Kitchen-Herbert-14-10-6-order; Bishop v. Smith, 
Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014) (order lifting stay), https://www.scribd 
.com/doc/271071207/Bishop-Oklahoma-14-10-06-Order.  Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-
1283 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/doc/ 271074943/Hickenlooper-14-10-
07-Order.  Judge Raymond P. Moore of “haruspex” fame entered a permanent injunction 
ten days later on 10/17/14.  Burns v. Hickenlooper, No. 14-cv-01817-RM-KLM (D. Co. 
Oct. 17, 2014) (order granting unopposed motion), https://www.scribd.com/doc/2723 
14979/14-10-17-Order-Granting-Unopposed-Motion.  
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caution.  In Wyoming, Judge Scott W. Skavdahl stayed the injunction 
for six days to give the state a chance to appeal, which it declined to 
do.371 
The situation was more complicated in Kansas.  Judge Daniel D. 
Crabtree granted a one-week stay as the “safer and wiser course” to 
give the state time to prepare to honor the injunction.372  After the 
Tenth Circuit refused to stay the case, Kansas sought a stay from the 
Supreme Court.373  Circuit Justice Sotomayor stayed the order to 
await a response,374 but the full Court denied the stay two days later.375 
Perhaps signaling another shift, Justices Scalia and Thomas 
would have granted the stay.  This was the first time since the cert 
denials that any Justices registered a dissent on the marriage 
appeals.376  (A dissent from the South Carolina case377 would come two 
weeks later).  What changed?  On November 6, 2014, the Sixth 
Circuit became the first (and ultimately only) court of appeals to 
declare that same-sex marriage bans did not violate the Constitution.  
This created a circuit split, virtually ensuring the Court would grant 
certiorari and resolve the constitutional issue that term.  Justices 
Scalia and Thomas apparently believed all other cases should be 
placed on hold pending the Court’s resolution by the following July.  
Once there was a circuit split, they dissented from the denial of every 
subsequent stay application. 
It is worth considering how positions on stays shifted following 
the cert denials.  It takes five votes to grant a stay, meaning at least 
five Justices had previously voted for the stays in Kitchen, Evans, and 
Bostic.  Given that Scalia and Thomas continued to want to stay 
judgments, at least three Justices who previously voted for stays must 
have changed positions.  The other two dissenters in Obergefell—
Roberts and Alito—never registered any disagreement with respect 
 
 371.  Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 WL 5317797, at *9 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 
2014).   
 372.  Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1206 (D. Kan. 2014).   
 373.  Marie v. Moser Docket, Supreme Court Docket No. 14A503, http://www.sup 
remecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/14a503.htm.  The Supreme Court can 
grant a stay from “any case in which the final judgment or decree of any court is subject to 
review by the Supreme Court,” even if the parties bypass the court of appeals.  28 U.S.C. 
2101(f).  
 374.  Marie v. Moser, No. 14A503 (Nov. 10, 2014) (order granting stay), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/111014zr_0971.pdf.   
 375.  Moser v. Marie, 135 S. Ct. 511 (2014).  
 376.  Id. 
 377.  Supra notes 367–69 and accompanying text. 
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to the stay denials.  On the other hand, none of the five Justices in the 
Obergefell majority spoke either to the earlier stay grants or the 
current stay denials. 
4. Eleventh Circuit 
Florida’s challenge followed a similar path to Kansas’s.  Recall 
that Judge Hinkle had stayed his injunction until ninety days beyond 
the cert denials from the Tenth Circuit,378 a period due to expire on 
January 5, 2015.379  In December, the Eleventh Circuit declined to 
extend the stay beyond that date, stating that the “decision not to 
extend the stay is consistent with the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
this issue.”380  At that time, there was no stay in place from the 
Supreme Court in any case and no stay had remained in effect for 
more than two days since the cert denials.  The Eleventh Circuit 
would never even have the case argued before the stay in Florida was 
lifted.  In December, the Supreme Court denied Florida’s stay 
request, again with Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting, again 
without explanation.381 
Two weeks later, on January 1, 2015, more than four months 
after his original injunction, Judge Hinkle described Florida’s losing 
streak: 
 
I stayed the ruling in this case while those stays were in 
effect and for 91 more days—long enough to allow the 
defendants to seek a further stay in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and, if 
unsuccessful there, in the United States Supreme 
Court.  The defendants did that.  They lost.  The 
United States Supreme Court allowed the ruling in 
this case to take effect.382 
 
 378.  See supra notes 275–78 and accompanying text. 
 379.  Brenner v. Scott, No. 4:14-cv-107-RH/CAS (N.D. Fl. Nov. 5, 2014) (order 
denying the motions to alter stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272302072/14-11-05-Order-
Denying-Motions-to-Alter-Stay.  
 380.  Brenner v. Scott, No. 14-14061 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2014) (order declining to extend 
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272315872/14-12-03-Order-Motion-to-Stay.   
 381.  Armstrong v. Brenner, 135 S. Ct. 890 (2014).   
 382.  Brenner v. Scott, No. 4:14CV107-RH/CAS, 2015 WL 44260, at *1 (N.D. Fla. 
2015). 
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5. Fifth Circuit 
In November 2014, Judge Carlton Reeves of the Southern 
District of Mississippi invalidated that state’s marriage ban.383  
Although he declined to issue a stay pending appeal, he stayed the 
injunction for fourteen days to give the State time to appeal and allow 
the Fifth Circuit to decide whether a stay was appropriate.384  He 
captured the choice as one between “a race to the courthouse—with 
same-sex couples rushing to the circuit clerk’s office, and the State 
rushing to the Fifth Circuit,” which, he insisted, “does not serve 
anyone’s interest.”385 
A unanimous panel of the Fifth Circuit granted the stay pending 
appeal,386 something no other circuit had done since the cert. denials.  
Once again, the newly created circuit split loomed and may have 
affected the decision.  The court insisted that it “is not our task today 
to resolve the merits of this conflict in deciding the instant motion, 
however, we are convinced by the opinions of our sister circuits that 
‘a detailed and in depth examination of this serious legal issue’ is 
warranted before a disruption of a long standing status quo.”387  The 
court also emphasized the need to avoid confusion and the 
“inevitable disruption that would arise from a lack of continuity and 
stability in this important area of law.”388  In contrast, the Eleventh 
Circuit was not moved by the circuit split, denying a stay the 
following month. 
6. Eighth Circuit 
Three district judges in the Eighth Circuit took an unexpectedly 
narrow approach.  They invalidated state laws but nevertheless stayed 
their judgments.389  Each court minimized the effects of the cert 
denials and the subsequent stay denials in Moser, Parnell, and Latta.  
The key was that those stay denials arose in circuits (Fourth, Ninth, 
and Tenth) that had previously entered Article III-final judgments 
 
 383.  Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906, 953 (S.D. Miss. 2014) aff’d, 
No. 14-60837, 2015 WL 4032186 (5th Cir. July 1, 2015). 
 384.  Id. 
 385.  Id. 
 386.  Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 773 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 2014).  
 387.  Id. (quoting Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 711 F.2d at 40). 
 388.  Id. 
 389.  Jernigan v. Crane, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1276 (E.D. Ark. 2014); Rosenbrahn v. 
Daugaard, 61 F. Supp. 3d 862, 876 (D.S.D. 2015); Lawson v. Kelly, 58 F. Supp. 3d 923, 936 
(W.D. Mo. 2014).  
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recognizing the constitutional right to same-sex marriage.  Those stay 
denials therefore allowed judgments to take effect that were 
supported by binding precedent.  By contrast, the Eight Circuit had 
not yet ruled on the constitutional question.  Within the circuit, 
therefore, the situation was the same as prior to the cert denials—
district courts had enjoined state laws in the absence of binding 
precedent and stays were appropriate until those judgments became 
final or until binding precedent issued.390 
On the other hand, such a formalistic approach disregards the 
Supreme Court’s role as traffic cop in major constitutional cases.  
Through its shadow docket, the Supreme Court took steps to 
maintain the status quo throughout the courts of appeals, without 
granting certiorari or hearing cases on the merits.  In fact, one 
commentator suggests that this approach enabled the Court to decide 
Obergefell while limiting its dramatic effect on broader U.S. society 
and the Court’s institutional legitimacy.  By delaying its decision on 
the merits, the Court allowed lower court decisions to establish 
marriage in more states over a longer period of time, leaving 
Obergefell to clean up in about a dozen stragglers at the final point.391 
E. Phase IV: Certiorari Granted: January 16-June 26 
On January 16, 2015—three months after the October cert 
denials and the denials of stays from Idaho, Alaska, South Carolina, 
Kansas, and Florida (the last two over dissents by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas)—the Court finally granted certiorari of the divided Sixth 
Circuit decision upholding marriage bans in Kentucky, Michigan, 
Ohio, and Tennessee.392 
At that time, a number of cases remained pending in the district 
courts.  The judges’ easiest option would have been to stay the 
 
 390.  Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS (W.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2014) (order 
denying motion to stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272318247/14-11-25-Order-Denying-
Motion-to-Lift-Stay; Rosenbrahn, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 876. 
391.   Chris Geidner, Cert.Denied, Stays Denied, Marriage Equality Advanced: How 
the Supreme Court Used Nonprecedential Orders to Diminish the Drama of the Marriage 
Equality Decision, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 161, 171 (2015), http://moritzlaw.osu. 
edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2015/11/Vol.-76-161-172-Geidner-SCR-Essay.pdf. 
 392.  The case would be Obergefell v. Hodges before the Court because the petition for 
certiorari from Tennessee was filed first, had the lowest docket number.  Much to the 
chagrin of law professors and students for generations to come, Obergefell (pronounced 
“OH-ber-guh-fell”) was also the most difficult name to pronounce of all the petitioners. 
Richard Wolf, Grieving widower takes lead in major gay marriage case, USA TODAY (Apr. 
10, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/10/supreme-court-gay-marr 
iage-obergefell/25512405/; Compare the aptly named Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 
539 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
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litigation, given that a final, binding resolution of the constitutional 
issue was only a few months away.  There was nothing to be gained 
from new lower court precedent.  And there certainly was nothing to 
be gained from states issuing new marriage licenses based on a 
constitutional judgment that might be overruled in short order.  One 
district court in the Middle District of Alabama did just this, denying 
the state’s motion to dismiss,393 then immediately staying the litigation 
until that definitive ruling from the Supreme Court.394  The Eighth 
Circuit stayed an injunction from Nebraska.  Opting for the least-
efficient approach, the Eleventh Circuit declined to stay the 
injunction, as did the Supreme Court, prompting a vigorous written 
dissent from Justices Thomas and Scalia. 
1. Eighth Circuit 
District courts in the Eighth Circuit continued to grant time-
limited stays or stays pending appeal, although with limited analysis.  
After invalidating Nebraska’s marriage law, Judge Joseph E. 
Bataillon granted a one-week stay.395  Ironically, the district court 
justified its decision by citing to the Supreme Court’s denial of a stay 
and Justice Thomas’s dissent on the issue.396  In other words, a single 
dissent from the denial of a stay from two Justices trumped the 
significance of six consecutive and unexplained denials of stay from 
seven Justices.  Similarly ignoring the Court’s newer signals, the 
Eighth Circuit, without any analysis or noted dissent, stayed the 
injunction pending appeal four days later.397 
By issuing the stay in the face of the Court’s recent denials, these 
courts echoed in reverse those judges in Michigan and Indiana who 
had refused to grant stays when the prevailing signal from the Court 
was to grant them.398  All were saying, in essence, that the Court’s 
decisions with respect to stays—orders from its shadow docket—
 
 393.  Hardy v. Bentley, No. 2:13-CV-922-WKW, 2015 WL 1043159, at *1 (M.D. Ala. 
Mar. 10, 2015). 
 394.  Hardy v. Bentley, No. 2:13-CV-922-WKW (M.D. Ala. Mar. 10, 2015) (order 
granting stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272319130/15-03-10-Order-Staying-Case-Until-
Disposition-of-Supreme-Court-Cases.  
 395.  Waters v. Ricketts, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1290–91 (D. Neb. 2015). 
 396.  Id. at 1287 n.15 (citing Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015)). 
 397.  Waters v. Rickets, No. 15-1452 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 2015) (order granting motion to 
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272319674/15-03-06-Order-Granting-Motion-to-Stay-
Appeal.  
 398.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 
12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1149 (S.D. Ind. 2014). 
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carried no precedential force.  As Judge White of the Sixth Circuit 
had observed while dissenting from the stay in the Michigan case, the 
stay in Kitchen was “without a statement of reasons, and therefore the 
order provides little guidance.”399  The same went for the denials of 
stay and denials of certiorari in subsequent cases. 
2. Eleventh Circuit 
The final leg in this relay race involved challenges to Alabama’s 
marriage ban.  Almost overnight, Alabama sparked the most intense 
media attention, as well as the greatest legal, judicial, and political 
confusion.400  On January 23, 2015—one week after the Obergefell 
cert. grant—Judge Granade of the Southern District of Alabama 
declared that state’s marriage ban unconstitutional and enjoined its 
enforcement.401  Two days later, she stayed the judgment for fourteen 
days to give the Eleventh Circuit an opportunity to determine 
whether a stay would be appropriate.402  That same day, in a parallel 
case by same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses, Judge Granade 
again declared the ban invalid, enjoined its enforcement, and stayed 
the order for fourteen days.403 
Less than two weeks later, the Eleventh Circuit denied stays in 
the consolidated cases, consistent with its approach since the October 
cert denials.404  Later that day, Judge Granade denied the Plaintiffs’ 
motion to immediately lift the stay, but ordered that “[i]f the 
Supreme Court denies a stay or does not rule before February 9, 
2015, this court’s stay will still remain in place until that date to allow 
the Probate Courts of this state to be completely prepared for 
compliance with the rulings in this case and the Strawser case.”405 
 
 399.  DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-01341 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (order granting stay), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/270993306/DeBoer-v-Snyder-14-3-25-ORder-Granting-Stay 
(White, J., dissenting). 
 400.  See Wasserman, supra note 7, at 2. 
 401.  Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1286 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015).  
Unfortunately, the case itself had inherent procedural problems—it involved a married 
couple seeking a second-parent adoption rather than couples seeking licenses, and the 
only named defendant was Attorney General Luther Strange, who had no role to play in 
either the adoption or issuance of marriage licenses.  Wasserman, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
 402.  Searcy, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 1288–89.   
 403.  Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C (S.D. Ala. Jan. 26, 2015) (order granting 
stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272322643/15-01-26-Order-Granting-Stay. 
 404.  Searcy v. Strange, No. 15-10295-C (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2015) (order denying stay), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/272322995/15-2-3-denial-stay.  
 405.  Searcy v. Strange, No. 1:14-cv-208-CG-N (S.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2015) (order denying 
motion to lift stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/272323118/15-2-3-denying-motion-lift-
stay-pdf.  
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On February 9, the Supreme Court denied the eighth and final 
application for a stay in a same-sex marriage cases.  Once again, 
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented from the denial of the stay.  
Perhaps recognizing that this would be the final opportunity to 
address the stay issue, Justice Thomas (finally) explained his 
reasoning.  His explanation captured the ebb and flow of the four 
paradigms leading to this point and offered a rare insight into the 
inner workings of the shadow docket. 
He began by citing Kitchen, explaining that the “ordinary 
practice” when a lower court enjoins state officials from enforcing 
laws declared unconstitutional is to “suspend those injunctions from 
taking effect pending appellate review.”406  Thomas insisted that it 
would be the “rare case” in which a state could not make some 
showing of likelihood of success on the merits.  Similarly, a state 
suffers irreparable injury whenever it is precluded from enforcing 
laws that had been duly enacted by the public’s representatives.  
Thus, he insisted, it was “no surprise” that the court had stayed the 
orders from the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in Kitchen, Evans, and 
Bostic. 
Further, it was “of no moment” that the Court had recently 
denied several stay applications in Latta and others, because those 
followed the October cert denials.  While disagreeing with those stay 
denials, he acknowledged that there was at least an argument that the 
October decision justified an inference that the Court would be less 
likely to grant a writ of certiorari to consider subsequent petitions.  
But that dynamic was inverted anew by the cert grant in Obergefell, 
which guaranteed a decision on the merits by the end of the Term.  
The October inference was “no longer credible.”  Thomas labeled it 
“regrettable” that the district court in the Alabama case made no 
effort to preserve the status quo pending the Supreme Court’s 
decision on a difficult and open constitutional question.407 
He then jumped to the real heart of the matter—the Court’s 
shadow docket and the way an unexplained order had effectively 
preordained the outcome: 
 
This acquiescence may well be seen as a signal of the 
Court’s intended resolution of that question.  This is 
 
 406.  Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
application for stay). 
 407.  Id. at 941 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay) (citing 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013)). 
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not the proper way to discharge our Article III 
responsibilities.  And, it is indecorous for this Court to 
pretend that it is.  Today’s decision represents “yet 
another example of this Court’s increasingly cavalier 
attitude toward the States.”408 
 
Denying the stay, Justice Thomas concluded, does not show “the 
people of Alabama the respect they deserve and preserve[] the status 
quo while the Court resolves this important constitutional 
question.”409 
In Thomas’s view, this was the most blatant example of the Court 
signaling substantive results through shadow-docket orders, 
eliminating any possible doubt that the district court injunction would 
stand.  He accused the rest of the Court of “cavalier[ly]”410 washing its 
hands of its responsibility to maintain the status quo before 
Obergefell would definitively resolve the issue only three months 
later. 
F. The Shadow Docket and High-Stakes Litigation 
The same-sex marriage cases offer an important lesson for high-
stakes civil rights litigation—the Justices, and not the inferior courts, 
decide when and how momentous constitutional issues are resolved.  
Each of the district courts that declined to grant a stay did so based 
on their own independent judgment of how the traditional four 
factors balanced.  In the quotidian case, a district court judge’s 
individual assessment of whether the plaintiffs are likely to succeed 
on the merits or whether there would be irreparable harm, would 
suffice to resolve whether a stay should be granted. 
This was not your everyday civil rights litigation, however.  From 
the initial decision to stay the judgment in Utah, the Supreme Court 
maintained total control over how the litigation would proceed 
throughout the lower courts.  In keeping with the Justices’ broader 
 
 408.  Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 409.  Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).  In his dissent in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission later that term, Justice Thomas sounded a similar 
theme, citing to the October cert denials and commenting that “Court’s lack of respect for 
ballot initiatives is evident not only in what it has done, but in what it has failed to do.”  
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2698 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Id. (“The Court ‘refused to grant a 
stay pending appeal of a decision purporting to require the State of Alabama to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, even though Alabama’s licensing laws had not been 
challenged in that case.”) (citing Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015)). 
 410.  Searcy, 135 S. Ct. at 941 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of application for 
stay). 
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sense of taking the cases when they thought the country was ready for 
nationwide same-sex marriage, the Justices also attempted to exercise 
oversight over how the lower courts managed the issues.  Between 
Utah’s judgment, and the denials of certiorari in October, district and 
circuit judges that disregarded the signals from the shadow docket 
were quickly reversed by per curiam stays, with no explanation.  
Should the judges who exercised their independent judgment—in 
conflict with signals from the Supreme Court’s shadow docket—be 
faulted?  It depends on the proper orientation of this type of 
litigation. 
On the one hand, if we start from the proposition that each 
district court has the authority to decide cases or controversies before 
it, bound only by actual circuit or Supreme Court precedent, the 
courts that declined stays acted properly.  A single-sentence order 
from the Supreme Court, without analysis or explanation, is not 
binding or even persuasive precedent.  The lower courts thus could 
not be faulted for predicting—correctly as it turned out—that the 
marriage laws were unlikely to survive on appeal and that same-sex 
couples would suffer injuries during the litigation process.  This 
perspective offers the greatest defense for judges that refused to grant 
stays. 
On the other hand, such a formalistic approach disregards the 
Supreme Court’s role as traffic cop in major constitutional cases.  
Through its shadow docket, the Supreme Court took steps to 
maintain the status quo throughout the courts of appeals, without 
granting certiorari or hearing cases on the merits. 
And this dynamic need not be limited to the marriage cases.  For 
example, religious nonprofits in nearly every circuit alleged that an 
accommodation to the Affordable Care Act contraception mandate 
violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  Even though the 
courts of appeals have uniformly upheld the accommodation and 
would have allowed the mandate against the plaintiffs to go into 
effect, the Supreme Court has repeatedly halted enforcement of the 
mandate pending appeal.411  It will be up to the Supreme Court, and 
not the lower courts, to resolve this important issue.412  Even if the 
 
 411.  Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014); 
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014); Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2924 
(2015). 
 412.  Professor Blackman filed a brief in support of certiorari in Little Sisters of the 
Poor v. Burwell.  See Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, 794 F. 3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015), cert 
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Court ultimately upholds the accommodation, the status quo will be 
maintained until the Justices decide otherwise. 
The stays in Kitchen, Evans, and Bostic were not routine orders, 
but quick and unanimous repudiations of courts that immediately 
altered the status quo before the Court had formally evaluated the 
issue.  Only after the Court considered and denied the petitions for 
certiorari could the stays be lifted.  The Long Conference when the 
voted to deny the petitions constituted the first official opportunity 
for the Justices to share their views.  After that point, by rejecting the 
petitions, the Justices had then effectively stamped their imprimatur 
on marriage equality—seeing no need to reverse the lower courts—
and allowed the district judges to let their judgments go into effect. 
With the same-sex marriage cases, the Supreme Court 
aggrandized for itself the role as the arbiter of the status quo in high-
stakes civil rights litigation, albeit silently.  District judges—even 
those who blanch at this repudiation of their independent 
judgments—are now on notice that injunctions should be put on hold 
after the Supreme Court has taken an interest in an issue.413  In future 
high-stakes constitutional litigation, judges and parties must 
understand this and work in accordance with this background 
principle. 
III. State Litigation and Federal-State Conflicts 
With the tide in lower federal courts moving ineluctably and 
irreversibly towards recognition of a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage, officials in several states sought to at least slow, if not stem, 
the tide through state court litigation.  Three states initiated state 
mandamus actions in an effort to forestall same-sex marriages by 
preventing county-level officials from voluntarily complying with 
persuasive federal precedent.414  This created a potential new 
procedural hurdle, as attorneys general then attempted to use the 
state litigation they had initiated to keep federal courts from hearing 
and ruling on the constitutional question.  Federal courts uniformly—
and appropriately—rejected these arguments.  But their decisions 
 
granted in part, 2015 WL 6759642 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2015) (No. 15-105), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/15-105-tsac-Cato-Institute.pdf. 
 413.  In a related context, the Supreme Court has shown a propensity for granting 
certiorari a second time on cases that already have drawn its interest.  In recent years, the 
Court has twice granted certiorari in Bond v. United States, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, Horne v. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Fisher v. University of Texas.  See Richard Re, 
SCOTUS Repeaters, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 16, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2015/01/scotus-repeaters.html.  
 414.  Supra notes 304–05 and accompanying text. 
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illustrate another round of issues that may arise in future civil rights 
litigation. 
A. State Mandamus Proceedings 
We previously discussed conflicts in Kansas and South Carolina, 
where county-level officials indicated their intent to voluntarily 
comply with binding circuit precedent addressing identical laws in 
other states.  Officials in both states, recognized the inevitability of a 
federal lawsuit and adverse judgment that would invalidate their state 
bans, enjoining their enforcement, and imposing attorney’s fees.415  In 
response, attorneys general in both states initiated actions in the state 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, seeking a writ of mandamus to 
stop local officials from this voluntary compliance.416  Neither state 
court reached the merits of the constitutional issue, but both 
temporarily stayed local officials from issuing licenses, at least until 
resolution of then-pending challenges to the state laws in federal 
district court.417  In both cases, the local officials named as 
respondents on the mandamus petition took no position on the merits 
and simply simply asked the state Supreme Court to provide guidance 
on how they should proceed.418 
A similar tactic might have been appropriate in Wisconsin, where 
clerks statewide began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
following the district court declaration’s of the ban’s 
unconstitutionality but before entry of any injunction.419  The district 
court insisted, correctly, that these clerks were not acting under 
compulsion of a court order and thus were not subject to the court’s 
control.420  A mandamus action by the attorney general in the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, ordering clerks to cease granting licenses 
until a binding federal order issued, would have been an appropriate 
move to stop this voluntary compliance. 
Reflecting a common theme,421 things got far more complicated 
and confrontational in Alabama, the third state in which an original 
 
 415.  Supra notes 102, 105 and accompanying text. 
 416.  State ex rel. Schmidt v. Moriarty, No. 112, 590 (Kan. Oct. 10, 2014); State ex rel. 
Wilson v. Condon, 764 S.E. 2d 247 (S.C. 2014).  
 417.  Schmidt, No. 112, 590; Wilson, 764 S.E. 2d at 247.  
 418.  Id.   
 419.  See supra notes 292–309 and accompanying text. 
 420.  Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-cv-64-bbc (7th Cir. June 9, 2014) (order denying 
emergency motion for stay), https://www.scribd.com/doc/271058059/Wolf-v-Walker-14-06-
09-Order-Denying-Emerngency-Motion-for-Stay. 
 421.  Wasserman, supra note 7, at 10. 
326 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 43:2 
jurisdiction mandamus petition pulled the state Supreme Court into 
the mix.  Judge Granade invalidated the state ban and ordered one 
state probate judge to issue licenses to four named couples.422  Two 
private parties, acting as relators of the State, then initiated the 
mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Alabama.423  This action 
was potentially broader than the ones in Kansas and South Carolina, 
as it sought to prohibit all probate judges in the state from issuing 
licenses to any same-sex couples, in the wake of numerous judges 
voluntarily complying with Judge Granade’s decision. 
Most importantly, unlike in Kansas and South Carolina, the 
Supreme Court of Alabama reached the merits of the constitutional 
question.  In a 134-page per curiam opinion, six justices—the 
controversial Chief Justice Moore recused—held that Alabama’s 
same-sex marriage ban was constitutionally valid and must be 
enforced.  The court rejected concerns about the organizations’ 
standing as relators, questions about the court’s own jurisdiction, 
contrary decisions from the Southern District of Alabama and 
numerous other lower federal courts, and repeated signals from the 
Supreme Court of the United States.424  The result of this judgment 
was statewide uniformity going forward—no same-sex couples could 
obtain marriage licenses, except for those four couples already 
entitled to licenses from one probate judge under Judge Granade’s 
injunction.  Importantly, the court did not invalidate the marriages of 
those four couples or any other couple voluntarily issued a license by 
other judges in the state. 
As a starting point, there is nothing inherently problematic with 
a decision by a state court contradicting, or simply declining to defer 
to, a decision by a lower federal court.  Interpretations of federal law 
by lower federal courts do not bind state courts, except to the extent 
state courts choose to be bound as a matter of state law.425  State 
courts are presumed to have concurrent jurisdiction over federal law 
 
 422.  See supra notes 55–57, 400–02 and accompanying text. 
 423.  Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at *43 (Ala. 
Mar. 3, 2015).  Because Attorney General Strange was enjoined from enforcing the same-
sex marriage ban, Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8439, at 
*4 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 26, 2015), he did not, and arguably could not, litigate the mandamus 
petition. 
 424.  Ala. Policy Inst., 2015 WL 892752, at *25, *43; see also Wasserman, supra note 7, 
at 11–12. 
 425.  Frost, supra note 28, at 55; Logan, supra note 28, at 236–37. 
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issues and function as inferior federal tribunals.426  They are vested 
with the same interpretive leeway on the meaning of federal law as 
any lower federal court, bound only by Supreme Court precedent and 
subject only to Supreme Court review.427  The Supreme Court of 
Alabama could diverge from a federal district court on a 
constitutional question, just as two federal district courts (even within 
the same state or the same district) can diverge. 
State courts were entirely within their unquestioned power and 
discretion in not treating the Fourteenth Amendment issue as 
conclusively resolved and in reaching a different constitutional 
conclusion than did the federal district court.  One might disagree 
with the merits of that decision.428  But disagreement with a state court 
decision on a question of federal law does not render that decision 
illegitimate any more than disagreement with the federal judge 
renders her decisions illegitimate.  Nor do divergent results mean that 
the state court has rebelled against the federal court, since they stand 
on equal footing. 
B. Abstention 
The state mandamus actions raised the separate question of 
whether potential federal-state conflicts presented by permissible 
parallel state court litigation should have limited new or pending 
federal constitutional litigation.  While the state courts were 
rendering their decisions, there were lawsuits pending in the District 
of South Carolina429 and the District of Kansas,430 as well as motions to 
certify the Southern District of Alabama case as a class action and to 
extend the existing injunction.431  Officials in all three states argued 
that the federal courts were required to abstain, on a number of 
different bases, in deference to these state judicial and political 
processes. 
 
 426.  Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.130, 136 (1876).  Josh Blackman, State Jurisdictional 
Sovereignty, 2016 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2466845. 
 427.  James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the 
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 234 (2007).  
 428.  See generally Adam Lamparello, Why Chief Justice Roy Moore and the Alabama 
Supreme Court Just Made the Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
(ONLINE) 1 (2015). 
 429.  Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014). 
 430.  Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175 (D. Kan. 2014). 
 431.  Strawser v. Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449468, at *1, *6 (S.D. Ala. 
May 21, 2015); see supra Part I.D. 
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1. Pullman Abstention 
Federal courts abstain under Pullman432 when the challenged 
state law is ambiguous, difficult, uncertain, or unclear; by abstaining, 
federal courts afford state courts an opportunity to interpret the state 
law and perhaps to eliminate the federal constitutional defect, 
thereby obviating the federal constitutional question.433  Importantly, 
however, abstention is appropriate only when the challenged law is 
ambiguous and reasonably capable of a construction that would 
“render unnecessary or substantially modify” the federal 
constitutional question.434  Moreover, the uncertain or difficult 
question must go to the challenged law itself, not the validity of that 
law under the federal or state constitutions.  And Pullman is not an 
exhaustion requirement—state courts need not be given a first 
opportunity at determining the law’s validity, including under parallel 
state Equal Protection or Due Process provisions.435 
The District of Kansas recognized that Pullman was inapplicable, 
as there was no ambiguity or lack of clarity in Kansas’s marriage laws.  
The laws “unequivocally prohibit plaintiffs and other same-sex 
couples from procuring a marriage license and marrying a person of 
the same sex in Kansas,” and had been applied consistent with that 
plain meaning.  There was no way a state court could interpret the 
laws to avoid the constitutional concerns.436 
The Kansas decision contrasts with the Ninth Circuit’s 
inappropriate use of Pullman in a pre-Windsor same-sex marriage 
case.  The difference in their approaches demonstrates how quickly 
understandings of marriage equality, and its constitutional status, 
evolved.  In 2006, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court properly 
abstained under Pullman from a challenge to the state’s then-existing 
statutory ban on same-sex marriage in deference to ongoing litigation 
challenging that ban under the state constitution.  Abstention was 
proper because that state litigation could have resolved the 
constitutionality of the same-sex marriage ban and the court of 
 
 432.  Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
 433.  Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997); Pullman, 312 U.S. 
at 51; see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
 434.  City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 
U.S. 433, 438–39 (1971). 
 435.  Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437–39. 
 436.  Marie, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 1195. 
BLACKMAN&WASSERMAN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2015  4:34 PM 
Winter 2016] THE PROCESS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 329 
appeals could not predict its outcome.437  The court never considered 
the complete absence of ambiguity in the underlying marriage ban 
being challenged.  Nor did the court recognize its misstep in treating 
Pullman as an exhaustion requirement, an obligation to allow state 
courts to offer a first answer to the constitutional question. 
While legally erroneous, the Ninth Circuit’s decision may be a 
product of its time.  In 2004, voters in eleven states approved 
measures to amend state law or the state constitution to preclude 
same-sex marriage.438  It was inconceivable that, less than two years 
later, a federal court would declare that such bans violate the 
Constitution.  Abstention doctrines often are criticized as too-readily 
manipulable, offering federal courts a way to avoid confronting 
important constitutional questions.439 Smelt reflects that tendency, at a 
time when reaching a decision on the merits only could have 
produced a constitutional decision adverse to the plaintiffs.  Of 
course, this erroneous decision arguably proved beneficial to the 
marriage equality movement, as the district court in Perry (five years 
later, but a world away socially) did not have adverse binding 
precedent to overcome. 
2. Younger Abstention 
Younger440 abstention prohibits federal courts from interfering 
with an ongoing state proceeding, specifically through the issuance of 
an injunction or declaratory judgment that would result in a stay of 
the state proceedings.441  Younger rests on “Our Federalism,” under 
which state institutions must be given an opportunity to decide 
federal constitutional questions in the course of their own 
 
 437.  See Smelt v. Cty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 678–82 (9th Cir. 2006).  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court of California held that the marriage ban violated the equal protection and 
due process provisions of the state constitution.  See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 
(2008).  California voters overruled that decision several months later, overwhelmingly 
approving Proposition 8, which amended the State Constitution to provide that: “Only 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in this state.”  Proposition 8 
was declared invalid by a federal district court in Perry in 2011, starting the two-year sprint 
to nationwide marriage equality. 
 438.  Daniel A. Smith, Matthew DeSantis & Jason Kassell, Same-Sex Marriage Ballot 
Measures and the 2004 Presidential Election, 38 STATE & LOCAL GOVT. REV. 78 (2006). 
 439.  MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATIONS 
OF POWER (1990); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109–10, 
1117 (1977). 
 440.  Younger v. Harris, 403 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 441.  Samuels v. Mackell, 403 U.S. 66, 71–72 (1971); Younger, 403 U.S. at 49. 
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proceedings.442  The Supreme Court recently insisted that Younger 
only applies to three categories of state proceedings—criminal 
prosecutions; civil, “quasi-criminal” enforcement proceedings; and 
civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of 
state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.443  In addition, 
the state proceeding must be one in which the federal plaintiff would 
have an adequate opportunity to litigate the federal constitutional 
issues.444  Finally, Younger prohibits federal courts from halting 
ongoing state proceedings; it does not apply to parallel state-federal 
litigation that happens to deal with similar issues.445 
As applied to the same-sex marriage cases, Younger arguments 
failed for several reasons.  First, because the federal plaintiffs were 
not parties to the state mandamus proceedings, they did not have an 
adequate opportunity to litigate their federal claims in those 
proceedings.446  Second, mandamus actions did not fit in any of the 
three categories of state proceedings warranting Younger abstention.  
These federal actions did not challenge laws affecting state courts’ 
power to enforce judgments, such as contempt statutes or appellate 
bond requirements.  Rather, they challenged the way state officials 
performed the executive function of issuing marriage licenses in light 
of state laws banning same-sex marriage.447 
Third, the federal action did not seek an injunction that would 
halt or otherwise interfere with the state mandamus proceedings.  A 
federal injunction requiring defendant officials to issue marriage 
license to same-sex couples might impose obligations on those 
officials that conflicted with the state mandamus obligations.  But 
Younger is not concerned with simple parallel litigation or conflicting 
obligations derived from competing litigation.  There are other ways 
to deal with those potential conflicts without the federal court staying 
its hand entirely.  For example, the Alabama mandamus decision 
allowed officials subject to an ongoing federal injunction an 
opportunity to be excused from the mandamus.448 
 
 442.  Younger, 403 U.S. at 44–45. 
 443.  Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013). 
 444.  Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 432 
(1982). 
 445.  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593. 
 446.  Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1197 (D. Kan. 2014). 
 447.  Id.; Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 581 (D.S.C. 2014). 
 448.  See, e.g., Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at 
*42 (Ala. Mar. 3, 2015); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 12–13. 
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3. Rooker-Feldman and its Misuse 
Rooker-Feldman449 derives from an interpretation of the 
respective statutory grants of federal jurisdiction to the Supreme 
Court and the federal district courts.  The latter can only exercise 
original jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims, while review of 
final state court judgments on federal questions is vested exclusively 
in the former.450  In practice, Rooker-Feldman prevents a “state-court 
loser” from bringing an action in federal court claiming a 
constitutional injury caused by a state judgment or order that was 
entered prior to initiation of the federal action.451  Such a federal 
lawsuit improperly invites district courts to review and reject a state 
judgment.  But Rooker-Feldman plays no role where the federal 
action challenges conduct independent of a state court order.  
Moreover, as the Supreme Court recently clarified, the doctrine is not 
triggered by parallel litigation or the potential preclusive effects of 
parallel federal-state litigation.452 
Federal courts easily swept aside this argument as to the state 
mandamus proceedings.  Most obviously, the federal plaintiffs were 
not parties to the mandamus action, so they could not qualify as 
“state-court losers.”453  Nor did the federal plaintiffs challenge the 
state court judgments imposing the mandamus.  Rather, they 
challenged the state prohibition on same-sex marriage and the refusal 
of state officials—not the state courts—to perform the executive 
function of issuing marriage licenses.454  That a federal action may 
overlap or conflict with the state proceeding did not strip the federal 
court of jurisdiction.455 
Interestingly, the failure of parties and the court to recognize 
genuine Rooker-Feldman issues contributed to some of the confusion 
in Alabama in the months prior to Obergefell.  That failure produced 
an arguably premature and ineffectual federal decision that had no 
 
 449.  See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker 
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
 450.  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005); 
compare 28 U.S.C. § 1257 with 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 451.  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 
 452.  Id. at 292. 
 453.  Marie v. Moser, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1190–1200 (D. Kan. 2014); Strawser v. 
Strange, No. 14-0424-CG-C, 2015 WL 2449468, at *1, *6 (S.D. Ala. May 21, 2015). 
 454.  Marie, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 1200. 
 455.  Id. 
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meaningful legal effect and did not fit with broader efforts of couples 
to obtain marriage licenses. 
The first case in which Judge Granade of the Southern District of 
Alabama declared the state marriage ban unconstitutional was Searcy 
v. Strange.  The plaintiffs in Searcy were a couple, Cari Searcy and 
Kimberly McKeand; they were lawfully married in California, and 
wanted Searcy to second-parent adopt McKeand’s biological son.  
Under Alabama law, a stepparent may adopt the child of a 
“spouse.”456  But because state law prohibited same-sex marriages or 
the recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages, Searcy and 
McKeand could not qualify as spouses and Searcy was ineligible to 
adopt McKeand’s biological child.457  The state trial court denied the 
petition, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and the 
plaintiffs did not seek further review, rendering the state court 
judgment final.458 
Searcy and McKeand then sued in federal court, seeking to 
enjoin enforcement of the state marriage bans.  The couple insisted 
that “they ‘have exhausted all avenues of legal recourse in Alabama 
state courts and [are] left without the remedy they seek—the 
adoption.’”459  Alabama Probate Judge Don Davis, who had denied 
the adoption petition, was initially named as defendant, but the 
parties voluntarily dismissed the claims against him (rather than 
contest his motion to dismiss).  The case proceeded only against 
Attorney General Luther Strange.  And although Strange played no 
role in the adoption action, in late January 2015, the district court 
nevertheless enjoined him from enforcing the marriage ban as to 
these plaintiffs.460 
Rooker-Feldman should have stripped the district court of 
jurisdiction over this action.  Searcy and McKeand were state court 
losers.  They sought the adoption in state court and were denied by 
the state courts in clear judicial acts by Judge Davis and the Court of 
Civil Appeals.461  And their complaint in federal district court 
 
 456.  ALA. CODE § 26-10A-27.   
 457.  In re Adoption of K.R.S., 109 So. 3d 176 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). 
 458.  Id. 
 459.  Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2014 WL 4322396, *2 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 
2014). 
 460.  Searcy v. Strange, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1285 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2015).   
 461.  Judge Davis moved to dismiss the action against him by insisting that he enjoyed 
judicial immunity from suit for the judicial act of denying the adoption; the plaintiffs 
voluntarily dismissed him from the action, so the court never acted on the motion.  His 
judicial immunity argument was wrong as a matter of law, since judicial immunity does not 
apply to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief, although the plaintiffs must seek 
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expressly sought a judgment rejecting the state courts’ conclusion, 
declaring that Searcy was legally entitled to adopt McKeand’s child, 
and ordering the state court to approve that adoption.  Although the 
plaintiffs framed their federal action as a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the same-sex marriage ban, the cause of their 
constitutional injury was the denial of the adoption by the state 
courts, based on the conclusion (commanded by the state marriage 
ban) that Searcy was not McKeand’s spouse.  Having exhausted their 
state court options, the couple’s next move should have been to seek 
review of the final judgment in the Supreme Court of the United 
States.462  Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, that option was foreclosed 
because they never raised their federal constitutional challenge to the 
marriage ban in the state adoption proceeding.463  But failure to raise 
necessary issues in state court and to preserve them for Supreme 
Court review does not expand the jurisdiction of a federal district 
court to review or overrule a state court judgment. 
The result in Searcy was a legally ineffectual injunction that, 
while not creating actual mischief, certainly created confusion.  The 
injunction prohibited Attorney General Strange from enforcing the 
state marriage ban, but did not provide Searcy and McKeand with 
any relief because Strange played no role in granting adoption 
petitions or in controlling how probate judges decide adoption 
petitions.  The injunction did not—and could not—require the state 
courts to grant the adoption petition.  Nor did the injunction 
guarantee same-sex couples marriage licenses, since the plaintiffs 
were not seeking a marriage license.  This confusion reached its nadir 
in early February when the stay of the Searcy injunction was lifted 
and the plaintiffs sought to hold Judge Davis in contempt for failing 
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  Judge Granade 
properly denied the motion, recognizing that Davis was not a party to 
the action and thus not bound by the injunction or obligated to do 
anything under it.464  Had the parties and Judge Granade recognized 
 
declaratory relief first and only may obtain an injunction if declaratory relief fails to 
provide a remedy. 
 462.  28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). 
 463.  In re Adoption of K.R.S, 109 So. 3d at 178.   
 464.  Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL 519725, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 
2015); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 6.  Simultaneously, in an action brought by same-sex 
couples seeking marriage licenses, Judge Granade granted plaintiffs leave to amend their 
complaint to add Judge Davis as a defendant, then extended her earlier injunction, 
requiring Judge Davis to refrain from enforcing the state marriage ban and to issue 
licenses to the plaintiff couples.  Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1207–09, 1210 
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the Rooker-Feldman concerns in the first instance, the case never 
would have reached this point. 
Several days after Judge Granade expanded the Strawser 
injunction to prohibit Judge Davis from enforcing the marriage ban,465 
Judge Davis issued an interlocutory order in the Searcy-McKeand 
adoption petition.  He granted Searcy temporary parental rights, but 
ordered that the “[d]ecree is qualified in nature, and the Court will 
not issue a final adoption order until a final ruling is issued in the 
United States Supreme Court on the Marriage Act cases before it.”466  
Searcy in turn filed a new lawsuit against Davis in the Southern 
District of Alabama (again assigned to Judge Granade), seeking an 
injunction ordering Davis to grant the adoption without further delay 
and to strike the interlocutory order, as well as damages.467 
The Rooker-Feldman problem with this lawsuit was even more 
glaring than the first.  Once again, Searcy had sought a remedy—the 
final adoption—in state court and was denied, making her a state 
court loser.  She then went to federal district court seeking to enjoin 
the state judges to grant that very remedy, as well as damages caused 
by the denial of the adoption in state court.  A federal judge only 
could grant those remedies by concluding that the state judge erred in 
not granting the adoption,468 precisely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits 
federal district courts from doing. 
The several lawsuits involving the Searcy-McKeand adoption 
arguably reflected the worst misunderstandings of federal jurisdiction 
and procedure, in a legal controversy full of them.  This is not to 
suggest that Alabama’s ban on same-sex marriage did not deprive 
these women of their constitutional rights, only that they picked the 
wrong process through which to vindicate those rights.469 
 
(S.D. Ala. 2015); Wasserman, supra note 7, at 6–7.  That injunction then began driving the 
issuance of licenses in the state.  Id. 
 465.  Strawser, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 1207–09. 
 466.  Brendan Kirby, Mobile probate judge won’t approve adoption in gay marriage 
case; plaintiffs file new suit, AL.COM (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.al.com/news/mobile 
/index.ssf/2015/02/mobile_probate_judge_wont_appr.html. 
 467.  Howard Wasserman, Another twist in the march to marriage equality, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 24, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/02/ano 
ther-twist-in-the-march-to-marriage-equality.html.  
 468.  The lawsuit suffered from two additional problems.  Unlike in the first action, 
Judge Davis would have been entitled to judicial immunity from the claims for damages.  
And the claims for injunctive relief would have failed for lack of an initial declaratory 
judgment.  See Wasserman, supra note 7. 
 469.  Two weeks after Obergefell, Alabama courts began granting adoptions to same-
sex couples.  See Lee Roop, Alabama courts end legal limbo, begin approving same-sex 
couple adoptions, AL.COM (July 17, 2015, 6:30 AM), http://www.al.com/news/huntsville 
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And the lasting lesson of the marriage equality litigation 
demonstrates that process matters in constitutional litigation. 
 
 
/index.ssf/2015/07/alabama_courts_end_legal_limbo.html.  A July 24, 2015 hearing date 
was set for the Searcy-McKeand adoption. 
